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Abstract 
Witty Fools and Foolish Wits: Performing Cognitive Disability in English Literature, 
c. 1380–c. 1602 argues that the figure of the premodern literary fool serves as an avatar 
for cultural concerns about the frailty of cognitive ability. The performances of even the 
wittiest fools are best contextualized within the full range of the premodern literary 
tradition, which often depicts fools as morally suspect representatives of cognitive 
alterity and agents of social disruption. Fools’ performances of songs and verbal wit 
position them as figures who are both cognitively disabled and hyper-abled—that is, 
extraordinarily gifted. Literary texts regularly portray fools as figures who are either 
cognitively disabled by their own moral fault or counterfeiters of hyper-ability.  
Chapter 1 examines the pseudo-Chaucerian Tale of Beryn’s two theoretical 
models of cognitive disability. The early-fifteenth-century poem’s employment of the 
medieval topos of the “five wits,” or five senses, proffers a theory of fully embodied 
cognition. The poem also adduces a pervasive, societal model of cognitive disability—
rather than a model aimed at pointing out the cognitive difference of the individual 
from a societal norm. Chapter 2 shows how the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century 
romance Robert of Cisyle frames a king’s folly as a form of cognitive disability that 
imperils the institution of the monarchy itself. Chapter 3 examines the morality play The 
Longer Thou Livest the More Fool Thou Art (1569), demonstrating how the fool’s singing of 
solfège and nonsense syllables registers as “bable”—that is, “bauble”/“babble”—and 
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arguing that the play identifies such foolish “bable” as the cause of cognitive, linguistic, 
and educational failure. Chapter 4 argues that in Twelfth Night (c. 1602), Feste’s 
performance of songs and wordplay register as non-rational counterpoints to the forms 
of rational discourse valorized by handbooks on early modern masculinity and 
aesthetic creation. 
In the texts I examine, audiences attempt to read fooling as either the cause of 
fools’ own cognitive disability or the evidence of fools’ counterfeiting of hyper-ability. 
Premodern attempts to insist on these categories reveal deep social concerns about the 
impossibility of managing—or mending—cognitive difference. Yet fools themselves 
challenge such simplistic categories: their performances of fooling gesture toward a 





I had rather be any kind of thing than a fool; and yet I would not be thee, 
nuncle. Thou hast pared thy wit o’ both sides and left nothing in the 
middle. 
—Lear’s Fool (to Lear), King Lear, 1.4.164–61 
 
I saw him put down the other day with an ordinary fool that has no more 
brain than a stone. 
—Malvolio (on Feste), Twelfth Night, 1.5.72–73 
 
Fools are witty, provocative, gifted in wordplay. Uniquely positioned to tell the 
truths that no one else around them dare speak, fools speak truth to power. —This is 
the predominant scholarly view of the performing fool in medieval and early modern 
English literature.2 This view is buttressed by English literary scholarship’s long 
tradition of reading Shakespeare’s fools as the exemplars of English literary fooling: 
Malvolio’s insult, for instance, clearly implies that Feste is performing as the kind of 
witty fool who ought to be able to “put down” an “ordinary fool,” rather than the 
reverse. Scholars have generally adopted the same view of fooling that Malvolio 
displays: that is, a view of witty fooling’s superior contradistinction to ordinary, or less 
able, fooling. 
This predominant view relies on such displays of wit as the one by Lear’s Fool, 
quoted in the epigraph above. Lear’s Fool both disparages his own role as fool and 
boldly tells his king that he, Lear, is even worse off: “Thou has pared thy wit o’ both 
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sides and left nothing in the middle.”3 The skewering effect of the fool’s second-person 
address to his monarch is indeed typical of many premodern literary fools’ speech. 
These iconic, Shakespearean representations of fools themselves reveal a hidden—but 
crucial—conceptual scaffolding beneath the view of the fool as an exceptionally witty 
spokesman of the truth.4 When Malvolio insinuates that Feste is not actually as witty as 
he should be by comparing Feste unfavorably with a “fool that has no more brain than a 
stone,” he disparages both fools’ cognitive abilities. Although Malvolio’s words are 
clearly hyperbolical, they participate in a larger literary tradition that portrays both 
fools and their performances as disabled. It is this literary backdrop against which fools’ 
performances of wordplay and song register as manifestations of cognitive difference.5 
Literary fools serve not to reify cognitive difference but to relativize audiences’ 
awareness of what cognition, in all its variability, might entail. 
The more traditional, predominant reading of the premodern English literary 
fool depends heavily on reading backward through Shakespeare and, in particular, 
focusing selectively on the seemingly hyper-witty fools of Shakespeare’s later plays.6 
This project looks at the vast body of premodern anti-fool literature—that is, literature 
that represents and condemns fools—and discovers the anti-fool echoes of that literature 
even in apparent celebrations of witty fools. While the scholarly tendency to use a 
Shakespearean lens is understandable, it need not be the only lens through which we 
look at English literary fooling.7 In focusing on late medieval and early modern fool 
literature, this project enables a recovery of the full complexity of both Shakespearean 
and pre-Shakespearean literary representations of fools and their cognition. 
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Witty Fools and Foolish Wits argues that the figure of the fool serves both as a 
category of social identity and as an avatar for cultural concerns about the frailty of 
cognitive ability. It demonstrates that fools’ performances of songs and verbal wit 
position fools as agents of social disruption who are both cognitively disabled and 
hyper-abled—that is, extraordinarily gifted. Literary fools exhibit cognitive alterity: 
some display less ability than other literary characters, whereas others display excess 
ability. For example, some fools are noted for their malapropisms and lack of judgment, 
while others are praised for their verbal wordplay, songs, wit, and insight. Premodern 
literary culture subsumes both kinds of fools under the conceptual umbrella of 
cognitive alterity. Furthermore, these categories themselves are often muddled: many 
fools are said to have both enhanced and impaired abilities. Several of the texts I 
examine in this project advance a notion of literature itself as performed hyper-ability. 
Even when those texts fail the standards they set themselves—for example, the Tale of 
Beryn aspires to more literary hyper-ability than it achieves—these texts show fools 
performing, and failing to perform, the forms of hyper-able wit to which premodern 
English literature itself often aspires. 
This project situates four texts—two from the long fifteenth century and two 
from the long sixteenth century—within their literary, historical, and social 
contexts.This kind of contextual analysis uncovers how such texts represent fools and 
their varying cognitive abilities. The performances of even the wittiest fools are best 
contextualized within the full range of the premodern literary tradition, which often 
represents fools as both cognitively disabled and morally suspect. Whereas modern-day 
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discussions of disability are likely to touch on medical discourses—even if they are 
critical of such discourses—medieval and early modern literary representations of 
disability typically intertwine the cognitive with the moral demesnes. For the purposes 
of this study, I am examining literary evidence on fools and their folly. In medieval and 
early modern England, literary fools are always read by their contemporary audiences 
in the tradition of the cognitively and morally disabled fool.  
The precise definition and uses of the term “disability” are debated within the 
field of disability studies. Disability studies has long endeavored to push back against 
what is often called either “medicalization” or the “medical model” of disability—that 
is, the conceptualization of bodily differences from medical norms as problems to be 
diagnosed, treated, and corrected.8 As part of this endeavor, scholars of disability 
studies have advanced various constructionist models that seek to define and discuss 
disability in a more comprehensive manner. A prominent constructionist model, the 
“social model,” suggests that “impairment” is the physical fact of bodily variation, 
whereas “disability” is the phenomenon that occurs when people’s impairments affect 
their roles and functioning in their particular societies.9 This model has the advantage of 
proffering a vocabulary that allows scholars and students of disability studies to 
identify and critique societies’ roles in the conditions that surround bodily variation. A 
salient disadvantage of this model for my project is that the vocabulary of 
“impairment” fails to acknowledge either the fact of hyper-ability or the experience of 
“twice-exceptional” individuals—that is, people whose traits and experiences fall on 
divergent points of a spectrum of relative ability. The social model has elsewhere been 
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critiqued by proponents of the “cultural model,” resists over-emphasis on the social 
construction of disability in favor of showing the mutually influencing relationship 
between bodily experience and environment.10 Debates over such models in disability 
studies evince a tension that will be familiar to scholars of, for instance, transgender 
studies; both fields require constant careful negotiation between discourses of 
embodiment and discourses of social construction. My project on fools’ cognitive 
differences is likewise located at the tension between these discourses. 
This tension must be elucidated carefully in a project like this one, which is not 
about the scientific realities or historical experiences of fools’ cognition, but about how 
premodern literature represents them as cognitively various. In other words, my project 
acknowledges that the only point of access to literary fools’ cognition is the premodern 
social construction of that embodied cognition. This study’s discussion of fools’ 
performances, then, suggest not that fools’ disability and hyper-ability are performed in 
some scientific-historical sense, but that fools’ disability and hyper-ability are represented 
as performances by the preponderance of premodern English fool literature. Each of this 
dissertation’s chapters indicates in its own way what this premodern English belief in 
cognitive disability-as-performance meant for the interpretation of fools’ songs and 
wordplay, as well as their broader social role. For my purposes, disability studies offers 
the conceptual tools for identifying how people have thought about bodily and 
cognitive difference. If twentieth-century studies of fools have often taken the fool as a 
stable historical category, the tools proffered by disability studies can provide the 
language needed to talk about where premodern notions of fooling are less stable—or 
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even differently stable—than many recent scholars have assumed. The theoretical 
framework of disability studies also makes it possible to ask: What models of cognitive 
variation matter across the premodern period? What premodern models, if any, still 
survive today? How do fools fit into premodern ideas of cognitive difference? How do 
fools challenge those ideas?  
In the last half-century, the pervasive scholarly reputation of fools as witty 
entertainers has obscured the significance of anti-fool elements in premodern English 
literature. My work shows that instances of witty fooling serve not merely as 
celebrations of fools’ antics but also as explorations of fools’ social marginalization. 
While celebrations of holy fools from Erasmus’ In Praise of Folly, medieval miracle 
stories, and Pauline writings in the New Testament are familiar to many scholars, my 
work sheds light on the anti-fool sentiments that pervade medieval and early modern 
literary texts. Such anti-fool texts—whose critiques of fools are additive, variable, yet 
consistently sharp—suggest that fools, lacking true cognitive and performative ability, 
feign their skills in jesting and singing merely to make quick money. Premodern fool 
literature, as this project shows, represents some fools as disabled, some as hyper-abled.  
In such premodern literary representations, when hyper-ability is present, it is always 
either simulated or thought to be simulated.11 Even disabled fools are often accused of 
being in sufficient control of their folly to bear moral responsibility for not leaving that 
folly behind.12 My project shows that this anti-fool tradition, which relies upon and 
reinforces fools’ social marginality, suffuses even the seemingly pro-fool literature of 
medieval and early modern England. 
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The literary tradition that critiques fools’ alleged feigning evinces a tension 
between the premodern acknowledgment that some people actually have cognitive 
disabilities that are beyond their power to control, and the premodern insistence on 
cognitive disability as a moral problem that ought to be ameliorated. Chapter 3, for 
example, considers Erasmus’ suggestion that congenital fools are particularly blessed 
because, he says, they are exempted from the soteriological system that occupies the 
rest of humanity and do not have to worry about their salvation. The same chapter 
looks at a moment in tension with Erasmus’ model: in The Longer Thou Livest the More 
Fool Thou Art, the fool Moros is seen as congenitally foolish—perhaps even predestined 
to be foolish—yet he is simultaneously criticized for failing to improve himself and 
thereby escape his condition of folly. Chapter 1, in contrast, shows how Geffrey is 
lauded for feigning a hyper-able folly: this feigned hyper-ability allows him to rescue 
the tale’s eponymous delinquent from both his legal troubles and his moral and 
educational turpitude. 
In these portrayals of folly, feigning and hyper-ability are coterminous but not 
logically related. When a fool demonstrates hyper-ability of wit, the accusation that he 
is feigning that hyper-ability always ensues. This illogical link shows how premodern 
English fool literature treats the specific kind of cognitive alterity that folly represents: 
the folly represented as cognitively deficient and the folly represented as cognitively 
extraordinary may represent two opposed poles, but only the latter—wittiness or 
hyper-ability—is always called into question. This literary proclivity shows that, while 
folly is thought to be performed, the forms of folly that are said to be performed best are 
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also regularly called into question; folly-qua-disability itself is thought to have a norm—
that is, lack of ability—and deviations from that norm are met with suspicion. Fools’ 
wittiest language is taken to be an insouciant manifestation of the deeper danger of 
cognitive difference covered by a feigned performance. 
In premodern English literature, fools are often depicted as comedic characters 
who make their living by performing jokes and sometimes songs for a monarch or 
another member of the nobility. The denotative and connotative functions of the terms 
“fool” and “folly” are broad in premodern English literature.13 Some texts use the term 
“fool” to refer almost exclusively to characters who perform feats of verbal wit for an 
audience—that is, vocational fools—whereas others use the term as an umbrella to 
cover various cognitive, moral, and other qualities. Still more uses of “fool,” such as 
“fool” as a term of endearment, are sometimes related to performances of fooling but 
are not included in the present study. (The terms “clown” and “jester” are roughly 
synonymous with “fool”; although “clown” is slightly more likely to be used for a 
comedic bumpkin and “jester” typically refers to a character whose vocation is to 
perform before a court, these distinctions are not at all consistent in premodern 
literature. This project uses “fool” as an umbrella for all of these overlapping terms.)14 
In writing about Shakespeare’s fools, scholars have frequently invoked such 
works as Erasmus’ The Praise of Folly and suggested that it is appropriate to read 
Shakespeare’s fools as the “wise fool” of Erasmus’ text.15 The gesture to Erasmus has 
become so reflexive a move that it is regularly made in introductions of Shakespearean 
editions geared toward undergraduates.16 Whereas the Shakespearean and Erasmian 
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readings of English literary fools yield a relatively neat characterological category, 
premodern literature itself proffers a messier picture: the category of the fool is a 
category with a centrifugal impulse.  
As premodern visual representations of fools show, there is no consistent set of 
attributes that is common to all premodern fools (Figures 1–3). Literary portrayals of 
fools function much like Wittgenstein’s notion of “family resemblance”—that is, 
portrayals of fools often share some features, but no feature or set of features is common 
to all. For example, in premodern visual depictions, some fools have tassels or bells on 
their coats, some fools are naked altogether, some wear motley or simply differently-
colored hose, some have caps, some have shaved heads, and some carry “baubles” that 
may be either inflated bladders or intricately fashioned faces. Premodern fool literature 
presents a similarly wide array of qualities that may be associated with folly: some fools 
display verbal hyper-ability, while others are malapropists; some fools seem extremely 
witty, while others seem to lack conscious wit; some fools sing well, others badly, others 
not at all. Some fools bring about a “fool’s reversal,” in which they reveal truer folly in 
their audiences; other fools experience reversals of their own. Some fools are badly 
educated, dissolute young men; others perform in contradistinction to the badly 
educated and dissolute characters all around them. All of these visual and literary 
attributes indicate vocational folly, but none of them is necessary for indicating folly, 




Figure 1. BL Harley MS 1892, fol. 68. Psalter (Netherlands or England, c. 1490–c. 
1510).17 
 
A typical medieval depiction of a fool performing for his king appears in a 
fourteenth-century psalter (Figure 1). Whereas this performing fool is what we expect 
from scholarship’s traditional framing of premodern English fool literature, the more 
pervasive visual and literary representation of the fool in the period shows the fool’s 
intransigent resistance to acknowledging God. Medieval psalters commonly 
represented fools in illuminations accompanying Psalm 52, which begins, “The fool 
says in his heart, There is no God.” As V. A. Kolve has shown in his work on the 
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literature and iconography of the fool in Psalm 52, the psalter fool serves as the visible 
embodiment of rebellion and impiety.18 In Figure 1, the fool is wearing motley colors, he 
has tassels on his clothing and bells on the tassels, and he is carrying a bauble—a long 
rod that typically either has either an inflated bladder, a ball, or a face carved onto one 
end. This fool’s bauble has a face, which the fool would typically use during his verbal 
performances of wit. The bauble, which parodies a monarch’s scepter, allows the fool’s 
performance to hint saucily at the inversion of the hierarchical relationship between fool 
and ruler. 
 
Figure 2. Bodley MS Douce 118, fol. 60v. Psalter (Artois, end of the thirteenth 
century.) Bodleian Library, University of Oxford.19 
 
A slightly older depiction shows the plainer dimensions of the iconography of 
fooling (Figure 2). This fool’s bauble has a ball on the end, and his head is shaved—a 
 12 
common feature in the medieval iconography of fooling that is often invoked in literary 
texts.20 Yet another psalter depiction shows several different kinds of folly gathered 
together (Figure 3). In the center of the floriated capital, a couple canoodles in the left-
hand foreground. Most of the people in the crowd behind the couple have their backs 
turned toward God, while at least a few seem to be happily looking at the couple’s 
canoodling. Meanwhile, the vocational fool—clearly marked as such by his tassels and 
bells—is shaking a hand at God, and the finger on his mouth may indicate mockery, as 
well. This psalter thus shows multiple kinds of figurative folly—lack of chastity, turning 
one’s back on God, mocking God. And this psalter illumination, like the broader 
medieval and early modern literary tradition, represents all these various kinds of 
figurative folly in the person of the vocational fool. While the outward signs of folly 
vary throughout the premodern iconographic tradition, they all perform the same 
function: to witness externally to the fool’s inward, embodied cognitive disarray. 
Premodern English literature conceptually models cognition as an embodied faculty; 
thus, the fool’s cognitive difference from society is made visible through his 
habiliments, his words, and his songs. 
For these reasons, visual depictions of fools in psalters were consonant with a 
host of premodern English and Scottish literary texts that catalogued the moral and 
cognitive qualities of fools. Nearly all such portraits insist on fools’ deficiencies in 
character. Duplicity, mendacity, drunkenness, deficiencies in education, and the 
propensity for singing are all recurring features of these literary texts. According to 
such texts, some fools are clever, and some fools are virtuous, but no fool is both clever 
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and virtuous. By turns didactic, satirical, or both, these texts illuminate folly in rich, 
multi-faceted forms. Taken together, these literary depictions show fools and folly in an 
almost entirely negative light, yet their purposes and effects are as variable as prismatic 
colors. This wide array of textual representations of folly often resists existing scholarly 
categories for premodern literary folly. 
 





Literary scholarship has traditionally set great store by the categories of 
“natural” and “artificial” fooling—categories that are supposed to distinguish hyper-
able from disabled fools. Although the premodern term “artificial” favorably denotes a 
fool’s performing talents—literally, his artful skills—premodern English literature 
typically meets “artificial” or vocational fools with considerably deep suspicions. 
Conversely, it often regards “natural” fools with tolerance and delight. Such “artificial” 
fools’ work is often construed by premodern texts as a counterfeit performance of 
natural fooling—a performance that dangerously obscures the boundary lines between 
ability and disability and thereby calls into question the status of its audience’s own 
intellection.22 This premodern association of artificial fooling with craftiness and perfidy 
stands in stark opposition to the more pervasive trend in recent literary criticism that 
almost ubiquitously identifies the fool as a wise character. In such criticism, fools 
become safe—in fact, they become downright cuddly, serving as figments of modern 
scholars’ own skeptical sensibilities. Shakespeare’s corpus and its broader contexts, 
however, reveal fools performing a more complex negotiation between disparagements 
of their mental ability and their vocational imperative to display a dexterous wit.23 
Many Shakespearean critics have with reason distinguished between 
Shakespeare’s early so-called “clowns,” played most often by Will Kemp, and the later 
“licensed” fools, played by Robert Armin. Such critics have often discussed qualities 
much like cognitive deficits in the Will Kemp characters while noting the wisdom and 
insight of the licensed fools that Robert Armin played. These critics often derive this 
separation of categories from Armin himself, whose 1600 pamphlet, Foole upon Foole or 
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Six sortes of Sottes, distinguishes between “[n]aturall” and “artificiall” fools.24 Scholars 
have often accepted Robert Armin’s categories and perpetuated them, as if to endorse 
the idea that Armin identified transhistorical categories. This scholarly proclivity has a 
long history. For instance, in a discussion of All’s Well That Ends Well, Samuel Johnson 
distinguishes between the “Clown” as “licensed jester, or domestick fool”—that is, the 
vocational fool—and the “Clown” as “servant, or rustic, of remarkable petulance and 
freedom of speech.”25 Unlike many later critics, Johnson displays little interest in 
evaluating the relative merits of the different types of clowns’ performances. Twentieth-
century critics were more eager to rush in where Johnson feared to tread. Dana Aspinall 
provides a valuable summary of twentieth-century critical judgments of Shakespearean 
fools: “Stage critics and historians emphasize that Armin’s influence rests in elevating 
[…] clowns’ rustic knockabout roles to more sophisticated representations wherein 
these clowns become courtly fools, infusing wisdom into the dramatic circumstances in 
which they operate.”26 Aspinall traces this tradition back as far as two PMLA essays 
published in 1926 and 1927.27 He cites Leslie Hotson’s Shakespeare’s Motley as a 
particularly noteworthy example of the critical distinction between the two types of 
Shakespearean fools: Hotson describes Kemp’s work as “low-comedy clowning,” 
whereas he characterizes Robert Armin as the first in a “new and distinctive line of 
sagacious fools.”28 The overwhelming effect of this long critical history has been to 
elevate the work of the “sagacious,” artificial fools over the putative buffoonery of the 
natural fools. 
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This project shows that the tension between these categories of “natural” and 
“artificial” fooling appears frequently in premodern English literature.29 For example, in 
Twelfth Night, Feste alludes to this tension by employing approximately synonymous 
terms: 
Wit, an ’t be thy will, put me into good fooling! Those wits that think they 
have thee do very oft prove fools, and I that am sure I lack thee may pass 
for a wise man. For what says Quinapalus? —“Better a witty fool than a 
foolish wit.” (1.5.28–32) 
 
In Feste’s invocation, he cleverly puts himself in the category of natural fools who lack 
wit—a notoriously slippery premodern term encompassing a range of concepts such as 
cleverness, devious cunning, theological understanding, and both the figurative and 
physical faculties of reason. By this rhetorical move, he distances himself from the 
artificial fools who are seen as cunning feigners of folly. In both his quotation of the 
proverb attributed to Quinapalus and his assertion that “[t]hose wits that think they 
have thee do very oft prove fools,” he both suggests the oppositional relationship 
between hyper-able and disabled fools and hints at the instability of the divide between 
those categories. This instability and the words Feste uses to evoke it—“witty fools and 
foolish wits”—are at the heart of this project’s investigation of fooling. 
To perpetuate these categories without question is to lose a sense of the 
instability of the boundaries between “witty fool” and “foolish wit”—that is, between 
intellectually dexterous entertainers and verbose malapropists, between “artificial” and 
“natural” fools. On the other hand, a certain amount of category confusion can enable 
us to see the threat that this instability poses—not only to “fooles artificiall” like Feste, 
but also to other early modern characters and audiences. Armin himself performs this 
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kind of category confusion when he writes that “fooles artificiall, with their wits lay 
waite / To make themselves fooles.”30 Armin’s warning elides the distinction between 
“naturall” and “artificiall” disability of wit: playing the fool will make you a fool. 
The insights offered by disability studies can do much to enhance literary 
studies’ understanding of fools and fooling in premodern England. Scholars of 
disability studies—particularly those who focus on disability and rhetoric—have shown 
how troubling and persistent an adherence to similarly dichotomized labels can be. 
Melanie Yergeau’s work on the rhetorically constructed divide between “high-
functioning” and “low-functioning” autism articulates the problems that arise when 
this divide is reified: for example, “high-functioning” autistic individuals are often told 
that they are too capable to be truly autistic.31 Yergeau shows how forms of disability 
are often understood as forms of hyper-ability. At the same time, she shows that hyper-
ability itself is often misunderstood and disparaged, rather than celebrated. Yergeau 
writes, “Those autistic individuals who do speak (literally and metaphorically) and who 
do speak in atypical ways are in turn constructed as not being severe enough, as being 
too high-functioning, as not really having autism at all.” Such rhetoric creates a 
hierarchy of value between “high-” and “low-functioning” individuals with disabilities, 
elevating one group at the expense of another while excluding both groups from full 
participation in the larger society. As this project shows, similarly complex and 
problematic social treatments of cognitive alterity abound in premodern English 
literature. 
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The rhetoric that Yergeau critiques relies on observers’ adoption of what Jay 
Dolmage and Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson have termed a “normate stance”: that is, a 
“central (invisible and normal) position that enables ‘us’ to diagnose others and make 
judgments about ‘them.’”32 This cordoning-off of disabled individuals from each other 
and from critics who write in a normate stance has damaging effects. Yergeau’s work 
succinctly shows how the rhetoric of “high” and “low” functioning—especially as 
opposed to the normate stance of “neurotypical,” or ostensibly non-disabled, 
functioning—can produce a hierarchical rhetoric that negatively affects individuals 
with autism: 
Per the typical autism essay, functioning level involves the extent to which 
an autistic’s personality traits match up with the expectations of the 
particular neurotypicals who author the dominant narrative. When others 
denote me as a high-functioning autistic, there’s still an assumption that 
I’m malfunctioning, because no matter how “high” I am on the grid, I’m 
never just plain functioning. And when autistics are coined as low-
functioning, the assumptions made involve malfunctioning on warp 
overdrive.33 
 
Here, Yergeau shows how even celebrations of “high” functioning produce a 
deleterious rhetoric in which cognitive action without qualifiers—or “just plain 
functioning”—put boundary markers between neurotypicals. In this schematic, 
neurotypical individuals are presumed to be critical observers, and autistic and 
otherwise cognitively different individuals are presumed to be the passive subjects of 
observation. This work in studies of rhetoric illuminates not only contemporary debates 
about disability but also the tendency of premodern literary scholarship to adopt a 
“normate” stance vis-à-vis fools and to be quick to assume the transhistorical value of 
“high” and “low” forms of social performance.34 
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This critique from twenty-first-century disability studies indicates how the 
hierarchical rhetoric of “high” and “low” functioning might color literary scholars’ 
examinations of the variously abled forms of cognition represented in premodern 
English literature.35 That is, while historicists have shown that twenty-first-century 
cultural conditions are not identical to premodern cultural conditions, the most acute 
practitioners of historicism are attuned to the ways in which modern-day cultural 
conditions may shape their views of earlier cultural contexts. Such attunement suggests 
that, if the emphatic premodern divisions between “natural” and “artificial” fooling 
have remained steadfastly entrenched in literary criticism, in the absence of clearly 
supporting evidence, the reason may be that such divisions too neatly align with 
trenchant twenty-first-century notions of “low” and “high” ability. The critical success 
of the notion of the “artificial” fool as clearly distinct from the “natural” fool may be 
facilitated by a modern societal tendency to locate social value in hyper-able cognition, 
rather than in a full array of cognitive variability. 
The more than four-hundred-year stability of these categories of “natural” and 
“artificial” fooling in the critical literature is astonishing. The literary scholarship of the 
past half-century has effected significant shifts in critical consideration of premodern 
literary notions of gender, race, social status, sexuality, species, authorship, economics, 
semiotics, and epistemology—to name a few among many categories that have received 
sustained, often revolutionizing, attention. Despite these shifts with respect to other 
categories, characters, and forms of literary representation—and despite several incisive 
studies on fools—the field’s received preconceptions of fools and fooling have not 
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budged. Rather than accepting that our half-millennium-long adherence to this 
dichotomy indicates that we have ably historicized the literary fool, we might ask 
whether the moment is ripe for theoretically informed re-historicizing. My project’s re-
historicizing demonstrates that premodern fooling is indeed engaging discourses of 
disability; in so doing, it’s offering a moral—rather than medical—model for thinking 
about disability in its social environs. 
Until recently, many scholars have been reluctant to bring interventions from the 
field of disability studies to bear on early modern literature. David Houston Wood, who 
has done much to reverse this trend, attests to “a general, if not institutional, reluctance 
to engage disability as a theoretical model for early modern topics.”36 In a special issue 
of Disability Studies Quarterly, he and his co-editor, Allison Hobgood, commendably 
seek to engage early modern scholarship with disability studies, as well as to move the 
critical conversation beyond earlier discussions of “monstrosity” and “deformity.”37 
Much of this new work in early modern disability studies has focused on visible 
disability, and relatively little research has been published on intellectual disability.38 
One notable exception to the predominance of recent critical focus on visible disability 
is Allison Hobgood’s work on epilepsy in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar. Hobgood 
identifies the threat that epilepsy’s lack of legibility poses in an early modern social 
context, and she argues that the epileptic body’s “illegibility confounds early modern 
methods of knowing and articulating disability.”39 The threat illegible disability poses 
pertains not only to epilepsy but also to cognitive difference. Premodern fools intensify 
this threat by performing wordplay and song as signs of cognitive difference, thereby 
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rendering this “invisible,” “illegible” disability both visible and sonic. Those fools who 
do sing employ their performances of song to register embodied aural, visual, and 
material forms of cognitive otherness.40 
If this productive conjunction of disability studies and premodern literary 
studies is to be made, then the methodology employed to study disability is crucial. A 
sustained examination of cognitive disability in premodern representations of fools 
requires close attention to the contextual specificity of the English literary tradition, 
rather than by the selective importation of modern scientific or psychological 
terminology into premodern literary analysis. As Marie-Laure Ryan has pointed out, 
new research in cognitive science has proven increasingly persuasive to literary 
scholars, but this is a one-way street: scientists have not, in turn, been persuaded of the 
value of literary studies to their work. Melanie Yergeau accurately sums up the effect of 
this unidirectional interdisciplinary: “‘Science’ provides the basis upon which we 
[humanities scholars] can retro-diagnose literary characters, historical figures, or 
student writers.”41 There is no value to be gained from attempting to present a modern 
mental-health diagnosis as the equivalent of premodern fools’ imagined disorders, and 
the aim of this project is not in any way diagnostic.42 
Such efforts to apply a patina of scientific authority to literary analysis all too 
often advance scientifically dubious claims that contribute no literary or historical 
insights. This project instead investigates how English literary texts themselves form 
theories of cognitive disability that influence their own representations of performances 
of relative ability and disability. In other words, this is a project—not about how people 
 22 
think—but about how people think they think. That is, it is about the interwoven skeins 
of literary fictions by which medieval and early modern England imagined cognitive 
possibilities and limitations. 
Three salient skeins in premodern literary representations of fools and folly are 
worth foregrounding here via brief analyses. First, John Lydgate’s The Order of Fools, an 
exemplar of anti-fool literature, portrays fools as morally vicious because of their 
cognitive difference. Second, Thomas Malory’s Le Morte Darthur shows how premodern 
literary representations of multiform cognitive disability treat folly as distinct from, but 
comparable to, madness.43 Third and most crucially, a brief discussion of William 
Dunbar’s “Master Andro Kennedy’s Testament” illuminates how the fool is often 
depicted as an agent of social disability. Thus, premodern English literature reveals the 
fool himself as a culpable agent of societal ills. 
If the relationship of cognitive disability to fooling sometimes seems opaque, it is 
because recent literary studies have too often neglected the substantial anti-fool 
tradition in premodern English literature. This dimension of the English literary 
tradition often portrays fools as socially out of hand because they are cognitively 
disabled. This tradition is thoroughly encapsulated in an early-fifteenth-century poem 
attributed to John Lydgate, traditionally known as The Order of Fools. Lydgate’s poem—
entitled A TALE OF THRESCORE FOLYS AND THRE in MS. Harl. 2251, fol. 303–5—
delineates in minute detail sixty-three kinds of folly, cataloguing each kind of fool 
according to his specific moral failings. The seemingly exhaustive list of human failings 
participates in the most starkly disparaging elements of the anti-fooling literary 
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tradition. At the same time, even premodern works like this one that are deliberately 
critical of fools acknowledge a wide range of causes and expression of cognitive 
disability: their characterizations of fools and folly are loose and additive, rather than 
systematic. 
At its outset, the poem purports to enumerate the kinds of fools one by one in 
eight-line ababbcbc or ababbbcc stanzas, beginning with the fool who turns against God. 
Lydgate’s comprehensively impious fool scorns not only God, but also church, saints, 
parents, and the poor: 
[9] The chief of foolis, as men in bokis redithe, 
And able in his foly to hold residence,°  endure 
Is he that nowther lovithe God ne dredithe, 
Nor to his chirche hathe none advertence,° pays no attention 
Ne to his seyntes dothe no reverence, 
To fader and moder dothe no benyvolence, 
And also hathe disdayn to folke in poverté, 
Enrolle° up his patent, for he shal never the.°44 Record; prosper 
(ll. 9–16) 
 
This enumeration of this fool’s impieties dovetails with the premodern emphasis on 
folly as a condition that disables the intellect by warping it morally. Soon the poem 
gives up the pretense of an enumerative catalogue, piling on one description of fools’ 
moral failure after another without concern for singularity. Many of these descriptions 
of fools repeat themselves at multiple points throughout the poem, accruing emphasis 
through repetition, if not through poetic craft. For instance, in the poem’s 
characterization of the fool’s habitual duplicity, the fool is someone who “hathe twoo 
faces in oon hoode” (l. 21) and, later, a “Janus [. . .] / Whitche in oon hoode can shewe a 
double face” (l. 178). The poem’s anti-fool investments are reinforced by the amassing 
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of a superabundance of detail, rather than in the meticulous enumeration of the kinds of 
folly that the poem seemed to promise at its outset. 
This superabundant anti-fool invective leans most heavily on repeated reminders 
of the fool’s duplicitous feigning—e.g., “Another foole withe countrefete visage, / Is he 
that falsly wil flater and feyne” (ll. 73–4). Such feigning is explicitly connected to fool’s 
performances of dancing and merriment: 
[25] The x. foole may hoppe on the ryng, 
Foote al aforn° and lede of right the daunce,  forward 
He that al yevithe and kepythe hymself nothyng, 
A double hert withe fayre feyned countenaunce, 
And a pretence face trouble in his daliaunce, 
Tunge spreynt° withe sugre, the galle kept secret, sprinkled  
A perilous mowthe is worse than spere or launce, 
Thoughe they be cherisshed, God lete hem never the! 
(ll. 25–32) 
 
This stanza neatly rolls together a number of the allegations that most frequently 
surface in fool literature: fools have double hearts beneath feigning faces, sugared 
tongues but hidden gall, and—despite the benignity of their appearance—their 
“perilous mowthe[s]” can do more harm than the weapons of war. These concerns 
about the fool’s moral failures, in fact, trump critiques of the “braynles” fool’s cognition 
per se: 
[17] The vj. foole this frary to begynne, 
More than a foole braynles, madde, and woode, 
Is he that never wil forsake his synne, 
Nor he that never wil lere° no goode.   learn 
(ll. 17–20, emphasis added) 
 
The poem acknowledges that some fools are at a cognitive disadvantage—“braynles, 
madde, and woode”—for physical reasons. Lydgate’s carving out of an exceptional 
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space for those whose folly is due merely to the limitations of the body precedes and is 
consonant with the similar exception Erasmus makes.45 Lydgate levels a more forceful 
critique at the fool whose folly is due to moral intransigence and the refusal to “lere 
[. . .] goode.” Notably, the refusal to learn is associated with moral, rather than strictly 
cognitive, deficits—a theme that appears repeatedly in premodern fool-texts. The 
poem’s depiction of fools as morally corrupt, duplicitous, impious figures aptly sums 
up the backdrop for English literary depictions of fools throughout the medieval and 
early modern periods. 
Malory’s Le Morte Darthur presents a skeptical view of the fool’s relationship to 
society. Malory’s version of the tale of “Syr Trystrams de Lyones” juxtaposes an 
instance of folly with an instance of fooling in order to show how these forms of 
cognitive disarray cause societal disruption. According to Malory, the hero Sir Tristram, 
hiding from King Mark and pining after Queen Isolde, 
rode unto the wilderness and broke down the trees and boughs. And on 
many occasions [. . .] he would harp and play thereupon while weeping.  
[. . .] Thus he stayed there a quarter of a year; [. . .] and then he became 
naked, and he grew lean and poor of flesh. And so he fell into the 
company of herdmen and shepherds, and daily they would give him 
some of their meat and drink; and when he did any shrewd deed, they 
would beat him with rods. And so they clipped his hair with shears and made 
him like a fool.46 
 
Though these few sentences do not yet give a name to Tristram’s mental state, this 
introduction to the episode deftly sketches several common narrative characteristics of 
cognitive disorder. Having lost his lover—a loss often associated with temporary folly 
or madness in premodern English literature—Tristram runs distractedly into the forest, 
distancing himself from the tale’s romanticized ideals of chivalric company and 
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civilization. Running naked, he forfeits the trappings of knighthood and also the 
physique that has given him his legendary prowess. Not coincidentally, his nakedness 
resembles that of the very early English iconographic depictions of fools. Having lost 
his accustomed social status, Tristram becomes first the fellow, then the laughingstock, 
of shepherds. He is visually “made lyke a foole” by having his hair rudely shorn off, a 
widely recognized, outward sign of inner cognitive derangement in premodern 
literature.47 Folly’s association with musical performance is not only re-emphasized but 
dramatized through his harp-playing. 
In his subsequent encounter with Sir Dagonet, Arthur’s own fool, Tristram 
performs a kind of “fooling” ritual, with the shepherds as spectators: 
 [¶]48 And so one day Sir Dagonet, King Arthur’s fool, came into 
Cornwall with two squires with him; and as they rode through that forest 
they came to a fair well where Sir Trystramys was wont to be. And the 
weather was hot, and they dismounted to drink of that well, and in the 
meanwhile their horses broke loose. Just then Sir Trystramys happened 
upon them; and first he dunked Sir Dagonet in that well, and after that he 
dunked the squires—and at that the shepherds laughed. [. . .] 
 Thus Sir Trystramys endured there half a year, naked.49 
 
Tristram and Dagonet face each other, fool and counter-fool, posing the question: What 
is the difference between the vocational fool and the madman, or witless fool? Malory’s 
telling of this story focuses on the epistemological problem occasioned by madness and 
fooling alike: how are these forms of cognitive difference identified and distinguished 
from the general societal condition? Following the passage I quoted above, Malory’s 
narrative names Sir Tristram’s cognitively disordered condition, yet it immediately 
casts doubt on this categorization: 
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[¶] Now turn we unto Sir Dagonet again. When he and his squires 
were upon horseback, he deemed that the shepherds had sent that fool to 
thrash them because they laughed at them; and so they rode to the 
keepers of the beasts and thoroughly beat them up. 
[¶] When Sir Trystramys saw that those who were wont to give 
him meat had been beaten, he ran thither and caught Sir Dagonet by the 
head, and there he gave Sir Dagonet such a fall to the earth and bruised 
him so that he lay still. And then he wrested the sword out of Sir 
Dagonet’s hand, and he ran with it to one of the squires and smote off his 
head—and the other squire fled. And so Sir Trystramys set off with the 
sword in his hand, running as if he were raving mad [Middle English: 
“wyld woode”]. 
[¶] Then Sir Dagonet rode to King Mark and told him how he had 
fared in the forest. “And therefore,” said Sir Dagonet, “beware, King 
Mark, lest you come near that well in the forest, for there stands a fool, 
naked—and that fool and I, fool, met together, and he almost slew me!”50 
 
Tristram’s actions are almost labeled as raving mad (“wyld woode”), but Malory 
refuses to assign them a definite name: Tristram runs “as he had bene wyld woode.” 
Perhaps the slightest of qualifiers, “as,” reflects the strands of the Arthurian tradition in 
which Tristram only feigns madness. Perhaps it adheres to the same principle that 
insists repeatedly on Tristram’s singularity, near-invincibility, and honor—even as it 
allows him casually to lop off the head of Dagonet’s nameless squire in this excerpt. 
Tristram’s folly or madness besets him suddenly, showing how quickly one may slip 
from cognitive soundness into the state of being “wyld woode”—an invisible affliction 
that, in this narrative and many others in premodern English literature, is evinced by a 
haphazardly collected conglomeration of behaviors and physical changes. Dagonet’s 
slight qualifier gestures toward the difficulty of ascertaining cognitive disorders. 
Dagonet, however, seems to countenance no such doubts. The narrative voice 
has Dagonet identifying Tristram as “that foole” early in the final excerpt above, 
signaling Dagonet’s apprehension of Tristram’s similarity to himself even as it suggests 
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that Dagonet might also prefer to emphasize “that foole[’s]” alterity. In his complaint to 
King Mark, Dagonet appears to settle on the similarity of Tristram’s “wyld woode” 
state to his own station as fool. Just as “that foole” and “I, foole” meet together, Dagonet 
seems to say, the once-great Tristram is little better than a knighted fool, a parodic 
representation of chivalry. Dagonet’s appositive description of himself (“I, foole”), 
echoing his description of Tristram, effects a fool’s reversal. In this reversal, 
characteristic of fools throughout premodern literature, the fool critiques his opponent 
by comparing that opponent to himself. In this move, the fool levels the power 
relationship between himself and his high-status interlocutor, and he calls into question 
the thin distinctions between cognitive ability and disability in his social context. 
William Dunbar’s poem “Master Andro Kennedy’s Testament” offers a brief, 
satirical portrait of a fool who is alleged to be putting on a false performance of folly for 
the sake of material gain. In Dunbar’s late-fifteenth-century mock-testament, Master 
Andro Kennedy catalogues the items he wishes to leave to various and sundry 
acquaintances. The poem satirizes both the speaker himself and the beneficiaries of his 
vaunted munificence. For example, the speaker says, “I leiff my saull forevirmare, [. . .] 
/ Into my lordis wyne cellar” (ll. 18, 20).51 Later, he leaves his “fenyening” and “fals 
wynyng” to false friars (“Relinquo falsis fratribus,” ll. 65–6). He turns next to “Jok Fule”—
a proximate association of feigning friars and feigning fools much like Lydgate’s. In this 
stanza, the speaker casts the fool as a disabling agent, saying that the fool blears his 
lord’s metaphorical eyesight in order to put on a performance of folly that enables him 
to rake in wealth:  
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To Jok Fule my foly fre°    freely52 
Lego post corpus sepultum.°   I bequeath after my body is buried 
In faith, I am mair fule° than he,   more fool 
Licet ostendit bonum vultum.°  Although he shows a good face 
Of corne and catall, gold and fe°   goods 
Ipse habet walde multum,°   He himself has a great deal 
And yit he bleris my lordis e°   eye 
Fingendo eum fore stultum.°   By pretending to be a fool 
(ll. 73–80) 
 
When the speaker says, “I am mair fule than he,” the implication is that the speaker is 
“mair fule” not only because Jok Fule is actually possessed of great cognitive acuity, but 
also, perhaps, because the speaker is “mair fule” to have missed an opportunity to take 
up such a performance himself, and thereby to gain more riches to leave in his last will 
and testament. According to the speaker, the cunning fool is accruing wealth and 
position at the expense of his lord, and his fooling functions as a deliberate impairment 
of his lord’s perception and cognition, which are here conflated. 
The poem thus mobilizes the conceptual metaphor of blindness as lack of 
knowledge: elsewhere, the speaker declares, 
We mon all de, man, that is done. 
Nescimus quando vel qua sorte°   We do not know when or by what chance 
Na° Blind Allane wait of the mone.° No [more than]; knows of the moon 
(ll. 10–12) 
 
Dunbar’s mock-testament, like other texts this project examines, compares the absence 
of knowledge to other disabilities—in this case, the physical disability of blindness. In 
the “Jok Fule” stanza, the fool directly causes this figurative blindness in his lord. In 
other words, this poem, like the Tale of Beryn, defines the fool by his ability to feign 
disability. Like Lydgate, Dunbar charges the fool with duplicitous dealing. Moreover, 
the fool’s alleged disability depends on the disabled judgment of his auditors: they are 
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insufficiently cunning either to discern the fool’s trick or to play the fool themselves. 
Despite the divergent formal tactics of their poems, both Dunbar and Lydgate portray 
fools as agents, rather than mere victims, of moral disarray and epistemological 
impairment. 
This project, which comprises four chapters, considers cognitive difference across 
the medieval and early modern periods. The first two chapters are principally on 
medieval narrative poems; the final two are on early modern dramas. The trans-generic 
nature of the project expands the scope of previous scholarship, which has been heavily 
weighted toward dramatic fooling. My analyses resist a marked emphasis on the 
historiographically convenient break between the two periods. Instead, my focus on 
fool literature as a broad tradition adduces a continuity in premodern thinking about 
folly and cognition across the late fourteenth through early seventeenth centuries. 
Across this period, English writers of widely varying religious affiliations and social 
positions posit a remarkably continuous model of fully embodied, morally implicated 
cognition, and they use this model to create the literature of fools and folly. If literary 
scholarship relies on a sharply articulated break between the medieval and early 
modern periods, it produces analyses that overlook how medieval and early modern 
literature’s models of cognitive difference are not separate melodies, but variations on a 
theme. For example, the tradition of thinking about the five bodily senses as “five wits” 
stretches from the early-fifteenth-century Tale of Beryn through late-fifteenth-century 
admonitions to cloistered nuns, Tyndale’s early-sixteenth-century theories of biblical 
interpretation, and Shakespeare’s Sonnet 141. In other words, writers from dramatically 
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disjunct religious and social backgrounds all use this model of the “five wits” for 
thinking through problems of the body and cognitive difference. This model’s strong 
through-line across several centuries reveals long-simmering anxieties about what 
happens when the body fails to produce morally and cognitively acceptable social 
performances. 
Despite this strong through-line, though, my project does find some periodic 
shifts in attention. Early texts, such as Robert of Cisyle, evince the concern not that an 
individual will be taken for a fool, but that an institution will fail. This romance thus 
concerns itself with problems in the social functioning of a king and, thus, in the 
institution of the monarchy itself.53 Sixteenth-century anxieties about folly, in contrast, 
become increasingly worried that the fool’s performances will disrupt the cognitive and 
educational workings of society writ large, rather than of one particular institution.54 
As we have seen, much of the critical attention on fools has focused on 
Shakespeare’s later, “licensed” fools, who are often taken to be witty analogues to the 
Erasmian trope of the wise fool. Examining premodern English fool literature primarily 
through the lenses of Shakespeare and Erasmus shows only a few of the dimensions of 
premodern literary fooling, missing dimensions of the fooling performed not only by 
less able, “natural” fools, but also by licensed fools. My study, which examines a 
broader array of literature from across the medieval and early modern periods in 
England, shows that Shakespearean fools are generally not typical of, but aberrant from, 
the literary fooling tradition. This project asks: How do scholarly readings of literary 
fooling change if scholars refuse to view fools with a Shakespearean or Erasmian lens? 
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Accordingly, three chapters of this study examine more typical, pre-Shakespearean 
literature. The fourth and final chapter returns to Shakespeare, showing how scholarly 
readings of Shakespeare’s fools change when such readings are informed by the 
broader premodern literary fooling tradition. 
Chapter 1 examines the pseudo-Chaucerian Tale of Beryn (c. 1410), a narrative 
poem in which the title character’s savior, Geffrey, pretends to be a cognitively disabled 
fool before a court of law in order to deliver Beryn from legal troubles. Having initially 
been lulled into complacent amusement by Geffrey’s antics, the adjudicators of Beryn’s 
case come to realize that they have been legally outwitted: “[W]e have hold hym a fole, 
but we be wel more!” (l. 3458). Geffrey’s performance of folly thus allows him to re-
distribute the tale’s attributions of hyper- and dis-abled cognition. The Tale of Beryn sets 
forth two robust theoretical models concerning cognitive disability. The poem’s interest 
in the “five wits,” or five senses, proffers a theory of fully embodied cognition, while its 
portrayal of the fool’s reversal proffers a pervasive, societal model of cognitive 
disability—rather than a model aimed at sussing out the cognitive singularity of the 
individual. While the Tale of Beryn does celebrate the vocational fool, it does so at the 
expense of the broader populace. 
In contrast, Chapters 2 and 3 consider texts that present overt, unrelenting 
critiques of fools’ cognitive disability. Chapter 2 looks at the medieval romance Robert of 
Sicily (extant in ten manuscripts, c. 1380–c. 1500), which explicitly links cognitive 
disability qua folly to loss of dignity. In this romance, the title character, a king, is 
punished for his injustices as a monarch by being turned into his own court’s vocational 
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fool while an angel rules in his place—a demotion that is linked to the king’s disabled 
judgment and described repeatedly as a loss of dignity. The chapter frames cognitive 
disability in two distinctive ways: as an intertwined cognitive and moral disability, and 
as the cause of deserved downward social mobility. Ordering that Robert be outfitted 
with the trappings of a court fool, such as a bauble and tattered clothes, the angel drily 
notes, “Thy bauble shall be thy dignity,” making the trappings of Robert’s folly the 
witnesses to his social fall and his moral culpability.55 
Chapter 3 similarly adduces a fool’s moral culpability, showing how such ethical 
critiques of fools and folly pervade early modern drama. In considering Wager’s 1569 
play The Longer Thou Livest the More Fool Thou Art, this chapter argues that fools’ songs 
are portrayed as direct impediments to their intellectual and moral education, as well as 
signs of their cognitive failures. Analyzing the play’s punning on “bable” (that is, 
“bauble”/“babble”), the chapter shows how the fool’s singing of solfège and nonsense 
syllables registers as “bable” and thus becomes associated both with non-signifying 
speech and with the material trappings of folly. 
Chapter 4 expands the previous chapter’s exploration of fools’ singing with a 
consideration of the role of song in Shakespearean drama. Turning to one of the most 
iconic representations of witty fooling in English literature—Feste in Shakespeare’s 
Twelfth Night—this final chapter examines the social status of popular song and its 
performers in the play. It argues that the aesthetic performance of song and the morally 
suspect act of counterfeiting folly both infuse the work of fools like Feste, evincing those 
fools’ social and cognitive marginality. The chapter argues that Feste works with and 
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plays against early modern anti-fool stereotypes as he uses song to blur cultural 
distinctions between “natural” and “artificial” forms of fooling. It demonstrates how 
Shakespearean fools’ performances of song are taken as expressions of cognitive 
difference, and it suggests that a thorough understanding of these signs of cognitive 
difference can, in turn, show the full range and effects of the fool’s engagement with the 
moralized discourse of folly. 
My project crosses the historiographic boundary between the medieval and early 
modern periods in order to uncover the richness of the broader English literary fooling 
tradition. In so doing, it also excavates a trans-Reformational discourse of cognitive 
disability that traverses multiple confessional affiliations, as well as the perceived 
contours of Christian orthodoxy and heterodoxy. This transperiodic, trans-confessional 
discourse construes folly as cognitive disability. Whereas the category of folly might 
today register as a non-normative cognitive capacity marked for medical treatment, in 
premodern literature it is discussed as a moral and epistemological concern. According 
to premodern fool literature, folly’s infringement on moral and epistemological 
questions both causes and results from educational failure, and it threatens the received 
benefits of high social status. Thus, premodern literature adduces the folly as a societal, 
rather than an individual problem. In portraying folly as a problem of collective 
concern, such literature both marks the individual fool for attention and suggests that 
his moral failings redound to his community. Likewise, because the signal expressions 
of the fool’s folly—wordplay and song—require an audience, the fool’s performances 
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draw their audience into both the aesthetic pleasures and the moral problems of 
perceiving, enjoying, and participating in cognitive difference. 
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The Five Wits and the Fool’s Reversal in the Tale of Beryn 
 
The Tale of Beryn is deeply invested in folly as a form of epistemological failure.1 
This chapter first shows how the tale’s opening frame and subsequent events treat 
disability as a societal rather than an individual condition. It then examines the tale’s 
representations of both folly and the five senses, or “five wits”—a standard topos in 
medieval didactic literature. Finally, it discusses the implications of the episode in 
which the title character’s savior, Geffrey, feigns a performance of fooling before a court 
of law in order to deliver Beryn from legal troubles.2 Having initially been lulled into 
complacent amusement by Geffrey’s antics, Beryn’s opponents come to realize that they 
have been legally outwitted: “[W]e have hold him a fool, but we be well more!” (l. 
3458).3 Geffrey’s feigned performance of fooling ultimately shows his interlocutors’ 
folly—not because it brings about a transformation in mental state, but because it 
represents an exposure of a disability, framed in epistemological terms, that is already 
present. In this way, the tale takes an ostensibly moral category—folly—and re-reads it 
through the category of epistemology, blurring the distinctions between hyper-able wit 
and disabled cognition. The tale produces a theory of fully embodied cognition that 
elides the boundaries between sensory experience, moral practices, and epistemological 
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ability. Beryn thus presents a heretofore unrecognized model of cognitive disability that 
refuses the idea of disability as exceptional and makes it a general condition. 
This portrayal of cognitive disability as not exceptional but widespread has 
received little attention in either Chaucerian or disability studies. Disability studies, in 
particular, have thus far focused primarily on how literary texts portray bodily 
disability as distinct from a broader cultural norm. David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. 
Snyder’s work on “narrative prosthesis” has provided an influential model for showing 
how literary narratives deal with the individually disabled body.4 Mitchell, in 
particular, argues that stories often designate a character’s physical difference or other 
outward sign of difference as the prosthesis that serves as the site of the narrative’s own 
dis-ease with deviance from a physical norm. In such stories, either the character’s 
deviance must be cured or the character must be annihilated.5 Whereas this model 
serves as an insightful one for analyzing a form of narrative dealing with disability and 
bodily variation, it need not be the only theoretical angle from which literary 
representations of disability can be examined. Andrew Higl’s work on The Tale of Beryn 
has already shown how the tale offers a model of disability that differs significantly 
from Mitchell’s model of narrative prosthesis. Whereas Mitchell suggests that 
“disability lends a distinctive idiosyncrasy to any characters that differentiate 
themselves from the anonymous background of the norm,” Higl shows how Geffrey 
“leans on his crutch, [. . .] in order not to stand out, but to pass in a world where 
concepts of abnormality and normality are inverted.”6, 7 Higl suggests that Geffrey’s 
later performance of folly before the law court extends his strategy of passing: “Thus, 
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for some years prior, he leans in his crutch to pass; now, he leans on his ‘yerd’ (3415) or 
‘fool’s bauble’ so as to pass and appear harmless and disabled as he prepares to defend 
Beryn at trial.”8 Higl perceptively points toward, though he does not fully explore, the 
paradoxical manner in which the accoutrements that typically mark the fool as different 
from the cultural norm—the bauble, the shorn head and beard—here enable Geffrey to 
go unremarked until his cunning strategy for legal triumph is fully under way.9 
Mitchell’s and Higl’s interventions, like much of the work in disability studies to date, 
have focused especially on cases in which individuals or sub-groups are identified as 
disabled and then stigmatized or cordoned off from the general population. The Tale of 
Beryn depicts the opposite phenomenon: Geffrey’s performance of folly excavates and 
brings to light forms of culturally widespread cognitive disability that affect nearly 
everyone in the society—everyone, that is, except Geffrey, the feigning fool.  
The poem identifies failing communal standards for the employment of cognitive 
abilities by specifically targeting failing reason and failing legal governance. The 
primary topos through which the tale describes a society-wide decline in cognitive 
abilities is the topos of the “five wits.” The ostensibly secular tale’s focus on the “five 
wits,” and those five wits’ susceptibility to sin, amplifies the account of disability and 
bodily variation that has thus far been proffered by scholars. Whereas it has been noted 
that “the stigma of sin” was “the most significant stigma medieval society attached to 
persons with disabilities,” there has not yet been any examination of the significance to 
disability studies in medieval European Christianity’s attachment of “the stigma of sin” 
to all persons.10 The Chaucerian and other Middle English literature on the “five wits” 
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simultaneously show how widespread is “the stigma of sin” and how sin is imagined as 
an entry-point for cognitive decline. 
The tale begins its depiction of the various forms of folly by leveling a broader 
critique of failures in reason—that is, failures in the wielding of cognitive skills and 
knowledge. In medieval literature, failures in reason are portrayed as problems related, 
though not identical, to folly and other cognitive disabilities. The Tale of Beryn’s bold 
opening lines suggest that few, if any, are perfectly reasonable and free from folly, 
indicting readers’ own powers of reasoning. The opening lines establish that the tale 
takes place long ago, in those far-off days when reason ruled the legal system: 
Whilom,º yeres passed in the old dawes,º  Once; days 
When rightfullich by reson governed were the lawes. [. . .] 
       (ll. 1–2)11 
 
The merchant’s—or poet’s—choice to immediately interrupt the opening “[w]hilom” 
with the redundant “yeres passed in the old dawes” makes it abundantly clear that the 
tale will speak of a time and a set of customs from which the present day has declined. 
The tale’s temporal scaffolding thus outlines a decline from the reasonable statutes that 
governed the halcyon days of old. While this type of nostalgia is conventional in such 
narratives, it is nonetheless an odd framing device for a tale that proceeds to fill its 
depiction of those very halcyon days with unweeningly doting parents, a wayward 
youth, corrupt governors, and an entire town bent on trickery. This opening signals that 
the tale is invested in reason as an ever-deteriorating faculty. Moreover, it includes its 




The popularly disseminated theology of the “five wits” and the idea that 
communal cognitive abilities undergo degradation provide a model for considering 
how medieval English literature conceives of bodily variation and disability. Across 
numerous Middle English texts, the five wits are discussed both as faculties 
corresponding to the modern “five senses” and as faculties of reason. These portrayals 
of the five wits suggest that they constantly open up the bodily senses to 
epistemological danger. Accordingly, the Tale of Beryn uses the “five wits” topos as a 
backdrop for its portrayal of cognitive decay. For instance, the Tale use the idea of the 
“five wits” to take up the problem of communal failures in comprehension when it 
harps on the decline of modern times: 
But it fareth thereby as it doth by other thinges, 
For burh nether ceté,º regioune ne kynges  town nor city 
Beth nat nowe so worthy as were by old tyme, 
As we fynde in romaunces, in gestesº and in ryme. heroic tales 
For all thing doth wast,º and eke mannes lyffe  decay 
Ys more shorter then it was, and our wittes fyveº five senses 
Mowº nat comprehende nowe in our dietesº  Might; lifestyles 
As somtyme myghte these old wise poetes. (743–50) 
 
The poem thus locates well-functioning wit and able comprehension in the work of the 
poets of days past, whose historical context has earlier been commended as a reason-
governed one.12 The disparagement of “our [present] wittes five” adduces a pervasive 
cultural disability, which is identified not by the deviation of a sub-population from a 
norm but by widespread decline from the worthiness of the people and places of old-
time literature—specifically “romaunces, […] gestes and […] ryme.” The tale’s account 
of such widespread decline rests heavily on late medieval literary developments of the 
“five wits” as embodied epistemological faculties. 
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The Tale’s depictions of the five wits suggest that they constantly open up the 
bodily senses to epistemological danger. At the same time, there is often recognition of 
the five wits’ positive capabilities. John Audelay’s carol on the topic, which adjures the 
reader, “Thy Fyve Wittis loke that thou wele spende,” suggests the dual potential and 
danger these faculties embody: 
De quinque sensus.º     Concerning the five senses 
 
[Refrain:] Thy Fyve Wittis loke that thou wele spende, 
And thonke that Lord that ham thee sende. 
 
The furst, hit is thi heryng:º    hearing 
Loke thou turne away thyne ereº    ear 
Fro ydilº wordis, untrew talkyng;    From idle 
The lausº of God loke that thou lereº—   laws; learn 
Lest thou be chent!º    ruined 
Thy Fyve Wittis loke that thou wele spende, 
And thonke that Lord that ham thee sende.13 
 
The carol’s subsequent four verses touch similarly on the “wittis” of “seyng,” 
“towchyng,” “smellyng,” and “tastyng.” Each concludes with a warning to take care 
“[l]est thou be chent,” followed by the cautionary refrain (“Thy Fyve Wittis loke that 
thou wele spend, ...”). The carol, filled with admonitions such as the one to “[w]orch no 
worke unlawfully” (16), displays the same anxieties about the five wits that other 
medieval literature on the topos articulates. 
While Audelay’s carol’s admonitions do warn—in a rather familiar, banal 
fashion—against filling one’s senses with sinful pleasures, they also posit a strong link 
between sensual wit and well-governed moral reasoning. In both its suggestion of 
synonymity between the “Fyve Wittis” and the “quinque sensus” and its stanzas on each 
of the senses, the poem further stresses that the five wits comprise both bodily appetites 
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and powers of reasoning. For instance, one notable line bids, “Let resun thee rewle in 
thyne etyng” (24). The idea of eating as a reason-governed process both comports with 
the religious concept of gluttony as a mortal sin and shows how closely late medieval 
English literature links moral error and disabilities in reason. Even more strongly, when 
the stanza on seeing says, “Thou hast fre choys and fre wil / To behold al wordlé thyng, 
/ The good to chese, to leve the ille,” it suggests that the five wits actively function as 
epistemological guides. Likewise, the “towching” stanza’s admonition to “fley foly” 
(18) suggests that the five wits themselves serve as an epistemological threshold. From 
them, one may either turn toward well reasoned moral governance of one’s sensual 
appetites or to folly—that is, cognitive, moral, and sensual disability. 
Similarly, the Beryn-writer and Chaucer himself use the “five wits” as both a 
proverbial catalogue of the senses and a standard by which human knowledge and 
mores are ever in danger of decline (cf. 748, 991, 1344, and 2587). The three references to 
the five wits in the undisputed Chaucerian canon appear in the Melibee and the Parson’s 
Tale. The Parson’s Tale, which arrogates theological authority to its condemnation of the 
five wits by attributing its viewpoint to Augustine of Hippo, explicates how the five 
wits serve as entry-points for sin: “Seinte Augustyn seith,/ ‘Synne is every word and 
every dede, and al that men coveiten, agayn the law of Jhesu Crist; and this is for to 
synn in herte, in mouth, and in dede, by thy fyve wittes, that been sighte, herynge, 
smellynge, tastynge or savourynge, and feelynge.’”14 Elsewhere, the Parson’s Tale links 
the corruption of the five wits to damnation: “For certes, delices been after the appetites 
of the fyve wittes, as sighte, herynge, smellynge, savorynge, and touchynge./ But in 
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helle hir sight shal be ful of derknesse and of smoke, and therfore ful of teeres; and hir 
herynge ful of waymentynge and of gryntynge of teeth, as seith Jesu Crist.”15 While 
fools, their companions, and the faculties of the five wits are distinct entities, each might 
potentially pave the way to sin and damnation, according to the logic of this body of 
literature on fools and folly. 
The poem depicts the “fyve wittes” as particularly susceptible to becoming 
disabled. Whereas some literary references to the five wits give the broad warning that 
the five wits potentially lead to sin and damnation, others suggest that the five wits 
serve as portals to outward enemies. Chaucer’s Tale of Melibee cautions, “[F]or certes, the 
three enemys of mankynde—that is to seyn, the flessh, the feend, and the world—/ 
thou has suffred hem entre in to thyn herte wilfully by the wyndowes of thy body,/ 
and hast nat defended thyself suffisantly agayns hire assautes and hire temptaciouns, so 
that they han wounded thy soule in fyve places;/ this is to sen, the deedly synnes that 
been entred into thyn herte by thy fyve wittes.”16 The Melibee here recapitulates a 
medieval tradition of allegorizing a verse from the book of Jeremiah—“For whi deth 
stiede bi ȝoure wyndows, it entride in to ȝoure housis”—by interpolating the five wits 
as the windows that allow sin inside.17 A contemporary Wycliffite tract makes this 
connection even more explicitly: “And þus it is verrifyed þat god seiþ by Jeromye; deþ 
haþ entrid by ȝoure wyndowis, þat ben fyue wittes. bi þes queyntises & many moo þe 
fend disceyueþ men.”18 This tract’s broad concern with mounting a defense against 
diabolical machinations that corrupt human senses is vividly expressed in its title, “Hou 
sathanas & his children turnen werkis of mercy vpsodom & disceyuen men þer-inne & 
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in here fyue wittis.”19 The title aptly encapsulates the writer’s concern—shared with 
many other medieval writers—that although the five wits themselves are not inherently 
governed by sin, they are ever in danger of being corrupted.20 
By the late fourteen and early fifteenth centuries, anchoritic literature had made 
familiar the imagery of the senses as the soul’s bodily windows. In keeping with the 
broader five wits topos, this anchoritic imagery portrays the five wits as windows that 
must be guarded lest danger enter. For instance, the thirteenth-century Ancrene Wisse, 
or Anchoresses’ Rule, imagines the heart as an animal looking to escape confinement and 
the five wits as its guardians:21 
Middle English: 
The heorte wardeins beoth the fif wittes: 
sihthe, ant herunge, smechunge, ant 
smeallunge, ant euch limes felunge. Ant 
we schulen speoken of alle, for hwa-se 
wit theose wel, he deth Salomones bode: 
he wit wel his heorte ant his sawle heale. 
The heorte is a ful wilde beast ant 
maketh moni liht lupe.22 
Modern English translation: 
The heart’s guardians are the five senses 
(wits), sight and hearing, tasting and 
smelling, and the feeling in every part. And 
we must speak of all of them, for whoever 
protects these well does as Solomon 
commands: protects well [Middle Englsih: 
“wit wel”] their heart and their soul’s 
health. The heart is a most wild beast and 
makes many a light leap out.23 
 
The verbal play on the noun “wittes” and the verb “wit”—translated “protect” in 
the modern English version—shows the double-edged nature of the “five wits” 
discourse: the sensuous “wittes” are imagined to be endangered and in need of 
protection, while the act of protecting them is articulated nearly homophonically. A few 
lines later, the text connects the five wits’ need of protection to the danger posed by 
literal windows, cautioning anchoresses against over-cherishing the windows of their 
cells: “Therefore my dear sisters, love your windows as little as you possibly can” (“For-
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thi mine leove sustren, the leaste thet ye eaver mahen luvieth ower thurles).” 24, 25 The 
text’s concern for both the health of the soul and safety of physical apertures—
architectural windows as well as the bodily senses—is characteristic of the “five wits” 
literature’s treatment of body and soul together, rather than as separate entities.26 This 
literature thus produces a theory of fully embodied cognition, in which the five wits are 
ever vulnerable to dangers. 
The Tale of Beryn’s employment of the “five wits” topos links moral error, 
disabilities in reason, and failures in education. The poem identifies cognitive disability 
as a social problem emanating from a deficit in forms of moral knowledge. This earliest 
part of the tale is most directly interested in deficits resulting from a lack of learning. 
The deficits are attributed first to Beryn’s parents and later to Beryn himself.27 Initially, 
the poem depicts Faunus, Beryn’s father, exercising the good judgment one might 
expect of a man portrayed as an exemplary figure from this time long past. He provides 
well for his son’s early education: the narrative tells how he “sent anoon for nursses, 
four and no les, / To reule this child afterward as yeres did pas” (887–8). The fine 
outcome that might perhaps be expected from all this “reule” hardly comes to pass, 
however. Breaking into the first person, the narrator paints a portrait of the young 
Beryn as an ungoverned terror: 
But it had beº wel better heº had be wele i-lernedº been; [if] he; taught 
Noriture and gentilnes, and had i-had som hey.º restraint 
(902–3) 
 
Here, the narrator clearly lays the blame for Beryn’s violent behavior at his parents’ feet. 
Subsequent lines do so much more explicitly, when they suggest that Faunus and Agea 
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stand idly by while their son physically attacks those who displease him (913–18). The 
poet’s lament that Beryn has not “i-lerned [… n]oriture” attributes Beryn’s violence to a 
deficit in his learning. The invocation of “noriture”—good upbringing and education—
suggests that Beryn might have developed better judgment had his cognitive 
development been carefully guided. The poem never hints that Beryn’s intellectual and 
behavioral shortcomings in any way stem from innate traits. Rather, its careful praise 
for Beryn’s parents’ good breeding and resources—together with its explicit criticism of 
their failure to restrain Beryn by giving him “som hey”—suggests repeatedly that 
Beryn’s deficient judgment might have been corrected, had he been given the tools to 
develop better reasoning abilities in his youth. Like both the literature of the five wits 
and the literature on folly, this early section of the tale suggests that cognitive failures 
are preventable and, up to a point, remediable. 
In the religious context of late medieval England, one remedy repeatedly touted 
for failures in knowledge and judgment is the discipline of the will. For instance, the 
Wycliffite tract discussed earlier in this chapter warns that “the fend & his disciplis […] 
wolen not be reulid bi goddis lawe & reson but bi hire wille, & þer-fore alle þingis schal 
turne aȝenst hem at þe laste.”28 The tract’s opposition of the fiends’ “wille” to “lawe & 
reson” parallels a concern repeatedly explored by the Beryn-writer, whose praise of the 
old days (“[w]hen rightfullich by reson governed were the lawes”) contrasts with the 
tale’s excoriation of Beryn: 
For ever in his yowthe he had al his will 





The narrative’s heavy-handed assertion that only death could have turned Beryn from 
his “evill dede[s]” (l. 915) apparently closes off the possibility of Beryn’s reformation—
that is, the possibility of the very dénouement that Geffrey will bring about by the end 
of the poem. Moreover, it closes off this possibility by building on the tale’s own 
decline-and-fall topos, as well as its concern with the precarious status of the “wittes 
fyve.” 
The poem’s many allusions to those five wits repeatedly suggest that they are 
faculties ever in danger of succumbing to debility. Although Beryn’s own parents are 
troubled by his deficits in reasoning and self-governance, they, too, are susceptible to 
cognitive decline. On her deathbed, Agea pleads with Faunus: 
Now wold ye so hereafter in hert be as trewe 
To lyve without makeº and on yeur sone reweº  spouse; take pity 
Thatº litill hath i-lerned sithensº he was bore.  Who; since 
(981–3) 
 
Troubled by these worries, Agea secures a promise from Faunus, 
“Certes,” quod Faunus, “whils I have wittes fyve, 
I thynk never after yewe to have another wyff.” (991–2) 
 
Faunus’ invocation of his own wits as faculties he presumes he will retain sounds an 
ominous note. Shortly after giving this promise to his dying wife, he does indeed 
remarry. As Karen A. Winstead points out, “Little more than one hundred lines later he 
has married, forgotten Agea, and ‘litill carid / ffor eny thing at all, save his wyff to 
plese’ (1128–29).”29 Faunus’ remarriage to Rame, Beryn’s eventual stepmother, is subtly 
cast as a failure in reasoning, and thus he joins the tale’s pantheon of the foolish. 
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Meanwhile, the tale carves out a place for Beryn in this pantheon as it 
increasingly calls attention to his limited educational and cognitive resources and 
begins explicitly to give his actions the name of folly. Beryn, who has been given every 
advantage at birth by his parents, continues to reject these gifts in a spectacularly willful 
and obdurate manner. The most stunningly memorable of these moments comes when 
Beryn’s father sends a maid to bring Beryn to the bedside of his dying mother: Beryn 
scoffs at the idea of interrupting his game of dice for such a mere inconvenience. At this 
point in the tale, the poet holds forth on Beryn’s foolish failures of reasoning and 
judgment, explicating the results of his miseducation in a long Homeric simile: 
But Beryn cam nat there, 
Namelich onto the place thereº his moder lay,   where 
Ne onesº wold he a pater-noster for hir soule say.  once 
His thought was al in unthryfft, lechery and dyse,º  dice 
And drawing al to foly, for yowth is rechelesº   reckless 
But thereº it is refreyned and hath some maner eye.º Except where; supervision 
 And therfor me thinketh that I may wele sey: 
A man i-passed yowth and is without loreº   instruction 
May be wele i-likened to a tre without moreº   roots 
That may nat bowe ne bere fruyte, but rootº and ever wast; rot 
Right so every youthe fareth that no man list to chast. 
This mowe we know verely by experience 
That yerdº maketh vertu and benevolence   beating-rod 
In childhode for to growe, as prevethº imaginacioun;  proves 
A plant whils it is grene, orº it have dominacioun,  before 
A man may with his fyngers ply it where hym list 
And make thereof a shakill,º a witheyº or a twist,º shackle; wreath; hinge 
But let the plant stond, and yeres overgrowe, 
Men shall nat with both his hondes unnethesº make it bowe.  hardly 
No more myght Faunus make his sone Beryn, 
When he growe in age, to his lore enclyne. 
(1048–68, emphases added) 
 
The earlier lines of this passage suggest skewed thought, as if Beryn’s modes of 
knowing are ever more bent toward folly. The strongly physical imagery of “drawing 
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all” to folly and, later, a man manually training a sapling to grow “where hym list” 
reinforce the literature of the five wits’ insistence that bodily senses pose dangers to the 
whole person. That is, according to these literatures’ verbal images, disabled cognitive 
and moral senses threaten the whole self, much like a small sapling, untrained, grows 
into an unyieldingly crooked tree. 
This simile of the crooked tree appears again in disparate English texts on fools 
and folly, evincing a vocabulary for foolishly disabled cognition that spans time and 
genres. About one hundred sixty years after the appearance of the Tale of Beryn, a 
character in Wager’s Elizabethan morality play The Longer Thou Livest the More Fool Thou 
Art utilizes another simile comparing foolish youths to ill-trained saplings. Wager’s 
sapling passage uncovers remarkable resonances between the Beryn-writer’s and 
Wager’s similes. According to the stage direction, Exercitation delivers this speech 
while the play’s fool, Moros, repeatedly interrupts by “put[ting] in his head”: 
EXERCITATION: But folly hath so overcharged his reason 
That he is past redress in my judgment. 
While a plant of a tree is young and tender, 
You may cause it to grow crooked or right; 
So a child, while knowledge is but slender, 
You may instruct whereto you will by might. 
But after the plant is grown to a tree, 
To any bowing it will not give place; 
So young folks, when to age grown they be, 
Wax stubborn and be of an indurate face. (ll. 536–45)30 
 
The speech echoes the Tale of Beryn’s concern with training the youth and tree to grow 
correctly—down to the impossibility of making the tree “bowe” (Beryn 1066; cp. Longer 
543). Both texts stress the necessity of corporal means to enforce learning and prevent 
folly: just as the “yerd maketh vertu and benevolence” (Beryn 1060), the youth must be 
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instructed “by might” (Longer 541). In addition to the common vocabularies 
surrounding folly in these texts, there are some slight differences in metaphorization. 
Exercitation’s speech adds the allegation that “folly hath [. . .] overcharged [Moros’] 
reason,” suggesting the quasi-Galenic anxiety about surfeited reason that pervades 
Wager’s play.31 
The Tale of Beryn, for its part, ties Beryn’s moral decrepitude, as demonstrated in 
his refusal to go to his dying mother, to Beryn’s intentional rejection of the wisdom that 
comes from good “lore” (l. 1068)—a word that suggests both intellectual and moral 
instruction. Beryn shows some contrition for his treatment of his mother after her death: 
as the tale narrates, “Beryn lay so long or he myghte awake, / For al his fyve wittes had 
clene hym forsake” (ll. 1353–4). His utter abandonment by his “fyve wittes” leads him 
to behave temporarily like a madman: “He trampeled fast with his feet, and al totare his 
ere / And his visage both, ryght as a wood man” (ll. 1351–2). The poem thus suggests 
that the five wits, although they are ever-susceptible faculties, still do serve as 
guardians against utter cognitive disarray. Beryn repents of his folly and sets out on a 
venture with an outfit of merchant ships. However, as the tale strongly implies, he is 
still “lewde” and without “lore”; the sapling has already grown into a crooked tree. 
When Beryn leaves home, his outward actions may have taken a productive turn, but 
his “lewde” qualities go with him. 
In the second half of the tale, the treatment of cognitive ability and variation 
shifts. The focus is no longer primarily on the five wits in general or on Beryn’s youthful 
failures in judgment, but on Beryn’s legal plight, Geffrey’s feigned performance of folly, 
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and the trickery of the townsfolk among whom Beryn finds himself. Upon arrival in the 
new town, Beryn wagers and loses his ships in a game of dice. Beryn laments this fate, 
connecting his lack of wit to his lack of access to upper-class leisures: “Had I had wit 
and grace, [. . .] / It were my kynd now among my baronage / To hauke and to hunt” 
(2344–6). Soon, however, Geffrey enters—yet unnamed, designated only by his 
apparent physical disabilities and his assistive technologies: 
And when that Beryn in this wise had i-made his mone, 
A crepillº he saw comyng with grete spede and hast,  crippled man 
Oppon a stilt under his kne bound wonder fast,º  tightly 
And a crouchº under his armes, with hondes al forskramed.º crutch; contorted 
(2378–81) 
 
Although Geffrey regards Beryn as “lewde,” he agrees to help him as a fellow Roman 
(2436).32 Here, the tale shifts even more of its critique of pervasive cultural disability 
from its previous targets to the local townsfolk’s self-disabling of their five wits. Geffrey 
bitterly complains that the townsfolk “set all hir wittes in wrong, al that they mowe” 
(2498). Telling the story of his long residency in the town, he reveals that he is not truly 
a “crepill,” but has only disguised himself as one in order to save himself from the 
treachery of the townsfolk: 
“For drede of wors, thus thought I myselff to disfigure. [. . .] 
And so I hope nowghe,º as sotillº as they be,    now; crafty 
With my wit engyneº hem and help yewe and me.   outsmart 
My lymesº been both holeº and sound; me nedeth stilt ne crouch.” limbs; healthy 
(2504–9) 
 
Even at this early stage in the escapade, Geffrey’s heroic status rests on not being 
disabled but performing disability—even to the extent of “disfigur[ing]” himself. Unlike 
virtually all of the other characters in the tale, his limbs and wit are alike “hole and 
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sound,” and he—unlike the disabled man he pretends to be—needs no physical 
accoutrements to aid him. Indeed, his plan to save Beryn by feigning folly relies on his 
able-bodied capering and upon the agility of his cognitive faculties. 
In this way, the poem’s narrative structure sets Geoffrey’s feigned folly in 
contradistinction to Beryn’s moral folly. Unlike other late medieval texts, such as Piers 
Plowman, the Tale of Beryn does not condemn Geoffrey’s feigning of folly before the 
court. Distinctively, Geoffrey is not portrayed as a trickster who merely pretends folly 
for his own gain. His performance of folly on behalf of Beryn is clearly represented as a 
virtuous, even an altruistic deed. Notably, Geffrey does not sing or dance—forms of 
performance that premodern texts often associate with counterfeiting folly for 
mercenary gain.33 His performance springs from a more strictly narrative tradition of 
literary fooling; he relies entirely upon outwitting his opponents through feats of verbal 
dexterity and fiction-making. The poem’s treatment of his feigned folly betrays little 
valorization of cognitive difference. Instead, the tale turns on Geffrey’s cognitive hyper-
ability, which is sharply and didactically contrasted with the cognitive failures of the 
“lewde” Beryn—and, indeed, with the rest of the characters in the tale. 
In the dramatic courtroom scene that concludes Beryn and Geffrey’s adventures, 
the performance of fooling exposes the manner in which embodied cognition can 
function as an aperture that leaves open the way for cognitive and moral peril to enter. 
The poem narrates how Geffrey’s performance of folly completely takes in his audience, 
disabling their abilities of comprehension. Yet Geffrey couches this feat as an unfeigned 
act, cloaking his canny performance in the rhetorical guise of artlessness. As Geffrey 
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promises Beryn, “I woll nat feyn oon woord, as makers doon to ryme, / But counsell 
yewe as prudently as God woll send me grace” (2462–3).34 Geffrey’s pointed 
disparagement of poetic “makers” as feigners of words and his opposition of those 
makers to prudent counsel, divinely inspired, dramatically contrasts with the 
narrative’s earlier nostalgia for the work of “old wise poetes” (750).35, 36 
Geffrey’s promise not to feign, delivered before he has undertaken to disguise 
himself and perform as a fool, anticipates and fends off the routinely-made accusation 
that those who perform folly are feigning disability for their own gain. It does so at the 
expense of the tale’s fictional and nonfictional inventors: its rhymed dig at the feigning 
of “makers” asks the poem’s readers to question the veracity of every level of the fiction 
the poem’s own maker has so elaborately constructed. Indeed, the Merchant has 
prefaced the Tale of Beryn by exhibiting a certain anxious desire to emphasize the 
unembroidered quality of his tale. Saying that he will tell a tale to please his Host, he 
prefaces the beginning of his tale with a disclaimer about its lack of artifice: 
“With this I be excused of my rudines,º   ignorance 
Allthoughe I cannat peynt my tale but tell as it is, 
Lepyng over no centence,º as ferforth asº I may, essential point; to the extent 
But tell yewe the yolkeº and put the white away.” [of an egg] 
(729–32) 
 
The Merchant’s assertion that he “cannat peynt [his] tale” serves as a subtle and sly 
acknowledgement of lack of ability.37 His averred lack of ability to deliver anything 
other than the essential “yolke” of his story harmonizes with Geffrey’s promise not to 
feign like a maker of ryme, even as both men’s claims ring dissonantly with the rhymed 
couplets that serve as the selfsame medium for their tales. Both of these men, notably, 
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are claiming to lack specialized ability and thereby positioning themselves as normative 
figures amid broader societal disabilities and hyper-abilities. 
Indeed, Geffrey himself claims that his motivation for hatching the plot to help 
Beryn stems from his resentment at the townsfolk’s corruption of their own modes of 
knowing—that is, their self-disabling cognitive bent. Shortly after Geffrey delivers his 
promise not to feign, he launches into his plan to don the guise—and, indeed, feign the 
part—of a fool in order to appear before the court and defend Beryn. He clearly spells 
out his motivation for doing so. He tells Beryn how the townsfolk use “hir fals lawe” to 
deal treacherously with all strangers within their borders: “For they think litill elles, and 
all hir wittes fyve, / Save to have a mannes good and to benym his lyve” (2586, 2587–8). 
His own words point back to the poem’s earlier articulation of anxiety about the ever-
deteriorating nature of the five wits. He blasts the townsfolk’s direction of their pursuits 
toward “trechery” and against “trowth […] and reson” (2584). He suggests that the 
citizens’ insistence on “think[ing of] litill else” than treachery and bending “all hir 
wittes fyve” toward entrapping strangers disables the townsfolk’s own cognitive 
agility—a critique to which the poem repeatedly returns. The language Geffrey employs 
here reinforces his condemnation of the townsfolk: they are not merely robbing their 
visitors but working to “benym”—entrap and seize—their lives. Geffrey’s choice of a 
strengthened form of the Middle English verb “nimen” stands out: the Oxford English 
Dictionary notes that the prefix “be-” attached to a stem “naturally intensifies the sense 
of the verb” and often creates a stronger verb with “a privative force.”38 The cumulative 
effect of Geffrey’s diatribe is to declare that the citizens’ privation of visitors serves as a 
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privation of their own five wits: their determination to “benym” lives springs from their 
self-limiting of their own “wittes fyve” to the knowledge and practice of treachery. 
To combat this self-disabling of cognition and moral judgment among the people 
of the town, Geffrey undergoes a thorough physical transformation in order to take on 
his role as a fool before the court of law. He takes on the outer disarray that typifies the 
fool, ordering that his head and beard alike be carelessly shorn. The shearing of the 
fool’s head, a recurring motif throughout premodern English literature and 
iconography of fooling, sets the fool apart visually, indicating his cognitive difference 
from his audience: 
“Have no dout,” quod Geffrey; “beth mery; let me aloon. 
Geteth a peir sisours, shereth my berd anoon, 
And afterward lete top my hede hastlych and blyve.” 
 Som went to with sesours, som with a knyfe, 
So what for sorowe and hast, and for lewd tole,º crude instruments 
There was no man alyve betº like to a fole  more 
Then Geffrey was, by that tyme they had al i-do. (2914–2020) 
 
Once shorn, Geffrey tells a series of ridiculously inane jokes, causing all around to 
“[laugh] at him hertlich” (3082). Geffrey’s alteration of his appearance and his verbal 
performance together do the trick. The poem portrays the effects of Geffrey’s 
performance of folly as a disabling of his audience’s already uncertain cognitive 
abilities. In this way, the poem suggests that the feigning fool’s performance of cognitive 
disability makes him an agent of disability. For example, Hanybald the provost’s 
assessment of Geffrey’s appearance and manner shows how thoroughly Hanybald is 
convinced that Geffrey is truly a fool, cognitively disabled by nature: 
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Hanybald loked on Geffrey as he were amased, º  insane 
And beheld his contenaunce and howe he was i-rased,º shaved 
But evermore he thought that he was a fole, 
Naturell of kynde, and had noon other tool,º   means 
As semed by his wordes and his visage both, 
And thought it had been foly to wex with hym wroth. (2933–8) 
 
This compact description shows how the Tale of Beryn is representing the townsfolk’s 
ideas of congenital cognitive disability. The terms in which it represents such ideas—“a 
fole, / Naturell of kynde,” resurface many times throughout fourteenth- through 
seventeenth-century English fool literature. Hanybald’s belief that Geffrey is a “fole” 
receives the appositive elaboration that, as a fool, Geffrey is assumed to be “naturell of 
kynde.” In premodern English literature, the term “naturell” refers to the type of fool 
believed to be cognitively disabled by birth or happenstance. “Kynde,” when used of a 
person, may refer to inherent qualities of character, to outward appearance, to feelings, 
to habits, to class or station, to lineage, to family or clan, and to a range of other traits 
that might be subsumed under the category of one’s congenital state.39 The redundancy 
of the phrase “naturell of kynde” drives home its point. Calling Geffrey “a fole, naturall 
of kynde” is twice calling that person’s folly inherent—much like calling him “naturally 
natural.” As Mark Twain said of a similarly emphatic redundancy he encountered in his 
German studies, “I consider that that person is over-described.”40 
The effect of this over-description is to show how completely Geffrey’s 
performance of folly has taken in both Hanybald and Geffrey’s broader audience. At the 
same time, by portraying the disabling effects on the townsfolk of Geffrey’s 
performance of folly, the poem sets up the feigning fool as a disabling agent. Edward 
Wheatley’s careful comparison of the treatment of disability in the Tale of Beryn and its 
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French source, Bérinus, suggests that this concern is particular to the Beryn-writer, who 
evinces far more interest than his sources do in the effects of Geffrey’s performance.41 
Wheatley writes, “The English Geoffrey is also far more performative as a fool than the 
French Gieffroy: he warms up the crowd with his wit before the arrival of the false 
accusers, and they repeatedly ‘laughed at him hertlich.’”42 Indeed, the lines 
immediately preceding this laughter further emphasize how deeply Geffrey’s auditors 
are taken in by his disheveled appearance and verbal antics: 
Thus Geffrey stode oppon a fourm,º for he wold be seyº bench; seen 
Above all other, the shuldres and the cry, 
And stared al aboute, with his lewd berd, 
And was i-hold a verry fole of ech man hym herd. (3077–80) 
 
Not only does the description “verry fole” describe how completely the townsfolk 
believe in Geffrey’s quintessential folly, but even the mention of his “lewd berd” 
suggests that Geffrey’s audience regards him as vulgar, misshapen in both appearance 
and wit. Indeed, it is the thoroughgoing success of Geffrey’s “lewd” performance of 
folly that enables his stealthy legal victory. As Wheatley states, “Geoffrey’s feigned 
disability leads to poetic justice for Beryn, but it also becomes a lesson to readers about 
misplaced belief in people who appear to be impaired. [. . .] The citizens’ reaction to the 
fool shows that they are conditioned to respond with derisory laughter that keeps them 
from looking at him seriously, for he is actually a man they already know.”43 As if to 
confirm this point, the poem again describes the townsfolk’s mistake in terms of failed 
knowledge when it says that “al that herd hym” laughed at Geffrey’s jesting words: 
“For they knewe hym noon other but a fole of kynde” (2965). The modifier “of kynde” 
reminds the poem’s readers that Geffrey’s performance of folly has been so successful 
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as to make his audience believe that it is no performance at all. He has pulled 
particularly opaque epistemological blinkers over his auditors’ eyes, limiting their 
ability to know him as anything other than the fool he feigns to be. 
At the same time, the poem elsewhere suggests that Geffrey’s auditors’ 
epistemological blinkers are self-made. In fact, the phrase “knewe […] noon other” 
closely echoes the poem’s earlier withering critique of the townsfolk, of whom it is said, 
“[E]very man his purpose was to have parte / With falsnes and with soteltees; they 
coud noon other art” (2003–4). The Beryn-poet’s employment of the verb “connen”—in 
the stern phrase “they could noon other”—deftly disparages the townsfolk’s knowledge 
and ability in the same syllable. Indeed, as the idiom “connen art” denotes possession of 
the knowledge necessary to perform a crafty trick, the poet suggests the townsfolk’s 
limitation of their knowledge to the single cognitive trick of knowing and performing 
false deeds. The narrative construes this falseness as simultaneously a moral failure and 
an epistemological failure: the townsfolk’s lack of “other art” is a deficit that precludes 
modes of acquiring and deploying non-deceitful knowledge. Later, when Beryn has 
triumphed over the townsfolk through Geffrey’s performance, the Steward uses “art” to 
denote the capacious cognitive abilities that have enabled the success of Beryn and his 
compatriots: 
“These Romeyns,” quod the Steward, “been wonder scly, 
And eke right ynmagytyff and of sotill art.” (3526–7) 
 
The Steward’s description of the Romans’ “sotill art” rings changes on the narrative’s 
earlier critical description of the townsfolk’s lack of any “art” but “soteltees” and 
“falsnes” (3526, 2004). The Steward clearly means to cast aspersions on “scly,” 
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“ynmagytyff,” and “sotill” modes of wielding cognition—the very modes of cognition 
that are repeatedly said to characterize his fellow citizens. A few lines later, Hanybald 
complains that Geffrey has “caught us even by the shyn / With his sotill wittes in our 
own gren” (3891–2). The application of the adjective “sotill” to Geffrey’s “wittis” echoes 
both the poem’s description of the townsfolk’s “soteltees” (2004) and the poem’s 
participation in the “five wits” tradition. “Sotill wittes” serves as a particularly stark 
term in the context of a complaint that the townsfolk have been caught in their own 
“gren.” Indeed, although the poem repeatedly touches on the superior dexterity of 
Geffrey’s intellect, it simultaneously suggests that the townsfolk have been hoist by 
their own petard. While the poem at first seems to suggest that Geffrey’s fooling takes 
in his audience, it ultimately portrays Geffrey’s fooling as an unveiling of his audience’s 
existing epistemological deficits.  
Geffrey displays his cognitive ability by successfully defending Beryn against his 
accusers. He does so not by answering Beryn’s false accusers with truth, but by one-
upping them with even bigger whoppers that win the case. These whoppers, in 
addition to Geffrey’s fooling, engender another layer of epistemological confusion in 
the poem. 
This episode in the courtroom, which seems antithetical to Geffrey’s earlier 
rejection of feigning words, has attracted attention from scholars investigating the legal 
systems presented in the Tale of Beryn.44 R. Evan Davis suggested that the tale portrays 
and critiques a legal system, based on Roman civil law, that diverges from the 
principles of English common law.45 In other words, the tale marshals its critique by 
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portraying Roman civil law as more obstreperously inflexible that it was in actual 
practice. Davis shows that, because of the inflexibility of Roman civil law as portrayed 
in the Tale of Beryn, Geffrey has to resort to “fabricating bigger lies” than his opponents’ 
in order to win the day for Beryn.46 Of Geffrey’s fabrications, Davis says, “Certainly not 
a single human being in that courtroom believes a word of what Geffrey says, yet the 
rules of that court force them to sit there and accept pure fiction as legal fact.”47 
Guillemette Bolens takes Davis’ observations farther, arguing that Geffrey explicitly 
“link[s] law and fiction production” by inventing “legal fictions” to bolster his pleading 
on Beryn’s behalf.48, 49 The point of these legal fictions is not to deceive. Rather, as 
Bolens puts it, “As far as Beryn is concerned, neither its readers—interested in sotilté—
nor Geoffrey’s court audience are meant to believe or take as facts the fictions offered in 
the pleas and counterpleas. Both categories of auditor are supposedly well versed in the 
art of subtlety and in the use and reception of such legal narratives.”50 Indeed, she says, 
“When Geoffrey debates at length with the blind man about circulating eyes, the text 
parades its fictional quality.”51 Davis and Bolens’ contributions, taken together, suggest 
that these legal fictions are mandated by the legal system of the poem. Nonetheless, the 
enforcers of this legal system are ultimately taking in by a greater fiction. 
Geffrey’s feigning of folly is the fiction that creates the tale’s most shocking 
reveal. His fictional feigning expands the significance of the tale beyond law to the 
broader moral character of the populace. The revelation of Geffrey’s hyper-ability puts 
his audience in the fool’s place: 
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Evander the Steward and al men that were there 
Had mervill much of Geffrey that spak so redely,º wisely 
Whose wordes thertofor semed al foly, 
And were astonyed cleenº and gan for to drede. were stunned 
And every man til other lenedº with his hede  to another inclined 
And seyd, “He reported the tale right formally. 
He was no fool in certen, but wise, wareº and scly,º astute; sly 
For he hath but i-japedº us and scorned heretofore, jested with 
And we have hold hym a fole, but we be wel more!” (3450–8) 
 
This reversal—beyond the shaving of his head and appearing “naturell of kynde” (2936) 
that take in the spectators—is the act that designates Geffrey’s performance a fool’s 
performance. The fool’s reversal is the move by which the fool shows his auditors that 
they, not he, are the foolish ones.52 In this particular fool’s reversal, Geffrey “hath i-
japed” his audience not, as they initially thought, by silly riddles. Rather, he engenders 
“mervill” and “drede” in them by showing that the lone, ostracized, disabled character 
they have taken him to be is the only figure in the courtroom capable of showing to 
them their own cognitive failures. The fool’s reversal thus up-ends (turns “vpsodom,” 
as a Wycliffite might say) the attributions of individuals’ knowledge and cognitive 
abilities in the tale. Disability studies enables us to see this fool’s reversal and its effects 
as an implicit meditation on varieties of ability. The fool’s reversal re-distributes the 
attributions of hyper- and disability in the tale. 
Over and over again, the tale explicitly shows that Geffrey is telling bold-faced 
lies—a trope often analyzed in disability studies, which has considered how disabled 
people are frequently accused of feigning their disability. Significantly, the Tale of Beryn 
presents an alternative world in which feigning is first undetected and, ultimately, 
celebrated. Indeed, when Geffrey educates Beryn at the close of the tale, his feigning of 
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folly and his web of fictions become the foundation of a wise, effectual form of 
education. 
As we have seen, the fool’s reversal is a work of re-distribution that destabilizes 
the notion of cognitive difference that his audience might otherwise posit between 
themselves and him. Still, the Tale of Beryn’s handling of folly and the “five wits” topos 
can neither be read as an unalloyed celebration of cognitive disability nor a clear 
expression of disdain for disability and disabled people’s value to society. On the one 
hand, Geffrey’s simulation of folly works precisely because it is a simulation—that is, 
because it locates hyper-ability, rather than disability or impairment, in the person of 
Geffrey the “fool.” The tale’s reliance on the hyper-ability behind Geffrey’s performance 
precludes a neat reading of Geffrey as disabled hero. On the other hand, this very 
complexity in the tale generates an exploration of multifaceted modes of cognition. 
Geffrey’s hyper-ability to perform the role of one who is by all appearances congenitally 
foolish (that is, “naturell of kynde,” 2936) is contrasted with the townsfolk’s explicit 
refusal to know any art but falseness. Indeed, if folly serves as both a cognitive deficit 
and an instrument for pointing out cognitive deficits, then Geffrey’s very performance is 
necessitated by the folly of the broader society. As the tale’s participation in medieval 
“five wits” literature shows, the cognitive abilities of the entire society—not only of 
mere individuals—have been disabled. By the end of the tale, so prominent is the model 
of shared cognitive disability that no one but that mysterious impersonator, Geffrey, is 
allowed to consider himself wise. Beryn, parents, townsfolk, officials, and even 
readers—all who come into contact with this odd little fiction must question their own 
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The way in which the Beryn-writer de-centers Chaucer’s authorial status by 
performing it anew may also be read as feigning of poetic ability and status—or, 
indeed, as a form of passing.53 Just as Geffrey passes as a “cripill” and then a “verry 
fole” among the townsfolk, the Tale of Beryn passes as a Chaucerian invention among 
the tales of the Northumberland manuscript.54 Its attempt to pass as a Canterbury Tale is 
noteworthy, even though its differences from Geoffrey Chaucer’s own tales have long 
been recognized by scholars.55, 56 While Geffrey’s passing engenders epistemological 
confusion, calling into question the townsfolk’s ability to know truly—that is, to 
“connen art” other than trickery, the Tale itself proffers another possibility for the value 
of passing. Beryn serves as an especially acute reading of Chaucer, although one notably 
out of step with contemporaneous fifteenth-century readings. As Karen Winstead notes, 
fifteenth-century writers overwhelmingly lauded Chaucer for his work’s didactic 
merits, but the Beryn-writer pays homage to Chaucerian humor: for example, the 
Prologue of Beryn imitates Chaucer’s flair for rollicking situational comedy.57 In a similar 
vein, the joking riddles Geffrey tells during his performance of fooling at the law-court 
attempt to channel Chaucer’s verbal wit.58 In these ways, Beryn’s passing as a 
Chaucerian tale opens avenues to knowing the Chaucerian corpus that are otherwise 
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unavailable in fifteenth-century tributes to Chaucer. It thus demonstrates that passing 
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Chapter 2 
Robert of Cisyle, King Turned Fool 
 
Robert of Cisyle, a medieval romance about a king who is punished for his 
foolish deeds by being compelled to serve as his own court’s fool, explores the 
visible manifestations of an invisible disability—that is, folly. Unlike the Tale of 
Beryn, Robert of Cisyle deals with no witty characters who feign folly for a specific 
end. Rather, the fifteenth-century romance proffers a portrait of a fool who is 
bereft of able cognitive and moral judgment. It positions fools and kings as polar 
opposites: kings as those who ought to have wise moral judgment and fools as 
those whose disabled moral judgment brings about their downfall. It presents a 
hierarchical view of social class and cognitive difference: those of a high class are 
expected to possess outstanding cognitive abilities, and vice versa. Trouble 
brews when these neat alliances do not obtain. In the story, King Robert is clearly 
expected to play the role of a benevolent, wise king. When he fails to do so, 
however, an angel appears and tells Robert that he will be compelled to take on 
the role of court fool as punishment. When, having refused to acknowledge his 
folly, he prays to confess it, the Angel restores him to his former place as king. 
Robert commands that his story of descent into the role of a fool and his 
restoration to the position of king be written. He then sends the story to his 
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brother, the pope, who disseminates the story by preaching it as a homiletic 
example. The romance thus paints a relentlessly critical portrait of fools, whose 
intertwined cognitive and moral failings are depicted as directly responsible for 
their inherent lack of dignity. 
Although scholars have previously written about the romance’s 
metafictional dénouement, its treatment of Robert’s pride, and its similarities to 
Sir Gowther and King Lear, no one has yet recognized its theorization of folly as 
cognitive disability.1 As this chapter will demonstrate, Robert of Cisyle proffers 
several clear models of cognitive disability. First, disability is portrayed as 
simultaneously a moral and cognitive deficit—its moral and cognitive 
dimensions appearing here, as elsewhere in the texts this project examines, as 
inextricably intertwined concepts.2 Second, cognitive disability qua folly is 
framed as both the cause of and the punishment for sin. Third, disability serves 
at the end of the story as a deterrent: Robert’s fate as the king humbled by his 
demotion to fool becomes the homiletic example used to enjoin repentance. These 
models come together in Robert of Cisyle to form a critique of folly that is 
unalleviated by any witty fool’s reversal, such as the one performed by Geffrey 
in the Tale of Beryn.3 
The romance Robert of Cisyle is extant in ten manuscripts that stretch from 
around 1380 to 1500.4 There is evidence that the story was also adapted as a play 
and performed in Chester in the early sixteenth century.5 This romance, then, 
underwent a shift from narrative poem to play that also coincided with broader, 
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trans-generic, trans-periodic shifts in the fool literature—from poetry to drama, 
from pre- to post-Reformation. The Robert of Cisyle narrative’s movement from 
poem to play, variously religious to variously secular manuscript contexts, and 
medieval to early modern literature is emblematic of the complex genealogy of 
premodern English literary fooling.6 It exemplifies the rich poetic tradition that is 
lost if early modern dramatic fools are read in isolation from non-dramatic 
literature. 
The narrative emphasizes the mutability of cognitive ability and social 
status—that is, the ways in which cognitive and social failure are coordinates of 
one another. These forms of failure are likewise a feature of fooling in the English 
literary textual tradition, recurring in numerous texts in the broad trans-
Reformation period. The textual tradition of the Robert of Cisyle romance, 
specifically, goes to great lengths to provide consistent, almost catalogic allusions 
to Robert’s erroneous thoughts and beliefs, as well as his unstableness of heart 
and mind. The poem itself then accords Robert the visible effects of his inward 
errors by giving him the trappings of a fool. 
Robert of Cisyle thus offers one of the most explicit connections between 
erroneous thought and the outward manifestations of folly of the texts in this 
project. Robert’s habiliments during his sojourn as a fool and his companionship 
with an ape are portrayed as parodic signs of his undone dignity. The tale’s 
insistence that Robert’s folly should be made visible—literally visible, as 
habiliments that parody his former kingship—foregrounds the perceived 
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unsuitability of his high social station to his status as a cognitively disabled 
figure. The outer manifestations of Robert’s disability force him to acknowledge, 
in the romance’s logic, his inner deficits. The possibility of restoration comes only 
when he himself acknowledges the magnitude of the social descent from his 
once-high position as monarch to his compelled shame in his role as fool. 
The audacity of Robert of Cisyle’s portrayal of a king as someone capable of 
tumbling down the courtly hierarchy to the lowly position of fool has received 
surprisingly little attention. Post-Shakespearean scholars may have encountered 
Robert of Cisyle with so little surprise because the romance has been cited as a 
precursor to King Lear, perhaps the most renowned tale of a king’s decline in 
post-classical western literature.7 Yet taking Robert of Cisyle on its own medieval 
terms foregrounds the shock of its portrayal of regnant disability. Raluca 
Radulescu’s book, a notable exception, builds on Paul Strohm’s argument that 
the early-fifteenth-century Lancastrians, anxious about their shaky claims to 
legitimate monarchy, propped up those claims with an elaborate web of cultural 
fictions and propaganda.8 Radulescu suggests that Strohm’s thesis concerning 
monarchical anxiety might be extended chronologically throughout the 
remainder of the century, as well as generically—to medieval romances: 
Monarchical crises and collapses in governance at the centre, in the 
provinces and abroad were factors that influenced the reading 
experiences of fifteenth-century audiences. This is the century that 
saw no fewer than seven kings (from Richard II to Henry Tudor) 
and five depositions or falls from power (Richard II, Henry VI—
twice, Edward IV and Richard III) accompanied by changes of 
dynasty, as well as the anxious period of minority of England’s 
youngest ever monarch, Henry VI. Spaced at increasingly shorter 
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intervals, these political upheavals left significant traces in the 
collective memory.9 
 
It is within this context, which overlaps with the more than century-long 
production of the ten manuscripts that contain Robert of Cisyle, that we must 
consider the strange tenacity of a story that takes the self-inflicted deposition of a 
king as its framing device. As Strohm’s and Radulescu’s work suggests, 
medieval readers would have encountered romances’ literary depictions of the 
fortunes of fictional kings against the historical backdrop of actual English 
monarchs whose reigns depended to a significant extent on the spinning of 
fictional webs. 
Indeed, in the middle of the fifteenth century, the suggestion that King 
Henry VI resembled a fool was investigated as seditious speech. Henry VI was 
later remembered for his tenuous grasp on kingly power, and he was 
posthumously venerated for this shaky reign, which was seen by devotees as a 
lack of concern for worldly, secular things.10 Despite this memorialization, 
though, the comparison of the king to a fool served in 1450 as grounds for a 
formal indictment: 
It is to be inquired for our sovereign lord the king whether 
John Merfeld of Brightling in the shire of Sussex, husbandman, and 
William Merfeld of Brightling in the shire aforesaid, husbandman, 
at Brightling in the open market the Sunday in the feast of Saint 
Anne, the 28th year of our sovereign lord [26 July 1450], falsely said 
that the king was a natural fool and would often hold a staff in his 
hands with a bird on the end, playing therewith as a fool, and that 
another king must be ordained to rule the land, saying that the king 
was no person able to rule the land. [. . .] 
Also the said John at Brightling on St James’s eve, the 28th 
year above said [24 July], falsely said that he and his fellowship 
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would rise again and when they were up, they would leave no 
gentleman alive but such as they pleased to have.11 
 
The move from calling the king a natural fool—indeed, citing his kingly 
habiliments as the reason to do so—and threatening a bloody uprising, however 
paratactically, is a strikingly direct one. Presumably the remark’s bluntness 
accounts for the need for juridical follow-up: A. R. Myers’ reprint of the 
indictment adds, “An endorsement shows that on 1 July 1451 a jury declared this 
to be a true bill.”12 Radulescu, who cites the portion of the incident in which John 
Merfeld called the king a fool but does not note Merfeld’s threat to “rise again 
and [. . .] leave no gentleman alive,” comments that “[a]lthough the remark 
displays the offender’s ignorance (he did not understand the significance of the 
rod with the dove, part of the regalia), it is interesting to note how the varied 
imperial emblems of sceptre and orb could be mocked as the sceptre-like stick 
and round-white disk sometimes associated with the medieval fool.”13 
If the trappings of kingship could so easily be mistaken for their parodic 
inversions, it is noteworthy that both the 1450 indictment of Merfeld and the 
pan-fifteenth-century Robert of Cisyle attempt so strenuously to maintain the 
presumptive distance between kingly and foolish roles. Because the indictment 
predates Henry VI’s eventual deposition and readeption, it is altogether too 
tempting to read the document as a hint of the turbulence yet to come for Henry 
and his subjects. While no such easy teleology is possible, it is feasible to note the 
threat that the breakdown in propaganda permits. This indictment, like the 
Robert of Cisyle romance, implicitly holds that even the potential cognitive 
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disability of the king would represent the ultimate calamity to both the kingly 
person and the realm. The romance—whose manuscripts both predate and post-
date Henry VI and all his troubles—neatly skirts the question of wider dangers 
to the realm by means of a near-literal deus ex machina in the form of the angel 
who rules wisely in Robert’s stead. Moreover, the king’s restoration requires that 
he leave behind the residue of folly in order to resume his former high place in 
the social hierarchy. Yet both the romance and the indictment pin their anxieties 
about the weaknesses of kingship on the hapless figure of the utterly cognitively 
disabled “natural fool.” The notional character of the fool himself and the less 
tangible specter of incipient cognitive disability serve as the much-maligned 
figure who, juxtaposed against the kingly body, awakens subjects’ and readers’ 
fears. 
From its outset, the romance ties Robert’s impending descent to his 
cognitive-moral errors. It begins not by portraying Robert as a king given over 
specifically to folly, but by outlining the errors in his way of thinking. As 
previous critics have noted, the romance sets up its story of Robert’s downfall by 
pointing out his overweening pride, which foreshadows his fall.14 One of the first 
passages that focuses on Robert’s pride, however, does so by implying that this 
pride is the result of erroneous thought: 
25 The kyng thoughte, he hedde° no peer  had 
In al the worlde, fer no neer; 
And in his thought he hedde pryde, 
For he was nounpeer in uch a syde.°  arbiter on either side 
(ll. 25–28, emphasis added) 
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Here, the poem gives an attribution for Robert’s pride: “in his thought he hedde 
pryde” (27). The poem is keen to focus on the problem in Robert’s cognitive 
processes: while pride is mentioned at the outset and in a few other key moments 
of the story, the romance’s language reminds its readers, far more assiduously, 
that Robert repeatedly manifests errors in thought. His errors, by their 
association with pride, acquire a negative moral valence. 
Robert of Cisyle’s association of sinful pride with thought gone awry is 
typical of late medieval texts. In the Wycliffites’ vernacular translation of the 
gospel of Mark, produced the decade before the Vernon manuscript, Jesus 
exhorts his disciples not to worry about physically contaminating their bodies 
through food—which “may not defoule [a man], for it hath not entrid into his 
herte, but in to the wombe, and bynethe it goth out, purgynge alle metis.”15 
Instead, Jesus warns against internal sources of “defoulyng”: “For the thingis 
that gon out of a man, tho defoulen a man. Forsoth fro withynne, of the herte of 
men comen forth yvele thouȝtis, [. . .] blasphemyes, pride, folye.”16, 17 This litany of 
errors enumerates pride, folly, and evil thoughts alike among many inward 
qualities that “defoulen a man” and thereby prove themselves more deleterious 
than the innocuously scatological process of “purgynge alle metis.” 
In a similar vein, Robert of Cisyle’s assertion that “in his thought [Robert] 
hedde pryde” invokes an interlinked network of inward errors that Middle 
English literature often identifies as both moral and cognitive. Premodern 
English literature often—though not exclusively—discusses cognitive function in 
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terms of moral categories.18 These cognitive and moral categories are 
simultaneously implicated with issues of class. Thus, in this romance, Robert’s 
folly is depicted as incongruous with his kingliness; he must be brought “lowe” 
(e.g., ll. 45–46 ff.), descending to the status his moral and cognitive disability 
warrants, until his cognition, his moral capacity, and his status can be 
simultaneously restored. 
The romance intimates the necessity for this fall and restoration by 
proffering an almost catalogic list of Robert’s errors in thought, particularly in 
the plot-catalyzing scene in which he goes to church to hear the Magnificat at 
evensong. Once again, the narrative describes Robert’s thought as replete with 
moral errors: 
At midsomer, a Seynt Jones Niht, 
30 The kyng to churche com ful riht, 
Forto heeren his evensong. 
Hym thoughte, he dwelled ther ful long: 
He thoughte more in worldes honour, 
Than in Crist, ur saveour. (29–34, emphasis added) 
 
Both instances of the verb “thoughte” point toward errors in Robert’s judgment: 
he grows impatient at the amount of time he has spent at evensong (l. 32), and he 
esteems “worldes honour” more than “Crist, ur saveour.” The poem’s phrasing 
of Robert’s error-laden thoughts via active verbs subtly signals that Robert’s 
cognitive processes are warping his perception of the world. 
The following lines highlight Robert’s lack of learning—a quality that is 
elsewhere associated with the folly of men of high social status.19 The poem 
indicates that the king needs to have this very familiar Latin liturgy translated 
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into the vernacular: 
35 In “Magnificat” he herde a verse, 
He made a clerk hit him rehers 
In langage of his owne tonge, 
In Latyn he nuste,° that heo songe. He did not know Latin 
(35–8) 
 
Once more, Robert’s knowledge is summarized in the negative (“nuste,” l. 38). A 
later manuscript variant offers a version of this line—“ffor in latene wyste he not 
what þey songe”—that even more emphatically frames Robert’s ignorance of 
Latin as a negation of potential knowledge (CUL Ff. 2. 38, l. 38). 
The explication of this gap in Robert’s knowledge leads to seemingly 
prescient lines about the precariousness of high social status. Once translated by 
the clerk, the verse from the Magnificat ominously and pointedly foreshadows 
Robert’s fall from his high position: 
The vers was this, I telle the: 
40 Deposuit potentes de sede, 
Et exaltavit humiles. 
This was the vers, withouten les.°  lies 
The clerk seide anone right;°  right away 
“Sire, such is Godes miht, 
45 That he may make heyghte° lowe, high 
And lowe heighe in luytel throwe. 
God may do, withoute lyghe,°  lie 
His wil in twynklyng of an eighe.” (39–48) 
 
These verses, followed almost immediately in the narrative by Robert’s demotion 
to the role of his own court’s fool, implicitly couch fooling as the inversion of 
kingship. These relatively few lines of the poem themselves focus on inverted 
relationships. They pointedly pair verbs of downfall and uplift: “Deposuit [. . .] 
exaltavit” (40–41). They employ chiasmus to show the precariousness of social 
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status: “heyghte lowe, / And lowe heighe” (46–7). The near-synonymity created 
by the articulation of these paired opposites in close proximity echoes psalmic 
pairing of synonyms and thus lends a liturgical cadence to the extra-liturgical 
poetry. The liturgical cadence gives the clerk’s words a quasi-prophetic quality in 
advance of Robert’s impending fall; later, the similarly liturgical cadence of 
Robert’s prayer will play a role in effecting his restoration. 
The poem attributes the impending reversal of Robert’s position in the 
social hierarchy to his dogged moral-cognitive errors. Robert’s inversion-to-come 
seems ever more inevitable—to all but Robert, that is. Again effectually 
demonstrating his erroneous thinking, Robert scoffs at the clerk’s translation of 
Mary’s words: 
The kyng seide with herte unstable: 
50 “Al your song is fals and fable! 
What mon hath such pouwer, 
Me to bringe lowe in daunger? 
I am flour of chivalrye, 
Myn enemys I may distruye; 
55 No mon lyveth in no londe, 
That me may withstonde. 
Then is this a song of nouht!” 
This errour he hede in thought. (49–58) 
 
The king’s disdain for the “fals and fable” liturgy follows a tradition of Middle 
English invective that associates “fable” with lying—e.g., Lydgate’s reference to 
“A fable vnsoth, / Falsly feyned” and the Romaunt of the Rose’s assertion that 
“paramours do but feyn [. . .] / With many a lesyng and many a fable.”20, 21 That 
the king holds the evensong liturgy on par with other untrue fables bodes ill for 
him. A few lines later, the poet deftly undermines Robert’s assessment of the 
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liturgy—“song of nouht!”—with the rhyme at the end of the self-same couplet, 
which explicitly names Robert’s assessment an “errour.” More subtly, the poet 
features, but does not name, the category error Robert commits when he 
questions “Godes miht” by asking, “What mon hath such pouwer, / Me to 
bringe lowe in daunger?” (51–2). “Mon” functions here more as an indefinite 
pronoun than as a term for “human.” Still, by including God among the more 
generalized populace that might be described as “mon,” Robert skirts the edge of 
species confusion. This theme will return later in the poem, when Robert is 
demoted to the rank of ape’s companion. More explicitly, the erroneous 
assessment of the king’s “herte unstable” is made more pointed in the later CUL 
Ff. 2.38 variant, which speaks of the king’s “þoȝt vnstabull” (l. 39, emphasis 
added). The two texts’ almost seamless alternation of “herte” and “þoȝt” finds 
resonance within both the Latin and English texts of the Magnificat itself, 
suggesting a conceptual conflation of these centers of embodied apprehension. 
These repeated emphases on Robert’s warped cognition hint at the 
punishment he is about to incur by refusing to acknowledge his low position in 
the divine-human hierarchy. Robert’s foolish assessment of his own position is 
thrown into relief by the implied surrounding context of the Magnificat liturgy 
itself, in which Mary’s language emphasizes that the proud are humbled by the 
power of God’s mind. For example, in the Old Vulgate Latin text, Mary says, 
“Fecit potentiam in brachio suo: dispersit superbos mente cordis sui.” The 
Tyndale Bible, translated from Greek, would later render this verse, “He hath 
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shewed strengthe with his arme, he hath scattered them that are proude in the 
ymmaginacion of their hertes.”22 The Wycliffite translation of the same verse 
suggests that, during the time of production and circulation of the Vernon 
manuscript, this vernacular rendering of the Lucan tradition valorized God’s 
well-performing mind and heart: the Wycliffite Bible translates the Latin as “he 
scateride proude men with mynde of his herte.”23, 24 The effect of this Wycliffite 
version is to emphasize the power of God’s mind and heart vis-à-vis humans’ 
erroneous and unstable faculties.  
In the landscape of the romance, Robert’s insistent moral and cognitive 
errors cannot go unremarked or unpunished. Robert does continue to claim that 
he is too high to be brought low, citing his claim to “dignité.” When the angel 
appears and says to him, “Thou art a fol,” he rebuffs the assertion by saying, 
[. . .] Thou shalt wite wel, 
That I am kyng and kyng wol be, 
With wronge thou hast my dignité. 
The Pope of Roome is my brother 
150 And the emperour myn other. (146–50) 
 
It is a bold move: Robert, who has already been described as having “errour [. . .] 
in thought” (58) claims that the angel is the one who needs to know better 
(“Thou shalt wite wel,” 146). His insistence that the angel wrongly apprehends 
his true kingly dignity reinforces the poem’s framing of the roles of king and fool 
as polar opposites. The angel more directly contrasts “dignité” with folly in a line 
that is both conceptually and structurally opposed to Robert’s assertion, “I am 
kyng and kyng wol be”: 
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“Thow art my fol,” seide the angel, 
“Thou schal be schoren everichdel,°  shaved completely 
155 Lych° a fool, a fool to be,    Like 
Where is now thi dignité?” (153–6) 
 
The angel’s declaration that Robert is “my fol, [. . .] / Lych a fool. A fool to be” 
connects folly to the loss of the very “dignité” Robert has previously claimed for 
himself while opposing the angel. Loss of “dignité” serves both as the 
punishment for Robert’s foolish pride and the corollary of his cognitive failures. 
Fittingly, then, Robert’s loss of “dignité” is evinced in new trappings of 
folly: the shearing of his head (see l. 154, above), tattered clothes (156), an ape for 
his counselor (155). The extensive descriptions of Robert’s trappings of folly, 
then, are integral not only to the account of his fall, but also to the romance’s 
portrayal of folly as a cognitive and moral disability. As this and the following 
chapter will show, both medieval and early modern English literature depict the 
outward trappings of folly—shorn head and beard, tassels, motley, baubles, 
etc.—as outward signs of inward cognitive and moral disability. While the 
specific details of such outward trappings vary between different images and 
textual representations, their important function as visual indicators of folly 
remains largely stable across the fourteenth through early seventeenth 
centuries.25 
Robert of Cisyle’s explication of the depth of Robert’s social fall relies on 
Robert’s new-found equivalence to his animal companions. The confusion of 
species—ape with man—harks back to the moment of Robert’s own 
anthropomorphic misprision, in which Robert himself confused God with 
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“mon.” In words clearly intended to show Robert how far he has fallen from his 
kingly station, the angel decrees that Robert shall be paraded around with an 
ape: 
Thi counseyler schal ben an ape, 
And o clothyng° you worth ischape.° one clothing; shall be dressed 
I schal him clothen as thi brother, 
160 Of o clothyng—hit is non other; 
He schal beo thin owne feere,°  companion 
Sum wit of him thou miht lere.°  learn 
(157–62) 
 
The angel remarks repeatedly on how identical Robert’s station will be to the 
ape’s: Robert and the ape will wear identical clothing, as if the ape were Robert’s 
“brother” and “non other”; the ape will be Robert’s “owne feere.” 
The romance uses its ape motif to repeatedly and emphatically portray 
Robert’s fall as a degradation.26 Medieval literature and iconography often depict 
apes, much like fools, as jokers—or “japers”—kept by a lord for his amusement.27 
In The Pilgrimage of the Life of Man, Lydgate has Poverty complain: 
Off ffolkës off dyscressyoun, 
I am had in derysyoun; 
They holde off me but a Iape, 
As a lord dothe off his ape.28 
 
The character Poverty thus explicates a classed hierarchy, in which Robert has 
fallen from the highest to the lowest station. Other Middle English texts perform 
a similarly associative comparison of japers, janglers, apes, and folly. For 
instance, Chaucer’s Parson’s Tale establishes the moral reputation of all these 
figures by associating them with the service of the devil and sins of the tongue: 
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[649] ¶ Now comygh Iangelynge / that may not been withoutyn 
synne And as seyth Salmon it is a synne of a-pert folye / [. . .] 
[651] ¶ Aftyr this comyth the synne of Iaperys / that been 
the deuyllys apis / for they make men to laughe at here folye / & 
at here Iaperyes / as folk doon at the gaudis of an Ape / [. . .] And 
right soo confortyn the vileyns wordis & knakis of Iaperis hem that 
trauayly in the seruyse of the dewil ¶ [653] These been the synnys 
that comyth of the tunge /29 
 
The Parson’s Tale’s direct association of “the deuyllys apis” with laughter and 
“folye” ought to revise the more common scholarly accounts of both apes and 
fools. H. W. Janson’s magisterial and still-cited Apes and Ape Lore in the Middle 
Ages and the Renaissance cogently argues that apes, long considered sinners and 
devilish figures in the Christian tradition, come to be regarded as more amusing, 
fool-like figures in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries—thanks in large part to 
the domesticating effect of the success of the vocational fool in late medieval and 
early Renaissance literature and art.30 This reading of apes, though, relies heavily 
on a celebratory reading of fools. Texts like the Parson’s Tale and Robert of Cisyle 
demonstrate that a more sinister interpretation of fools’ and apes’ pernicious 
effects was readily available to late medieval English readers. 
Indeed, some Lancastrian texts invoked the images of apes and fools to 
show how precarious the king’s position on his throne might be—and how easily 
disparaging words might damage his position. One such cautionary association 
of apes and folly with kingship appears in medieval Anglophone literature from 
Ireland—a translation of the Secreta Secretorum produced in the Pale during the 
reign of Henry V (1422). A passage on the necessity that the king maintain the 
law declares: 
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For manys lawes byth good alwey, Whan thay dyscordyth not from 
the laue of god. By that hit apperyth that a kynge sholde be wyse 
that he be not y-callid an ape. As Seynt bernard Seyth “An 
ape Envyronyth the fole kynge, that sittyth in See, And therfor yf a 
prynce be vnletterid, he sholde aftyr the consaill of letterid men 
wyrche, and hym and his realme gouerne.”31 
 
Although the text claims to be a translation of Aristotle’s advice to Alexander, 
these claims in no way hinder its references to St. Bernard and the book of 
Deuteronomy—or its pointed warnings that kings ought not to be “y-callid” apes 
or fools, but ought to be receptive to the “consaill of letterid men.” These 
standards handily condemn Robert, whose failure to listen to the lettered clerk’s 
liturgical translation makes him both a fool and an ape’s social peer. Moreover, 
the Secreta Secretorum’s insinuation that the compound noun “fole kynge” might 
juxtapose folly with kingship—with nary a lexical item as buffer between the two 
titles—is a pointed one, maugre the slight softening of the sentiment via the 
attribution to St. Bernard. 
The poem continues even further in offering a blow-by-blow depiction of 
Robert’s long fall down the hierarchical rungs of the courtly ladder. Robert’s 
punishment by species confusion is intensified. As if to show that Robert can lose 
even more status than he loses in being paraded around as an ape’s peer, the 
angel relegates Robert to eating meals with the hounds—after the hounds, in fact: 
Houndes, how so hit bifalle, 
Schulen eten° with the in halle;  Shall eat 
165 Thou schalt eten on the ground; 
Thin assayour° schal ben an hound, taster 
To assaye° thi mete bifore the;  test 
Wher is now thi dignité?” (163–68) 
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Cambridge has a variant line here—the more biting “For thou art a kynge of 
dygnyte” (CUL Ff. 2.38, l. 174).32 Whereas the Vernon line dwells on the king’s 
loss of dignity, Cambridge sarcastically contrasts kingly dignity with the king’s 
newfound dining place beside his own hounds—the lowest of the low creatures 
in the hall, who subsist on the scraps beneath the table. 
Hounds are often used to analogize moral deficiency in premodern texts. 
For example, the Wycliffite Bible proffers an anti-canine proverb that suggests an 
equivalence between dog’s vomit and repeated folly: “As an hound that tourneth 
aȝeen to his vome; so an vnprudent man, that reherseth his folie.”33 If, as the 
romance shows, Robert is determined in his rehearsal of folly, his demotion 
beneath the courtly hounds is a fitting yet rebarbative fate.34 His utter loss of 
status is thus attributed to his determined adherence to cognitive error. 
In other late medieval English texts, dogs are used in analogies that 
explicate fools’ moral corruption—specifically, their corrupt use of good words 
or counsel. A proverb in the Wycliffite translation of Ecclesiasticus says, “An 
arowe fastned in the hipe of a dogge, so a word in the herte of a fool.”35 In a 
collection of proverbs in the Vernon manuscript—that is, the very manuscript 
that elsewhere contains one of the earliest versions of Robert of Cisyle—a 
collection of versified proverbs fleshes out this saying: 
An arwe in an houndes buttoke 
And counseil in a foles herte istoke 
A-cordeþ wel, for nouþur makeþ soiourning; 
Þorw mouþ þei passen wiþ-outen restreyning.36 
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The verse rendition adds to the fool’s half of the biblical saying an extra verb, 
“istoke,” re-articulating the unbudgeable plight of counsel in the fool’s heart. The 
fool’s reception of counsel is analogized to an object stuck in a physical body— 
the metaphorized arrow in the hound’s buttock. The proverb suggests lightly the 
premodern understanding of the fool’s cognition as embodied—enfleshed—and 
the image it calls up of the injured hound hints at a certain possibility for pity, 
even as the proverb itself offers little hope of remedy for the fool. 
Each of these comparisons of Robert to an animal species shows how 
“Godes miht” is “mak[ing] heyghe lowe” (ll. 44–5). Animals are portrayed as 
lowly, morally corrupting members of the court, and the angel repeatedly shows 
Robert-as-fool that he will be equally low. Just as the romance draws a 
distinction between human and animal, it draws one between human social 
classes: the role of king is greater than that of lower people, and the lowest 
person of all is the fool. The romance thus presents a damning portrait of the 
effects of loss of cognitive ability on the now-fool, who loses both the birthright 
to be treated as a king and the species-based right to be treated as a human. 
The story’s almost blow-by-blow explication of Robert’s new-found 
equivalence to these lower forms, couched as a loss of “dignité,” shows how 
thoroughly the romance’s concept of folly as cognitive disability is entwined 
with the questions of class and what it means—or ought to mean—to be a king. 
The much later version of the romance found in CUL Ff. 2.38, which was 
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probably produced one hundred or more years after the Vernon manuscript, 
focuses even more closely on how folly is diametrically opposed to kingship. 
While the great majority of Cambridge’s text is nearly identical to 
Vernon’s, it is about seventy lines longer than Vernon and most of the other early 
manuscripts, largely due to several insertions of lines that elaborate on the more 
direct early versions of the tale. In the section with the angel’s decree that Robert 
will become a fool, then, CUL. Ff. 2.38 adds several lines that specifically cast 
Robert’s trappings of folly as parodies of the customary habiliments of kingship. 
Specifically, it introduces the “babull,” or bauble, which functions as a physical 
parody of the customary kingly scepter. Rather than asking Robert where his 
dignity has vanished, this version’s angel says that Robert’s “babull” shall be his 
dignity, mocking the king’s expected scepter with the accoutrement of folly.37 
Lyke a fole and a fole to bee 
160 Thy babull schall be thy dygnyte 
 Thy crowne schall be newe schorne 
 ffor thy crowne of golde ys lorne (159–62) 
 
The Cambridge version makes the ironic comparison of Robert’s kingly 
accoutrements to his fool’s trappings almost literally visual with the newly-
inserted comparison of Robert’s shorn crown to his gold crown. The couplet’s 
antanaclasis—its repetition of the same word, “crowne,” with two different 
denotations—suggests how thoroughly Robert’s kingly status has been 
superseded by his folly. The same couplet’s rhyming of “schorne” and “lorne” 
underscores the poem’s figuring of the outward investiture of folly as loss of 
kingly degree—and, harking back to the previous couplet, loss of “dygnyte.” 
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These trappings of folly, couched so repeatedly as the outward show of inward 
loss of cognitive and moral capacity, come to function as an externalized 
“defoulyng” of Robert the erstwhile king. In a century of English monarchs 
famously touchy on the question of the legitimacy of their kingship vis-à-vis 
other claimants to the throne, the romance’s portrait of a king’s “defoulyng” is a 
bold poetic move, indeed. 
The romance overtly theorizes Robert’s newfound outward appearance of 
folly as a loss of kingly degree. This passage, which does not appear in the 
Vernon MS, emphasizes that Robert’s status as fool is the lowest possible “degre” 
in the court: 
At lowar degre he myght not bee 
 Then be come a fole as thynkyth me  
 And euery man made scornynge 
 Of hym þat a fore was a nobull kynge 
195 Lo how soone be goddys myght 
 He was lowe & that was ryght 
 He was euyr so harde be stadd 
 That mete nor drynke noone he had 
 But hys babull was in hys hande 
200 The Aungell be fore hym made hym to stande  
 And seyde fole art þou kynge 
 He seyde ye° wyth owte lesynge°   yea; lying38 
 And here aftur kynge wyll bee 
 The aungell seyde so semyth the°   it seems to thee 
(191–204) 
 
Here, the angel declares that Robert’s belief that he is a king is merely a matter of 
seeming: Robert continues to deny the reality of his fall, even as he encounters all 
of its consequences. For this reason, this passage explicitly connects Robert’s 
bauble to his loss of kingship: his trappings of folly belie his words.39 The 
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passage thus deftly gestures toward both the fool’s erroneous beliefs and his 
contentious relationship with the truth. Robert’s erroneous beliefs, which have 
caused his transformation into a fool, identify his newfound status as a cognitive 
deficiency that has become embodied. In this way, the romance insists on parallel 
socio-political and moral-cognitive hierarchies. 
The poem aggressively pathologizes the change wrought in Robert’s once-
kingly appearance by his new habiliments of folly. The change is instantaneous 
and total, rendering Robert unrecognizable to his closest former associates. If 
Robert cannot acknowledge his lowly position as court fool, his courtiers cannot 
see that he has ever been anything else. In telling how utterly the members of 
Robert’s own court fail to recognize him and thus spelling out the upshot of 
Robert’s donning of the habiliments of folly, the poem employs a verb that 
suggests a total transformation of Robert’s “figure”: 
Ther nas in court grom ne page, 
190 That of the kyng ne made rage; 
For no mon ne mihte him knowe, 
He was defygured in a throwe. (189–92, emphasis added) 
 
While both the Middle English Dictionary and the Oxford English Dictionary 
categorize “defygure” as an early form of “disfigured,” the genealogy of these 
terms is complex. Both dictionaries cite this line in Robert of Cisyle as the earliest 
known instance of a denotation that signals transformation of appearance, rather 
than disfigurement in the more common modern sense of damage to the 
countenance. Still, both this context and early Middle English citations for 
“defygure” suggest that the two senses of the word—damaging alteration and 
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mere transformation—are imbricated. “Defygure” and “disfigure” are used to 
describe the effects of sin, as well as the effects of injury or disease.  They are also 
used to describe the effects of successful disguise. Both senses are active in 
Chaucer’s Knight’s Tale, in which Arcite looks in a mirror, seeing 
That sith his face was so disfigured 
Of maladie the which he had endured 
He mighte wel, if that he bare him lowe, 
Live in Athenes evermore unknowe.40 
 
In a very different context, the fourteenth-century The Pricke of Conscience, the 
connection to sin is overt: 
[. . .B]right angels [. . .] 
Fra þat blisful place thurgh syn þai felle, 
And bycome þan foule deuels of helle, 
And horribely defygurd, thurgh syn.41 
 
If, then, Robert becomes “defygured” by merely donning the trappings of folly, 
the associations that these trappings bring into play include disease, sin, and a 
few hellish devils. Through his foolish cognitive and moral errors, the erstwhile 
king’s new appearance is linked to the “defyguring” effects of sin—a damning 
model for the visual rendering of invisible disability. 
Robert’s erroneous cognitive judgment is shown to be intransigent as the 
narrative rendering of his downfall fails to correct his cognitive errors. Despite 
having become unrecognizable to his own courtiers, Robert remains confident 
that his brothers, the pope and the emperor, will recognize him as their brother 
and the king of Sicily. Whereas the rest of the court is clad in “riche aray” (267), 
Robert stands out in his fool’s garments, which clearly signal his low station: 
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The fool Robert also went, 
Clothed in lodly garnement,°  hideous garments 
With foxes tayles mony aboute. [. . .] 
An ape rod of his clothing,°  rode in the same clothing 
In tokne that he was underlyng. (247–9, 271–2) 
 
His outer raiment signals his inner disarray—that is, the fool’s clothes that are 
customary throughout medieval and early modern English literature are here 
explicitly theorized as witnesses to the fool’s inner cognitive state. The success of 
Robert’s punishment by demotion to court fool is borne out. When the angel-as-
king journeys with the entire court—including Robert-as-fool—to visit the pope 
and the emperor, the pope and emperor receive the angel as their own brother 
and the rightful king. The romance thus portrays the complete transformation of 
Robert’s status as brother of the highest spiritual and temporal rulers to brother 
of an ape. Meanwhile, the status of king is elevated in Robert’s absence; the 
throne is now inhabited by an angel claiming direct access to divine will. 
The romance’s narration of this scene affords a complex account of 
knowledge acquisition: “The pope ne the emperour nouther, / The fol ne kneugh 
not for heor brother” (287–8). Clearly, the romance does not uniformly present 
the failure to know something—here, the failure to know someone—as a 
cognitive deficit; this scene is presented as the angel’s triumph, rather than the 
pope’s or emperor’s downfall. The pope and emperor’s lack of recognition for 
their brother is not depicted as the kind of error of thought that, together with 
deficits in moral judgment, make someone a fool. Rather, the “defygur[ing]” of 
Robert that makes him unrecognizable as king is construed as a revelation; those 
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who recognize him as a fool recognize him as he has ever been. The tale deals 
with the threat of invisible disability by rendering it visible, and by rendering it 
visible, disciplines and corrects it. 
When his brothers fail to know him, Robert realizes the reality of his low 
position: 
Kyng Robert bigon to maken care,°  to grieve 
Muche more then he dude are,°   did before 
295 Whon° his bretheren nolde° him knowe:  When; brothers did 
not 
“Allas,” quath he, “nou am I lowe.” [. . .] 
305 “Allas, allas,” was al his song. (293–6, 305) 
 
The brothers’ failure to “knowe” Robert is rhymed with the reality of his “lowe” 
degree, and the man who has derided the Magnificat—prophetic liturgy, in his 
case—is reduced to a minimalistic song of lament: “Allas, allas.” Like other 
English literary fools, Robert’s song is outside the bounds of liturgy: having 
earlier misapprehended the critically prophetic words of evensong, he can now 
offer only a song of two plaintive syllables. 
Yet these two minimalistic syllables signal Robert’s long-delayed 
acquisition of moral knowledge. Having seen the futility of his insistence that he 
is a king, Robert relents and prays, acknowledging his folly: 
For that name I hedde pride, 
As angels that gonne from joye glyde, 
And in twynklyng of an eighe 
God binom heore maystrie.°   took away their power 
345 So hath he myn, for my gult, 
Now am I wel lowe ipult, 
And that is right that I so be. 
Lord, on thi fool Thow have pité. 
 106 
I hedde an errour in myn herte, 
350 And that errour doth me smerte. 
Lord, I leeved° not on The.   believed 
On thi fol Thou have pité 
Holy Writ I hedde in dispyt, 
For that is reved my delyt,°  taken away my delight 
355 For that is riht a fool I be, 
Lord, on thi fool thou have pité. (341–56) 
 
Robert’s prayer almost painstakingly recapitulates the phrases that, earlier in the 
poem, have been used to point out his folly and to foreshadow his downfall. The 
opening of his prayer echoes the clerk’s warning that “God may do, withoute 
lyghe, / His wil in twynklyng of an eighe” (39–49). Robert’s words recall the 
prophetic promise that the high can be made low (45–7), the characterization of 
his “herte” as “unstable” (50), and the descriptions of his “errour[s]” of 
“thought” (58 passim). His admission that, as a fool, he “leeved not” on God 
affiliates him with the God-denying fool of Psalm 52, reinforcing both the 
romance’s and the broader literary tradition’s cognitive-moral condemnations of 
fools. In this way, his prayer for restoration holds his former cognitive and moral 
errors up to view: scrutiny of cognitive disability is the precondition for its 
eventual remedy. 
Robert’s prayer serves as more than a reflective inversion of the words 
that have presaged his fall: it attaches the label of “gult” (345) to his actions. 
Moreover, instead of attempting to refute the label of fool, Robert claims it for 
himself (348, 352, 355). The phrase he returns to every few lines—“Lord, on thi 
fool Thow have pité”—serves as a quasi-liturgical refrain. It closely echoes one of 
the oldest phrases in the Western Christian liturgy: “Kyrie eleison,” or “Lord, have 
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mercy.” In Robert’s repeated pleas for pity—not general pity, but pity on “thi 
fool”—he utters a particularized Kyrie eleison, a simultaneously ritualized and yet 
individual plea. If Robert’s prayer has received relatively scant critical attention, 
except in its bare outlines, it is perhaps because pride has been identified as 
Robert’s besetting sin, and it is hardly surprising that a prominent deadly sin 
should require a prayer for pity. Yet Robert has been accused of more than pride: 
the poem explicitly names his folly, and it frames his movement from king to 
fool as a deposition. The deposition is attributed, in part, to the errors in thought 
and moral judgment that function as a form of disabled cognition. The shock of 
the deposition of the king is softened by the hope of his restoration and 
continued reign. 
For the role of fool, however, there is no such promised redemption. 
Through Robert-as-fool’s own words, the poem attributes guilt—“gult” (345)—to 
his particular form of cognitive disability. Folly is shown to be a form of 
cognitive disability that requires divine remediation. Furthermore, the poem’s 
deliberate use of Robert’s new habiliments to conflate the vocation of fooling 
with the general condition of folly elides any firm boundaries between the 
deliberate performance of folly, the non-deliberate condition of cognitive 
disability, and the occasional moral foible. Exemplary of this elision is the 
treatment of Robert’s wit, which is represented as “turn[ed] vn to folye” and 
instrumental to Robert’s sinning. The Trinity Dublin manuscript alludes to the 
trouble with Robert’s wit quite early on, right after Robert falls asleep in church: 
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“Whan Robert woke he was nye out of wyt.”42 The Cambridge manuscript 
amplifies this allusion near the end of its narrative. In Cambridge, an addition of 
several lines to Robert’s prayer attributes his downfall to the corruption of wit 
that leads to folly: 
 ffor when y seyde in my sawe 
 That noþynge myght make me lawe 
395 And holy wrytt dyspysed wyth all 
 And for þy wrech of wrechys men me calle 
 And fole of all folys y am ȝyt°   yet 
 ffor he ys a fole god wrottyþ well hyt 
 That turneth hys wytt vn to folye 
400 So haue y done mercy y crye 
 N ow mercy lorde for þy pyte 
  Aftur my gylte geue not me 
  Let me a bye hyt in my lyve 
 Þat y haue synned wyth wyttys fyve 
405 ffor hyt ys ryght a fole that I bee 
 Now lorde of þy fole þou haue pyte (393–406) 
 
The phrases “wrech of wrechys” and “fole of all folys” are sincerely expressed, 
despite their formulaic—not to mention Pauline—quality.43 These hyperboles 
serve to weaponize the self-critique in Robert’s admission that “he ys a fole god 
wrottyþ well hyt / That turneth hys wytt vn to folye” (398–99). Robert’s words, 
like many other premodern critiques of fools, suggest that Robert deliberately 
disables his own wit by choosing to turn it toward folly.44 Even more incisively, 
Robert admits that he has “synned wyth wyttys fyve” (404), thus linking the 
problem of the commission of sin with the susceptibility of the five wits to 
corruption.45 The poem’s model of folly as cognitive disability is tautological: 
folly is presented as self-disabling—its own cause, and its own punishment. This 
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causal structure enables the poem’s equation of access to power with cognitive 
status. 
Robert’s restoration can be effected only once he buys into this view of 
folly. Once he does thus eviscerate his own actions and standing as a fool, King 
Robert is restored to his former station. He commands that the tale of his sojourn 
as a fool be written. His story is written and disseminated abroad. As Walsh has 
observed, the romance here takes on a metafictional quality, writing the very acts 
of its writing and dissemination:46 
He let write hit riht anon, 
Hou God myd His muchel miht 
430 Made him lowe, as hit was riht. 
This storie he sende everidel°   every bit of it 
To his bretheren, under his seel. (428–32) 
 
The story, as written, thus inscribes the reformed king’s endorsement of his 
temporary deposition to the status of fool as a means of reform. It is perhaps this 
culmination of the story that led Dieter Mehl to dub it a “homiletic romance.”47 
The Cambridge version buttresses this critical opinion with additional lines that 
suggest that the Pope, the king’s brother, uses the story as homiletic fodder: 
495 The Pope of Rome here of can preche 
 And the pepull he can teche 
 That þer pryde þey schulde forsake (495–7) 
 
This version brings the focus back to pride, perhaps a predictable-enough focal 
point for a pope’s homilies. The pope warns that “ffor pryde wolde yf hyt myght 
bee / Ouyr mownte [over-mount] goddys dygnyte” (503–4). His warning 
suggests that pride has the potential to do more than merely rob the prideful of 
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their “dygnyte”; it can also threaten the very “dygnyte” of God. If, as the 
romance suggests, the relationship between pride and folly is synecdochic, then 
folly is threatening indeed. 
This threat may account for the thorough measures Robert and his 
brother, the pope, take to capture an appropriately homiletic version of the story 
in writing. The romance itself then localizes the story by referring to its status 
“[a]t Rome” and “[a]t seynt Petur kyrke.” The pope’s homiletic intervention 
emphasizes “godys wylle,” suggesting that this form of cognitive disability, folly, 
is a punishment—for the sin of pride, for errors of thought: 
Thys storye ys wythowten lye 
At Rome wretyn in memorye 
At seynt Petur kyrke hyt ys knawe°  known 
510 And that ys crystys owne lawe  
That lowe be hye at godys wylle 
And hye lowe thogh hyt be ylle (507–12) 
 
The romance’s assurance that Robert’s story is “wretyn in memorye” and known 
at St. Peter’s in Rome revises the relationship between the romance and its 
readers, who have been effectively written into the story. This immediate 
intervention in the present is being recovered anew by scholars: Raluca 
Radulescu has shown how fifteenth-century romances do not merely trace their 
historiographic genealogies back to their sources, but make interventions in the 
sociopolitical landscape in which they themselves are created and circulated.48 
To the readers of this metafictional conclusion, the pope’s sermon implies that 
folly is a remediable punishment—at least if one happens to be a king—with the 
prospect of being restored to an appropriately high station and moral position. 
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Still, its effect on fools who are not born as kings remains, at least in this 
romance, an open question, especially to its readers, who are presumably not all 
born to kingship. 
Robert of Cisyle’s view of folly as its own cause and punishment was 
widely disseminated in the fifteenth century, thanks to the romance’s 
considerable circulation. The story of Robert had transgeneric influence, in 
addition to the popularity evinced by the ten surviving manuscripts of the Robert 
of Cisyle romance. The priest John Audelay mentioned the story of Robert as a 
negative exemplum in a poem, “Hic incipit psalmus de Magnificat,” set in the 
middle of a sequence of hymns to the Virgin Mary and other female saints. The 
poem presents itself as an elaborated version of Mary’s Magnificat, spoken in her 
voice and imagined to take place simultaneously in the present era and in the 
biblical context. In Audelay’s poem, Mary is both “gret” with child (l. 25) and 
familiar with the medieval story of Robert of Cisyle. In speaking of God’s might 
and power, she—like the clerk in the romance—emphasizes his ability to make 
“[p]roud men” low (ll. 41, 42, quoted below). Also as in the romance versions of 
Robert of Cisyle, she suggests that Robert’s error is an error of thought (l. 50, 
below). Certainly, Robert’s insistence on his high position, coupled with his 
ignorance of the liturgy spoken by the famously humble “hand mayden of the 
lord,” evinces a misprision of the malleability of social degree in the Lucan 
story.49 
Mary herself agrees with the Robert of Cisyle romance in assigning Robert’s 
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blame to a form of species confusion, sketched out in the background of her 
account. This allusion, as in the rest of the poem, is framed by “Mangnificat [sic] 
anima mea Dominum” (“My soul magnifies the Lord”), the famous opening of 
Mary’s biblical speech. This refrain closes every stanza in the poem except, 
notably the stanza that explicitly takes up the story of Robert of Cisyle (stanza 2, 
below): 
“His myght has made, in his pouere, 
Proud men to sparpil° from his face  scatter 
With the mynd of his hert, fere and nere; 
That nyl not seche mercé and grace, 
45 Ne hem amend wile thai han space, 
Thai schul be cast fro his kyngdam, 
And have no part within that place. 
Mangnificat anima mea Dominum. 
 
“Thenke on Kyng Robart Sesel: 
50 He went° no lord had be bot he,   thought 
Yet sodenlé downe he felle 
And was put into a folis degré! 
An angel was set apon his se, 
Fore he had these verse in his scornyng — 
55 Deposuit potentis de sede — 
And sayd in heven ther was no Kyng. 
 
“Thus myghté men God pittis ful loue,°  puts very low 
And meke men he liftis ful hye, 
That his grace and his goodnes here wil knowe, 
60 And seche his grace and his mercé, 
And no nother sekyrly° —    certainly 
At the dredful Day of Dome, 
Here dedis schal deme ham hopynly.°  openly 
Mangneficat anima mea Dominum.” (ll. 41–64)50 
 
The ironies of this intertextual circularity abound: Mary’s song, inscribed in 
Audelay’s poem, invokes the tale of the king, which in turn accounts for its own 
ensconcement in text and homily. Moreover, the one stanza that abandons the 
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“Mangneficat anima mea Dominum” line turns instead to the line from the 
Magnificat that rings through Robert of Cisyle and foretells the downfall that the 
king is bringing on himself. Several phrases in Audelay’s poem directly recall the 
romance versions of Robert of Cisyle. The romance manuscripts’ vacillating 
concern with mind and heart are here instantiated in the cautionary explication 
of what God can do with the “mynd of his heart” (43). The poem’s strategic 
summation of Robert’s thought closely follows the romance texts by naming 
Robert’s erroneous belief: “He went no lord had be bot he” (50). Likewise, 
Audelay replicates the romance versions’ framing of the “folis degré” as a 
downfall from high to low. Audelay even recalls some formal elements of the 
romance: his poem, itself an adaptation of a biblical text long re-purposed for 
liturgical use, echoes the quasi-liturgical nature of Robert’s prayer, with its 
refrain that repeatedly invokes the name of “Lord.” In many ways, Audelay’s 
adaptation of the story of “Kyng Robart Sesel” provides an account of the king’s 
self-inflicted downfall that mirrors the concerns of the romance with erroneous 
thought, mutability of degree, and divine punishment for folly. 
In contrast, though, Audelay’s poem omits any mention of Robert’s 
eventual restoration. Instead, it emphasizes the idea of folly as punishment and 
warning. Its invocation of the “dredful Day of Dome” suggests that, at least in 
some variations, the homiletic version of Robert’s story is used primarily to warn 
hearers away from the kind of folly that will endanger them on Doomsday. Even 
more than the writers and scribes who produced the romance versions, Audelay 
 114 
flirts with the politically dangerous implications of the king’s story, especially in 
such lines as “Deposuit potentis de sede — / And sayd in heven ther was no Kyng” 
(55–6). These lines play with the temporality of kingship, subtly contrasting the 
monarch’s momentary grasp of earth-bound power with the divine rule he 
denies. Perhaps Audelay’s flattening-out of the details of Robert’s material 
transformation—the shorn crown, bauble, brother-ape, canine dinner 
companions, and “defygured” appearance—lessen the shock value of the process 
by which the king’s cognitive and moral errors are made visible. Indeed, 
although the words of the Magnificat would seem to indicate a mutability of 
social status without reverent respect for class, both Audelay and the Robert of 
Cisyle promulgators proffer a reading of the Magnificat that maintains a certain 
respect for kingly and other high stations, as long as the high person who has 
been made low makes sure to repent. This adaptive nuancing of the familiar 
“Magnificat” liturgy for late-fourteenth- and fifteenth-century English audiences 
may evince an appropriate political caution during the famously touchy 
Lancastrian period. Yet the multiple poems’ efforts to keep distance between 
high and low, kings and fools still reveal that distance to be sometimes as narrow 
as the width of a coordinating conjunction, or invisible as the denotation behind 
the letters that spell out the word “crowne.” 
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Coda 
About three decades and one change of monarch after the production of 
the last of the Robert of Cisyle romance manuscripts, there appeared a brief entry 
in BL. Add. 29777: “In this yeare [1529] an Enterlude named kinge Roberte of 
Scissill was playde at the high Crosse in Chester.”51 Did the king in this play 
become a fool? How was his folly staged? Was he permitted a restoration? It is 
impossible to know.52 What this tantalizing entry does tell us is that the legend of 
Robert of Cisyle survived outside the context of medieval manuscripts and made 
its way onto the sixteenth-century stage—the very stage on which, over the next 
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Fool’s Bauble, Fool’s Babble: 
The Accoutrements of Cognitive Failure in The Longer Thou Livest the More Fool Thou Art 
 
DISCIPLINE: “A fool uttereth his anger in haste, 
And hath not the wit measure to keep; [. . .] 
As fair legs to a cripple are unseemly, 
So to a fool honor is undecent; 
As snow in harvest is untimely, 
So is it a plague where a fool is regent.”1 
 
W. Wager’s The Longer Thou Livest the More Fool Thou Art, entered in the 
Stationers’ Register in 1569, features a fool, Moros, as its protagonist. Depicting Moros’ 
growth from boyhood to youth and old age, Wager confronts his fool with allegorical 
characters—Discipline, Piety, and so forth—who attempt to educate him. Moros 
steadfastly resists these attempts, preferring to clown around, literally, with the 
characters who are specifically named after vices, rather than improve on his slim 
knowledge.2 Moros’ foolish refusal of education is couched in heavily moralized terms. 
As Barbara Swain has previously commented, “The text is laden with scriptural 
comments upon fools, and the audience is not for a moment allowed to forget that to be 
a fool is practically to be a condemned sinner hastening to damnation.”3 Wager utilizes 
the allegorical conventions of a morality play, but he replaces the exuberant wit of the 
best-known medieval morality plays with warnings against popery. The play uses this 
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morality-play rubric to depict Moros as utterly bereft of his wits. As this chapter’s 
epigraph shows, the fool’s honor is analogized to physical disability: “As fair legs to a 
cripple are unseemly, / So to a fool honor is undecent” (ll. 1641–2). Likewise, his 
governance is likened to a pandemic (“So is it a plague where a fool is regent,” l. 1644), 
and his failures in wit and temperance are described as a failure in keeping musical 
time (he “hath not the wit measure to keep,” l. 1638). 
Throughout the play, the Moros demonstrates his cognitive and moral 
deficiencies by spontaneously erupting into song at inappropriate moments. He 
regularly disrupts the action with his inane singing. He also persistently chooses his 
singing over forms of education: his inadequacies in Latin and moral knowledge are 
regularly pointed out by Discipline and other characters. In these ways, Moros 
demonstrates the deficits in his moral knowledge.4 Even when he has grown to 
manhood, he proudly proclaims, “Singing and playing I love above all thing” (l. 1503). 
He proves his point by persuading his friends Cruelty, Impiety, and Ignorance to join 
him in—as the stage direction casually puts it—“[s]ing[ing] some merry song” (s. d. at l. 
1513). 
Discipline’s reproofs become more and more damning. He is soon likening 
Moros to the atheistic fool of the Psalms: “All his senses he applied to vice; […] Of such 
the Prophet did prophesy, / The fool saith in his heart there is no God. / Corrupt are 
they and full of villainy” (1608–10).5 The solitary actor who stands in for the 
congregated People concurs, saying of Moros, “[W]e think him to be a devil of hell. / 
Neither learning, wisdom nor reason / Will serve where he taketh opinion” (ll. 1698–
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1700). None of these critiques of his cognitive faculties or piety convinces Moros to 
amend his ways. He resolutely rejects both knowledge and wisdom, even when he is 
confronted by the character God’s Judgment. God’s Judgment strikes Moros down with 
a sword and orders that Moros be stripped of his clothes. Upon being stripped of his 
outer coat, Moros is revealed to be wearing a fool’s coat underneath.6 Unconcerned by 
this revelation of his true colors, Moros declares, “If it please the devil me to have, / Let 
him carry me away on his back” (ll. 1853–4). He is granted his wish and borne off to the 
devil. It’s not a subtle play. 
The Longer Thou Livest puts the performance of popular song in diametric 
opposition to intellectual and moral improvement. Specifically, as we shall see, it 
portrays the problems engendered by the fool’s pairing of nonsense syllables with 
solfège—a system of musical pedagogy that assigns sung syllables to specific notes in 
musical scales—as a direct impediment to his moral education.7 In this way, the fool’s 
musical disruptions become both the indicator and the instrument of his continued 
cognitive failures. The play makes musical disruption central to its characterization of 
Moros’ folly, and it frames Moros’ singing as a cognitive disability—a disability defined 
entirely in terms of its deficiencies. 
The character Wrath describes Moros succinctly: “He is as very a fool, I dare say, 
/ And as stark an idiot as ever bare bable” (ll. 674–5). This chapter considers two 
questions: First, what does it mean to be a “very [. . .] fool” and a “stark [. . .] idiot” in 
this pre-Shakespearean early modern drama? Second, what does it mean for a fool to 
“bare bable” in the cultural contexts of premodern England? In order to answer these 
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questions, this chapter begins by using extensively-circulated premodern texts, such as 
Chaloner’s 1549 translation of Erasmus’ The Praise of Folly, to examine the vernacular 
literary historiography of cognitive aberrations in the late fourteenth through early 
seventeenth centuries. Utilizing an approach intended to shed light on changes and 
congruities in the language surrounding folly and disability across several centuries, 
this chapter shows how a key material sign of the fool’s trade—the bauble—registers as 
an accoutrement of cognitive disability across a wide range of genres in premodern 
English literature. Finally, it utilizes these investigations of the fool’s language and 
material accoutrements to consider the specific problems engendered by the fool’s 
singing of nonsense syllables and solfège.8 
 
I. The Disabled Brain in Premodern Literature 
The play repeatedly faults the fool’s putatively deformed physiology for his 
cognitive failures. In this way, it sheds light on mid-sixteenth-century conceptions of 
the relationship between the body and cognitive disability. In particular, its role as a 
non-medical archive for cultural attitudes about specific forms of disability opens up 
new territory for the discussion of attitudes that have more contiguity with early 
modern debates about education, moral behavior and transgression, and aesthetic 
practices than with debates centered primarily on the practice of medicine. 
Although the play does draw on some of the competing medical discourses of 
the sixteenth century, it does so imprecisely and for the attainment of broader, extra-
medical ends. The play’s various characterizations of fools’ cognitive faculties function 
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broadly to separate those faculties from those that might be supposed to exist at the 
wiser centers of society. In this respect as in many others, Wager’s didacticism takes 
hold. For instance, upon the entrance of the character Wrath, two other characters 
named for vices take it upon themselves to connect Moros to the specific vice of wrath 
by noting Moros’ mutability of temperament: 
IDLENESS: [. . . W]rath in fools will soon be gone, 
Yea, and as soon it will come again. 
INCONTINENCE: To fools not only incontinency 
Is annexed but wrath also furious; 
The mind of fools without clemency 
Soon waxeth hot and is temerarious. (ll. 648–55) 
 
Incontinence’s assertion that fools’ minds universally grow “hot” draws roughly on 
Galenic humoral theory, which would categorize the heated, passionate, reckless young 
man as “hot.”9 Incontinence’s description of Moros’ hotness and changeable wrath 
clearly casts the fool’s mind as problematically outside the bounds of morally 
prescribed decency. Furthermore, his use of “temerarious,” which descends from the 
Latin adverb “temere”—that is, “blindly” in the sense of “rashly” or “by chance”—
associates the fool’s mind with disability in judgment.10 
This positing of the fool’s mind’s disabled judgment continues when Discipline 
attempts to lecture Moros in a quatrain of moralizing Latin verses, which he then 
translates into English—another suggestion that Moros’ learning is not up to snuff. 
Handily, Discipline’s translation from Latin into English offers greater access to the 
playgoers, too. Discipline intones: 
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Nature hath a pleasure fools to create, 
As mallows, nettles, and weeds of that rate. 
These are dull of wit and of a gross brain 
And set at nought virtue, given to pastime vain. (ll. 127, 129, 131, 133) 
 
The critique of Moros’ grossness of brain and the reminder that he is congenitally 
foolish are intriguing. This moment and the description of the fool’s mind as “hot” are 
as close as the play comes to speaking of the fool’s deficits in what modern readers 
might recognize as medical terms. Elsewhere throughout the play, Wager’s characters 
diagnose Moros’ folly according to educational and moral categories: his singing is 
problematic because it is childishly non-rational, disruptive, and against virtue. 
Discipline’s lecture illustrates a prevailing attitude toward fools in medieval and 
Renaissance English literature. In Wager’s play, Discipline’s heavy-handed allegations 
that the fool is deficient in both cognition and virtue are typical of the period’s literary 
depictions.11 Discipline focuses on the fool’s lack of mental acuity (“dull[ness] of wit”) 
and emphasizes this charge by calling the fool’s brain “gross.” For Elizabethan 
audiences, Discipline’s choice of the adjective “gross” would have conjured up the 
image of a brain abnormally large, uncontained in its growth and impaired in its 
function. Discipline’s assertion that fools are like weeds infesting a cultivated landscape 
alludes to the common anti-fool sentiments in premodern English literature, which 
often suggest that fools feign their skills in jesting and singing merely for social gain. 
In Wager’s play, the effects of Moros’ “grossness of brain” are exemplified by his 
lack of knowledge, understanding, and erudition. Many of these effects are comedic, 
and they resemble errors made by other natural fools in premodern English literature. 
For example, Moros commits various malapropisms, corrupting the names of the 
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virtuous characters who are trying to educate and reform him. He re-names Discipline, 
Piety, and Exercitation, calling them “Diricke Quintine,” “Pine-nut-tree,” and “Arse-
out-of-fashion” (see ll. 704ff.). These malapropisms—later made much more famous for 
historians of English literature by remarks like Shakespeare’s Dogberry’s “O villain! 
thou wilt be condemned into everlasting redemption for this” (Much Ado 4.2.50–51)—
are intrinsic to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English depictions of folly.12 Fools’ 
malapropisms, as well as their more sophisticated forms of wordplay, depict the fool of 
premodern literature as a corruptor of language—the very medium he relies upon to 
work his witty craft. Moros’ rendering of “exercitation”—the regular practice of study, 
art, bodily exercise, and religious devotion—as “arse-out-of-fashion” re-reads the word 
itself, flippantly overturning its supposedly timeless status and inherent virtue. 
Neither Moros nor his companions take this re-reading as evidence of cognitive 
skill. Such habits, it is implied, are a result of the unremitting grossness of Moros’ brain, 
unimproved as it is perceived to be by any true learning. Moros himself reinforces the 
other characters’ dim view of his educational attainments, declaring, “I am but a learner 
you may see; / I can no further than K for a knave” (ll. 725–6). His declaration that he 
knows less than half of the alphabet thus associates his particular folly with deficient 
literacy. Whereas the play’s allusions to the fool’s creation by nature and resemblance to 
weeds suggest that his cognitive deficiencies are innate, its repeated reminders of the 
fool’s willful slovenliness in his studies simultaneously gesture toward the malleability 
of cognition. There is a tension in this portrayal of the natural fool who is yet blamed for 
his failure to change: according to the logic of the play’s portrayal of Moros, the fool’s 
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continual refusal to better mold his own cognition through exercitation, piety, and 
discipline lays the blame for his folly squarely at his own feet. 
This disparaging of the fool’s putatively outsized monstrosity of brain 
accompanies Wraths’ disparagement of Moros as a “stark [. . .] idiot” (l. 674). In 
premodern English literature, “idiot” performs the dual functions of critiquing 
knowledge and congenital cognitive ability. Early attestations of this word appear with 
some frequency in religiously-affiliated contexts. The Middle English Dictionary traces 
the use of “idiot” as “unlearned, uneducated” to the Wycliffite Bible (c. 1384): “Forsoth 
thei, seynge the stedfastnesse of Petre and John, founden that thei weren men with oute 
lettris and idiotis, wondriden” (Deeds 4.13).13 Here, “men with oute lettris and idiotis” 
appears to be a close translation from the Vulgate’s “homines sine litteris et idiotæ.” There 
are no clues from the context that the Wycliffite translators wished to do much more 
with “idiotis” than to make it synonymous with “men with oute lettris”—that is, to 
make it useful shorthand for lack of acquired learning. Indeed, this use of “idiotis,” 
clearly influenced by its Latin source, drops out of the early modern biblical 
translations, which were primarily translated from Greek source-texts rather than the 
Vulgate.14 
The conflation of lack of learning and lack of “natural” mental ability in 
“idiot(s)” appears throughout late medieval and early modern English literature. The 
Oxford English Dictionary suggests that both senses of “idiot”—that is, the associations 
with uneducated ignorance and with lack of mental ability—were in written circulation 
by at least the early fifteenth century and current in the mid-sixteenth century.15 A 
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passage that seems to combine these two senses appears in the Foundation of St. 
Bartholomew’s (c. 1425, translated from a Latin MS, c. 1180). In this text, three Greeks 
visiting London “honoured and worschippid God, and aforn them that ther was 
presente, and beheld them, as simple ydiottys, they began wondirfull thynges to seye, 
and prophecye of this place.”16 This translation, whose Latin original shows heavy 
influences of the language of the Vulgate Bible, already displays the characteristic 
representations of holy fools and idiots—the devout actions, the seeming mental deficits 
that ultimately are superseded by awe-inducing prophecy—that would become more 
famous with Erasmus’ work. 
Indeed, both senses were employed by Thomas Chaloner in his 1549 English 
translation of Erasmus’ The Praise of Folly, a translation that would have been available 
in Wager’s younger years. Chaloner’s Englished version of Erasmus’ work contrasts the 
“idiot” to the educated person. For example, it notes that Pythagoras “preferred also the 
Ideote, and simple vulgars, before other learned and reputed persons”; it suggests that 
Homer concurred in this preference.17 Chaloner, like the Wycliffite biblical translator, 
has clearly borrowed “idiote” from a phrase in the Latin original: Erasmus uses “idiotas 
multis partibus,” which Chaloner renders as “Ideote” while adding “simple vulgars” as a 
clarification of “multis partibus.” 
This evolution in the denotations of the educationally and cognitively deficient 
“idiot” aligns also with other early modern characterizations of departures from an 
implied cognitive norm. A few lines after the passage lauding “the Ideote, and simple 
vulgars,” Chaloner’s translation invokes the familiar notion of the “naturall” fool as 
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deficient in cognition—not merely in learning. The narrative voice asks, “And by the 
faieth ye owe to the immortall goddis, maie any thyng to an indifferent considrer be 
deemed more happie, and blisfull, than is this kynde of men, whom commenly ye call 
fooles, doltes, ideotes, and paches? by most fayre and goodly names as I take theim?”18 
This passage draws on a longstanding premodern notion that congenital, or otherwise 
“naturall,” fools are particularly exempt from any responsibility for securing their own 
salvation—an exemption specifically owed to their cognitive deficits.19 In other words, 
Chaloner’s translation of Erasmus joins both the Tale of Beryn and The Longer Thou Livest 
in distinguishing between disadvantages of innate cognition and disadvantages of 
education. At the same time, it suggests that both problems result in disabilities that 
often reside in the same foolish people. It is the same move that Wager’s characters 
make elsewhere in the play when they condemn Moros for his “grossness of brain” and 
educational failures alike. 
This double vision of folly obtains throughout The Praise of Folie. Erasmus, via 
Chaloner, continues by cataloguing early modern Christian attitudes toward fools. The 
Erasmian catalogue—strikingly replete with ideas that circulated among texts by 1380s 
religious radicals, as well as post-Reformation English writers of varying shades of 
Protestantism—is worth quoting in full: 
Peradventure I move a thyng without purpose, and verie fonde at 
the fyrst syght, but ere I have dooen, ye will graunt I have cause to saie it. 
Seeyng fyrst suche ideotes are free, and exempt from all feare of death, 
whiche feare is no small corrosive, to a mind that mindeth it I warrant you. 
Lyke as they fele not what a twitching turment it is, to have a 
grudged conscience, and shrinke as little at these old wives tales of sprites, 
of divells, of hobgoblyne and the fayries, neither mournyng to theim 
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selves for feare of evills and adversitees impendyng, nor braggyng 
overmuche upon hope of any good lucke commyng. 
To be briefe, they are not tawed, nor plucht a sunder with a 
thousande thousand cares, wherwith other men are oppressed. Thei blushe 
at nothyng, they doubt nothyng, they coveite no dignitee, they envie no mans 
fortune, they love not peramours: and lastly if they be veraie brute Naturalles, 
now they sinne not, as doctours doe affirme. 
Here, I woulde my Maisters of sapience, naie rather Maister fooles, 
shoulde repute with theim selves, how on all sydes theyr myndes are 
vexed continually. Yea lette theim but gather to accompt, to what a 
noumbre of discommoditees, inconveniences, and difficulties the state of 
theyr lyfe is endebted, and so they shall soone summe vp, from howe 
many, and howe great evills I haue subtraied these my selie paches. Who 
not onely them selves are ever mery, plaiyng, singyng, and laughyng: but also 
what ever they dooe, are provokers of others lykewyse to pleasure, sport, 
and laughter, as who saieth, ordeined herefore by the godds of theyr 
benevolence, to recreate the sadnesse of mens lyves.20 
 
Chaloner’s Erasmus uses this catalogue to cordon fools off from society. His 
commentary on fools—a kind of via negativa—clearly suggests that the unmarked 
members of society do blush, doubt, covet dignity, envy others’ fortune, love 
paramours, and sin—and, moreover, the natural state of their lives is “sadnesse.” Fools, 
in contrast, are defined here by their alleged non-participation in common human 
emotions, love and sex, and error. Their main function is to be provokers of merriment. 
This portrait does not match every other early modern portrait of vocational folly in 
exact detail. For counterexample, Twelfth Night’s Feste apparently has a leman, albeit a 
very offstage one. Nonetheless, it clearly shares with many other literary portraits of 
fools an assumption that fools do not and ought not participate in the evils, cares, and 
melancholy of ordinary people. By means of their extra-ordinary brains, Chaloner’s 
Erasmus suggests, fools are “subtrayed,” or subtracted from these evils—but at the cost 
of societal exclusion except during their performances of fooling. 
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II. The Fool and His “Bable” 
Because premodern literature typically recognizes disability as an educational, 
moral, and social problem, Discipline couches his recommended remedy for Moros in 
moral terms: 
Forget your babish vanity; 
Folly and vice you must refrain 
And give yourself to humanity. (ll. 139–41) 
 
Unfortunately for Discipline but fortunately for the entertainment value of the play, 
Moros little heeds this advice. The exasperated Discipline attempts to cure Moros with a 
repeat-after-me game in which Moros must repeat the prayer that God will “open mine 
intelligence” (346). Moros turns this exercise into a game in which, much like a modern-
day child, he repeats every word Discipline utters, including compliments like “Well 
said” (l. 347). As the play traces Moros’ growth into manhood, nothing prevails against 
his resolute foolishness. He continues to exhibit “babish vanity,” cavorting and 
babbling like a young unformed child, rather than an educated youth. His determined 
failure to learn continues to be among his defining traits. 
It is in this context that two of the play’s vicious characters mock the fool’s 
illiteracy by suggesting that he prefers his bauble to his books: 
IDLENESS: [. . .] What dost thou with this book? 
Thou canst not read upon it, I am sure. 
 
MOROS: Pine-nut-tree took it me thereon to look: 
There are goodly saints in it, fair and pure. 
 
WRATH: Alas, one word to read in it he is not able; 
More fools than he to give him a book. 
A fool will delight more in a bable, 




Moros reveals that his knowledge of the book is limited to its images—the “goodly 
saints” who would have been depicted visually, perhaps à la Foxe’s Actes and 
Monuments (first published in 1563, several years before the entry of The Longer Thou 
Livest in the Stationer’s Register). Wrath throws a syntactic spotlight on the fool’s 
bauble—mentioned at the end of the line, a place of emphasis. The bauble clearly serves 
here to reinforce Wrath’s assertion of Moros’ true foolishness (“as very a fool”), as well 
as Wrath’s association of that foolishness with both cognitive disability and the 
ignorance born of failures in learning. 
Wrath’s disparaging description of Moros’ mental capacities is strengthened by 
its allusion to the fool’s signal accoutrement, the bauble. As Wrath puts it, Moros is not 
merely an “idiot,” but “as stark an idiot as ever bare bable” (l. 675, emphasis added). In 
late Middle English and early modern English, the term “bable” referred both to a 
child’s toy and to the fool’s stick with a face and asses’ ears that served as his mock 
scepter. One of the fourteenth-century illustrations of the “Dixit insipiens . . .” fool of 
Psalm 52 depicts just such a bauble (Figure 4).21 In fact, scholarly use of the term 
“bauble” indicates how dramatically early modern scholars have been influenced by a 
Shakespearean lens on the literature of the period: the “bauble” spelling first appeared 
in the First Folio of 1623.22 The fool’s bauble is linked directly to his deficiencies in 
cognition, morality, and piety by Aaron in Titus Andronicus (5.1.81): “An idiot holds his 






Figure 4. BL MS Royale 17 E VII, fol. 241. Bible historiale (Paris, 1356–7).23 
 
 
For pre-First Folio eyes and ears, the word “bable” punned on the verb “to 
babble”—that is, to engage in idle talk.24 Both words bore a homophonic correlation to 
medieval and early modern invocations of the story of the Tower of Babel (Genesis 11), 
in which the name “Babel” comes to stand in for divinely ordained linguistic confusion. 
The Wycliffite and Tyndale translations of the text speak of language being 
“confounded” at Babel and suggest that the name “Babel” itself is etymologically 
related to confounded language.25 Premodern commentators on the story tend to focus 
on the confounding of language, rather than the creation of a suddenly polyglot society. 
For example, Trevisa’s translation of the Polychronicon (printed in 1480) speaks of the 
name “Babel” as “sowndenge a confusion, in that the langages of men edifienge hit were 
confusede by the wylle of God.”26 The word “bable” and its homophones may have 
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reminded early modern audiences of confused linguistic efforts resulting from divine 
judgment and, thus, have reinforced the aura of divine judgment surrounding many 
premodern discourses on fools’ corrupt language. 
The verb form “to babble” was often linked with fools, as when Lyly’s Euphues 
asks, “Alas fonde foole arte thou so pinned to [women’s] sleeues that thou regardest 
more their babble then thine owne blisse?” This line handily employs “babble” to prop 
up its anti-feminism even as it associates listening to that “babble” with love’s own 
brand of cognitive impairment.27 In Chaloner’s Erasmus translation, “bablyng” likewise 
serves as an insult when men’s idle talk is likened to women’s babbling: 
And joigne we (hardily) to theim these Sophistrers and Logiciens, beyng a 
race of men more kackeling than a meny of dawes: eche of whom in bablyng 
maie compare with tenne women chosen for the nones, and farre more 
happie shoulde be, in case they were onely bablers, and not skoldis also: 
in sorte that oftentymes for the moone shyne in the water, they strive whole 
daies together, and with to muche arguyng, lette the trueth of the mattier 
slippe by theim.28 
 
The use of “bablyng” as a means of disparaging men by comparing their speech to 
women’s gossip and scolding appears again. It suggests that a man—such as a fool—
who babbles in this literature is considered as linguistically troublesome and irrational 
as a woman. The OED remarks on the probable onomatopoetic resonance in this word, 
playing as it does on the small child’s not-yet-articulate “ba.”29 In this way, by 
extension, the fool’s “bable” designates him as one ineligible for adult, male, 
homosocial camaraderie. His “bable” marks him as foolish because he babbles to it—
that is, because his speech falls short of cultural ideals of sense-making. 
Indeed, in the same time frame, “bable” was employed to refer to a child’s (or 
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childish) plaything. A hybrid attestation of “bable” as child’s toy and “bable” as a 
trinket related to fools may occur in John Russells Boke of Nurture (c. 1475): 
To teche vertew and connynge, me thynkethe hit charitable, 
for moche youthe in connynge / is bareñ & fulle unable; 
þer-fore he þat no good cañ / ne to nooñ wille be agreable. 
he shalle neuer y-thryve / þerfore take to hym a babulle. (ll. 9–12)30 
 
In this excerpt, the “moche youthe” who are marked as intellectually “bareñ & fulle 
unable”—that is, both bereft of innate talents and incapable of improving—are 
despaired of and consigned to perpetual childishness (“þerfore take to hym a babulle”). 
Although editorial and lexicographical commentary on this passage generally glosses 
“babulle” as a child’s trinket or toy, this poem is precisely coextensive with instances of 
“babulle” as a fool’s accoutrement and mock interlocutor. The fool’s back-and-forth 
with his “babulle” is homophonic with the pre-linguistic child’s play with a trinket. In 
modern-day terms, it is as if the sonic and visual trappings of the fool’s folly were 
synonymous with a child’s jangling of a parent’s keys. Indeed, the “babulle” in the Boke 
of Nurture might well have been read as a material sign of childish foolishness of mind. 
Middle English literary references to the “bable” appear to retain a connotative sense of 
the word’s etymological links to a host of Romance languages’ terms for babblers and 
fools. Notable among these links is the late Latin babulus for “fool,” which seems to have 
influenced the nonce-word, “babel” for “fool” itself, that appears in the late-fourteenth-
century Cleanness.31 
Similarly, Skelton’s “A Replycacion Agaynst Certayne Yong Scolers Adjured of 
Late” (c. 1525) employs both “bable” as a verb for foolishly idle speech and a noun 
denoting the childish toys of those whose folly makes them like children.32 Skelton, one 
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of the most vehemently anti-fool—not to mention misanthropic—writers of the early 
sixteenth century, provides a wealth of fooling-related invective in his verse.33 At the 
beginning of “A Replycacion,” Skelton loudly denounces those anti-Marian “heretikes” 
who 
leudly have their tyme spent, 
In their study abhomynable, 
Our glorious lady to disable, 
And heynously on her to bable 
With langage, detestable. (ll. 24–28) 
 
Skelton’s characteristically swaggering verse makes it clear that the adverbial 
connotation of “bable” is “heynously,” a judgment that is implied in many other 
premodern texts that employ this term. Crucially, Skelton also connects such babbling 
speech to impious and lewd—that is, uneducated and willfully wrong-headed—
religious opinions. 
This religious connection to “bable,” both noun and verb, appears repeatedly in 
literature about foolishness and the refusal to learn. In Wager’s play, for example, the 
young man who refuses to learn is condemned for his irreligiosity, as well as his 
indolent refusal to better his cognitive powers through education. Skelton—who was 
probably writing under the auspices of Cardinal Wolsey in order to discredit the 
upstart young scholars who had dared to stray dangerously close to Lutheran and other 
Reformed positions—specifically connects the “bable”-as-toy to the foolishness of his 
scholarly antagonists: 
Ye soored over hye 
In the [h]ierarchy 
Of Jovinians heresy, 
Your names to magnifye, 
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Among the scabbed skyes 
Of Wycliffes flesshe flyes; 
Ye strynged so Luthers lute, 
That ye dawns all in a sute 
The heritykes ragged ray, 
That brings you out of the way 
Of holy churches lay; [. . .] 
Marked in your cradels 
To beare fagottes for babyls.34 
 
Skelton delivers a double catalogue of invective. First, his declaration that the errors of 
his (and Wolsey’s) opponents exceed those of the ancient heretic Jovinian, the late 
medieval proto-Reformer Wyclif, and Martin Luther effectively positions Wolsey’s 
opponents beyond the pale of acceptable theological affiliation. Second, he suggests that 
such opponents are more truly affiliated with the material instantiations of folly: the 
stringed lute, “ragged ray” (tattered raiment), and the infant’s or fool’s “babyl.” 
Other texts designate the fool’s witticisms as mindless sound, analogized to 
babies’ pre-linguistic, non-signifying vocal experimenting. The difference between the 
fool and the baby is that the fool is never acknowledged to progress to any more mature 
linguistic phrase. Indeed, one of Wager’s successors in the premodern English 
historiography of fooling links the “bable” to other problematic sounds. In A Nest of 
Ninnies (1608) Robert Armin, who is thought to have originated most of Shakespeare’s 
later fools, writes that those who “musically fret their time out in idle baubling [. . .] will 
become artificiall Fooles to outbrave Fooles indeede, but stick often in their owne quick-
sands, and are got out with repentance.”35 Armin suggests here that “artificiall”—that 
is, witty—fools catch themselves in traps of their own making; their idle, musical 
“baubling” becomes the means by which they disable their own wits, thus making 
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themselves more foolish even than congenital fools. The Longer Thou Livest is likewise 
deeply concerned with the problem of the musical fretting out of time in idle baubling. 
Moros’ singing of solfège and nonsense syllables comes under censure as a form of 
musical babbling. His singing functions as the sonic accoutrement of his cognitive and 
moral failures, just as the fool’s bauble serves as visual witness to his folly. It is to that 
musical baubling that this chapter now turns. 
 
III. Witless Boys and Their Noise: Fooling in Song and Solfège 
In The Longer Thou Livest, Moros’ singing of nonsense syllables serves as evidence 
of his folly. This characterization of the fool’s singing is apparent from his earliest 
moments onstage. Even the stage direction announcing his first entrance comments on 
the foolishness of his singing: “Here enter’th Moros, counterfeiting a vain gesture and a 
foolish countenance [and] singing the foot of many songs as fools were wont.” (The 
description of a supposedly congenital fool as gesturally “counterfeiting”—that is, 
performing—shows how completely the categories of counterfeited and natural folly 
are sometimes conflated in early modern literature.) Moros bursts onto the stage 
singing a string of popular songs, one after another, and preventing his interlocutors 
from getting a word in edgewise. The relevance of the songs to questions of morality or 
knowledge—or, indeed, anything—can be difficult to discern. Here is one such song in 
its entirety: 
Martin Swart and his man, sodledum, sodledum, 




Although nonsensical words in songs (like “sodledum bell”) do not directly show 
deficiencies in the singer’s reason, they do function non-rationally.36 That is, they 
momentarily remove the song-text from rational discourse. Here, the text of the song 
celebrates Henry VII’s victory over the pretender Lambert Simnel, whose troops were 
led by a Martin Schwarz.37 In other words, the song refers to an event Moros might well 
have learned about in his youth, but those details are undiscernable in his version of the 
song, which is just as interested in the non-rational, nonsensical “sodledum, sodledum” 
as it is in the history lesson. 
In this early scene of The Longer Thou Livest, Moros continues in this antic vein for 
quite some time, singing fully nine songs in a row. The next character who does manage 
to speak, Discipline, reproves Moros: 
It is time childishness to forsake. 
I would find somewhat to do, I trow, 
And not like a fool such a noise to make, 
Going up and down like a witless boy, 
Singing and bellowing like a daw. (ll. 108–11). 
 
According to Discipline, then, Moros’ singing demonstrates his folly, vice, and 
witlessness—that is, his moral and cognitive deficits—as well as his likeness to 
inhuman species. To this assessment of his witlessness, Moros responds, saucily, “I 
have twenty moe songs yet” (l. 114). Clearly, the plays show, learning from admonition 
is not among Moros’ chief qualities. In fact, Idleness directly contrasts’ Moros’ utter 
ineptitude as a learner with his ability to rhyme and sing: 
IDLENESS: Tell him one thing twenty times, 
And he will forget it by and by, God wot; 




While rhyming and popular song-making are often derided by early modern English 
writers as non-rational, sub-standard forms of aesthetic creation, The Longer Thou 
Livest’s treatment of song suggests that the specific forms of singing in which Moros 
engages are antagonistic to the processes of improving cognitive ability through 
learning. 
Furthermore, Moros’ inept singing of solfège puts his cognitive inadequacies on 
display. When he is joined by his companions in vice—the none-too-subtly-named 
Idleness, Incontinence, and Wrath—he demonstrates the relationship between singing, 
bad morals, and lack of learning. Moros, the ringleader of the four, suggests that they 
indulge in more singing: “Before you go, let us have a song; / I can retch up to sing sol, 
fa, and past” (ll. 884–5). The self-critique implicated in his promise to “retch” up to high 
musical notes would have been apparent to Wager’s early audiences, for whom the 
usage of the verb “retch” as the act of coughing up phlegm and other throaty 
excrements would have been well-established.38 Moreover, Moros’ promise to “retch 
up” to “sol, fa, and past” inverts the direction of the degrees of the solfège scale, in 
which “fa” is lower than “sol,” rather than the other way around. In effect, he is 
promising to “retch up” to high notes by singing a descending scale—an indication of 
his deficits in knowledge. Moros’ mistake, then, clearly indicates musical folly and 
general mal-education. 
Moros then uses solfège coupled with nonsense syllables to attempt to establish a 
good pitch for their song: 
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MOROS: Let me study, it will come anon. 
Pepe la, la, la—it is too high there; 
So ho, ho—and that is too low; 
Soll, soll, fa, fa—and that is too flat; 
Re, re, re—by and by you shall know; 
Mi, mi, mi—how say you to that? 
 
IDLENESS: Care not for the true, but what is thy song; 
No remedy, thou must first begin. (888–95) 
 
Moros’ combination of solfège with nonsense syllables is clearly portrayed as evidence 
of his stark idiocy.39 Moros’ singing fails to signify—either linguistically, as words 
ought, or musically, as solfège ought. His awareness that there ought to be an agreed-
upon starting pitch for the song does demonstrate a kind of musical-social 
intelligence—yet his failure to find a good pitch shows his inability to meet the standard 
he understands. 
In this scene, Moros may be referring to either of a few different solmization 
systems used to teach singing during the premodern period. One of the earlier 
systems—an ascending six-note scale using the syllables “ut, re, mi, fa, sol, la”—was 
employed in medieval England. Moros’ singing clearly alludes to the last five of these 
six syllables: “re,” “mi,” “fa,” “sol,” and “la.” However, another system known as fasola 
was gaining traction in the mid-sixteenth century. (It is first attested in the 1570 Whole 
Booke of Psalmes —the year after The Longer Thou Livest was entered in the Stationer’s 
Register. As the system was apparently deemed familiar enough to be of practical use in 
psalm-singing, it seems probable that it was current by the late 1560s.)40 The fasola 
system names the notes of an ascending seven-note scale: “fa, sol, la, fa, sol, la, mi.” 
Because several of the syllables repeat, the fasola system relies more on context than the 
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medieval system; the syllable sung doesn’t indicate the exact scale degree outside the 
context of the pitched notes (Table 1). 
 
Sample scale C D E F G A (B♭) 
Medieval solfège system ut re mi fa sol la  
Fasola system fa sol la fa sol la mi 
Table 1. 
 
As its cultural location attests, the fasola system had traction among singers of 
vernacular, Protestant-inflected psalms—a genre compatible with the overarching 
Protestant interests of the play. Moros’ singing seems to occupy an awkward 
transitional space between traditional medieval solfège and sixteenth-century 
psalmody’s fasola system. Whatever solmization system Moros might have in mind, he 
understands and employs it badly (Table 2).  
 
Sample scale C D E F G A (B♭)    
Medieval solfège system ut re mi fa sol la     
Fasola system fa sol la fa sol la mi    
What Moros sings  re mi sol fa la (mi?) pepe so ho 
Table 2. 
 
Solfège is a system of musico-linguistic signification. Moros’ confusion of the 
relationship between signifier (the “sol, fa” phonemes), signified (the descending 
trajectory of the scale degrees represented by “sol, fa”), and referent (the actually 
ascending motion of the notes) stirs the pot of signification. He further muddies the 
waters by messing up even that form of signification: he adds nonsense syllables that 
have no part in his solfège system (“pepe,” “so, ho, ho”) and presumably bear little 
musical relation to the notes required. Indeed, Moros’ continued reliance upon the 
solfège scale may show that his musical education has never progressed very far. 
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Moros’ attempt to figure out (or “study,” as he says) the correct starting pitch 
again emphasizes his ineptitude in performing schoolboy-level musical skills. In his 
faux-erudition, he slides all over the solfège scale and gets no closer to his simple goal 
of finding a starting pitch for his song. These bootless efforts show that Moros’ scant 
education has rendered him less able to perform even the simple songs that he wishes to 
sing with his comrades in vice. Thus, he turns his supposed musical education—a 
system meant to expand the range of his cognitive skills—to mere babble. Even in this 
late stage of the play, he is still acting as a witless boy making noise. 
Idleness’ response to this elaborate performance of pitch-searching is: “Care not 
for the true, but what is thy song.” Idleness’ flagrant disregard for “the true” further 
emphasizes these four friends’ abandonment of the “true” learning advocated by 
Discipline and the other virtuously allegorical characters. Moros’ and his friends’ 
flouting of its system stands in for a flouting of the authority of their would-be 
educators. The Longer Thou Livest suggests, censoriously, that song is for the deliberately 
ignorant, who choose to engage in it because they reject better instruction. The play thus 
offers a distinctively dark portrayal of both popular songs and the fools who sing them. 
Moreover, the play’s gleeful performances of songs and silly games render its audience 
and players complicit in the foolishness it purports to critique. The foolishness is, after 
all, by far the most exuberantly delightful aspect of the play, which otherwise is made 
up of long lectures on the wickedness of popery and the proper Protestant methods of 
reforming one’s life. 
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Moros’ offenses against the play’s soundscape do not end with his songs—or 
even with his “retch[ing]” up to high notes. While listening to another of Discipline’s 
didactic, Latin-heavy excoriations of his cognitive faculties, Moros suggests that he 
might respond to this instruction with a non-verbal, non-musical noise: 
DISCIPLINE: Animi vilis timor argumentum est; 
Fear of a vile mind is an argument. 
Conscious accuseth the foolish beast 
That he hath forsaken wholesome document. [. . .] 
 
MOROS: Body of God, of him I am so afraid 
That at every word I am like to fart. (ll. 970–3, 988–9) 
 
Discipline is arguing that Moros’ mind is so corrupt as to be analogous to a cognitively 
deficient animal’s. Moros’ interjecting threat signifies less than solfège, less than babble. 
In an act of uncontrolled rebellion, he threatens—as Hamlet might say—“a sound, but 
not in governance.” This moment encapsulates the threat that Moros and other fools 
pose to their more educated, seemingly virtuous interlocutors. Fools, their “vile 
mind[s],” and their utterances are rarely in governance. Perhaps this refusal of lower-
case bodily and cognitive discipline is what makes the character Discipline, like Robert 
of Cisyle’s angel, deem the fool more comparable to a “beast” (l. 972) than a human 
being. 
Wager’s very late medieval morality play has a twist. It presents the hallmark 
allegorically-named characters of the earlier and more famous medieval moralities, but 
it grinds a distinctively Protestant axe. It contains several diatribes that rail in passing 
against transubstantiation, indicating a Protestant eucharistic theology that marks itself 
not merely as non-Catholic but as post- and anti-Catholic. More germane to this 
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chapter’s concern with fools is the character Fortune’s threat: “A popish fool will I place 
in a wiseman’s seat” (l. 1065). According to the logic of the play, neither a “fool” nor a 
“popish” character belongs in a wiseman’s place. Throughout the play, folly is 
characterized as mental and moral debility, and here Fortune labels such debility 
Catholic. Conversely, the virtuous characters in the play associate uprightness, wisdom, 
and wit with Protestant orthodoxy. This binaristic division of mental ability from 
disability, virtue from vice, old orthodoxy from new orthodoxy, contrasts sharply with 
the religious valences folly accrues in such late-fourteenth and early-fifteenth-century 
texts as the Wycliffite tracts, the Tale of Beryn, and Audelay’s poems and carols. These 
medieval, pre-Reformation texts all occupy different spaces on the spectrum of 
ecclesiastical orthodoxy with respect to the hot-button debates of the turn of the 
fifteenth century; they differ over the role of clergy and the circulation of vernacular 
scriptures among the laity.41 However, they clearly agree in their characterization of the 
five wits’ or senses’ precarious status, which they characterize as ever susceptible to 
corruption—that is, debility. Wager’s play, on the other hand, posits a universe in 
which able cognition and its fruits are strongly allied with a Protestant soteriological 
system. The religious dimension of the English literary history of fooling—rather than 
neatly aligning with some (imagined) theory about cognitive disability in orthodox and 
heterodox, or pre- and post-Reformation, contexts—makes up a variegated pattern, 
alternately matching and clashing with its own claims. 
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Coda: Wager, Shakespeare, and the Pleasures of Folly  
The Longer Thou Livest’s comedic but ultimately damning portrayal of the fool’s 
cognitive shortcomings provides a context that challenges scholarly readings of the 
putatively “wise” fools in the plays of Shakespeare and his contemporaries. Familiar 
Shakespearean fools like Feste and Lear’s Fool are rich, nuanced, keenly provocative 
characters not because they’re merely dispensing wisdom like candy to high-status 
recipients, but because they are working within the full scope of the premodern fooling 
tradition. This tradition valorizes their hyperability in wordplay, even as it scoffs at the 
supposed lightness of their wits and reminds them of their alleged disabilities in 
cognition. The connection between Moros’ steadfast witlessness and the obtuse silliness 
of “natural” fools like Dogberry is obvious. The connection between Moros’ behavior 
and that of witty “artificial” fools like Feste and Lear’s Fool is perhaps less so, but it is 
equally important. Moros’ songs, like Feste’s and Lear’s Fool’s songs, overflow the 
bounds of rational discourse, inviting their audiences to join in the pleasures of this 
transgression. 
The pleasures of transgression in babble and in song underwrite Wager’s 
otherwise heavy-handed morality play. The songs, bad jokes, and irrepressible antics of 
Moros and his companions—while sternly condemned by Discipline and the other 
virtuous characters—are the mainstay of the play’s action. When Erasmus says that 
fools “not onely them selves are ever mery, plaiyng, singyng, and laughyng: but also 
what ever they dooe, are provokers of others lykewyse to pleasure, sport, and 
laughter,” he suggests that fools make available forms of pleasures peculiar to their 
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performances of fooling.42 While Erasmus does not condemn such pleasures, the 
virtuous figures in The Longer Thou Livest do. Still, it seems that Wager understood that, 
despite Discipline’s reproaches and the ultimate pronouncements by God’s Judgment, 
the pleasurable insouciance of the fool and his fellows would draw audiences to the 
play. Moros’ performances of fooling, then, make audiences complicit in the pleasures 
that the virtuous characters proscribe. By featuring the entertainment value of witty 
wordplay and popular song, Wager’s play draws the audience into the fool’s moral 
circuit, challenging spectators to recognize the lightness of their own wits and to 
continue the fool’s staging of aesthetic pleasures, however silly those pleasure may 
seem. As Moros himself says, “If you will have any more, / Vouchsafe to sing it 
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Counterfeiting and Singing Folly in Twelfth Night 
 
In Twelfth Night, Feste’s performances of fooling encourage an inquiry into how 
embodied ability is treated on the Shakespearean stage. This chapter thus brings the 
concerns of early modern disability studies to bear on the scholarly conversation 
surrounding early modern song in Shakespearean drama. Song highlights the marginal 
position of both female and male characters deemed outside the parameters of idealized 
masculinity.1 Simultaneously, as in Wager’s The Longer Thou Livest the More Fool Thou 
Art, song in Shakespeare’s plays points out cognitive difference: it identifies characters 
portrayed as cognitively disabled, and it enables audiences to question the social 
assumptions that mark off those thought to have cognitive ability from those 
considered cognitively disabled. This view of song is repeated, and given greater 
specificity, in early modern writers who direct critiques at vocational fools.  These 
writers critique not only the fools’ jests and performances of verbal sparring but also 
their performances of popular songs, implying that fools’ songs are implicated in the 
allegation that fools counterfeit their performances in order accrue wealth or other 
social gains. Such writers argue that songs are a marker of both low social station and 
cognitive deficiency, and that they are even cognitively disabling—that is, deleterious to 
singer and audience alike. Feste is notable among Shakespeare’s fools for his singing 
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and his questioning of the very concepts of wit and ability—as well as his hyper-explicit 
playing with the boundaries between moral opprobrium and approved wisdom, 
between cognitive dexterity and disability, between nature and art. 
Song is integral to stage fools’ portrayal of otherwise invisible difference. On the 
Shakespearean stage, song tends to register the singer’s marginalized social position. 
Nearly every singer in Shakespeare’s plays is marginalized with respect to power, 
cultural authority, or social position. While it has previously been noted that many of 
Shakespeare’s characters who sing are marginalized, I would add that these characters 
are frequently hypermarginalized, a term that feminist scholars have used to refer to the 
position of any person whose identity intersects with more than one socially 
marginalized category. 2, 3 The young, often nameless boy singers in the plays are 
marginalized with respect to class and age (see, for example Measure for Measure, 4.1). 
The Welsh Lady Mortimer is marginalized with respect to gender, nationality, and 
ethnicity or race (1 Henry IV, 3.1). When Ophelia sings, she is marginalized with respect 
to gender and, arguably, rank, and she is further hypermarginalized by her madness 
(Hamlet, 4.5). Although not all marginalized Shakespearean characters are directly 
associated with song, it is clear that song is deeply implicated in hypermarginality 
throughout Shakespeare’s corpus.4, 5 
The unmarked position of power and authority at the center of all these marked 
forms is most often occupied by the adult, economically advantaged white male. In 
Shakespearean drama, this character is typically the mature male protagonist or male 
romantic lead.6, 7 To cite only a few examples from the Shakespearean plays that include 
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songs: Antony, Henry IV, Henry VIII, Romeo, Troilus, Prospero, Theseus, Demetrius, 
Lysander, Orsino, Claudio, Orlando, and Bassanio do not sing. Othello and Shylock, 
men who are socially marginalized by ethnicity and religion but are nonetheless in 
powerful positions, do not sing. Nor does The Merchant of Venice’s Gratiano, though he 
boldly announces, “Let me play the fool” (1.1.79). In short, although powerful adult 
male protagonists in the Shakespearean corpus often request, listen to, and discuss 
songs, they almost never sing.8 Cataloguing this phenomenon highlights the singularity 
of the rare cases in which male characters do break into song. When they do, they are 
most often slipping into positions of less social power and authority. 
When previously powerful male characters break into song, it can indicate not 
only a loss in social station, but also a loss of wits. For instance, Lear’s inarticulate 
snatches irrupt when he has lost his kingdom, his family, and his wits. His singing 
serves as a sign of his loss of reason, as Cordelia indicates late in the play when she tells 
her men, 
Why, he was met even now, 
As mad as the vexed sea, singing aloud. [...] 
  What can man’s wisdom 
In the restoring his bereavèd sense, 
He that helps him take all my outward worth. 
(Folio version, 4.3.1–2, 8–10) 
 
Cordelia’s appositive characterization of her “mad,” “singing” father closely echoes 
Gertrude’s description of Ophelia, whose madness is evinced and permeated by song: 
Ophelia famously appears singing before the court and dies while “chant[ing] snatches 
of old tunes” (4.7.148). King Lear places its age-assailed monarch among Shakespeare’s 
madly singing characters—boys, women, fools—who are already less powerful. This 
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social placement strikingly demonstrates that in Shakespeare’s dramatic universe, no 
one’s wits are safely immutable. Lear’s Fool, prominent among Shakespearean fools for 
his saucily explicit comparisons of vocational folly to the king’s deteriorating cognition, 
hints early in the play that the potential mutability of Lear’s wit has ever been a present 
threat. Having listened to the Fool’s saucy banter, Lear retorts “Dost thou call me fool, 
boy?” The Fool famously answers, “All thy other titles thou has given away. That thou 
was born with” (Quarto only, scene 4, lines 131–2). This stunning reversal brushes off 
Lear’s kingship and all the other advantages of his birth as mere outward trappings, 
suggesting that he is by rights both marginal and disabled. In this moment, the Fool 
seems to anticipate Lear’s later recognition of other socially marginalized people—his 
acknowledgment that he has “ta’en /Too little care” of “[p]oor naked wretches, 
whereso’er you are” (3.4.36-7, 3.4.32). This acknowledgment comes about about only 
when Lear himself has been pushed to the literal margins of his former kingdom. The 
Fool’s paradoxical characterization of Lear’s mental mutability as an always-latent 
feature of his cognition challenges the very category of cognitive disability. Indeed, this 
characterization renders the category ambiguous and its constituents dubious. 
Fools are the targets of longstanding anti-fool sentiments in premodern 
literature.9 Such anti-fool sentiments, which appear in such medieval texts as William 
Dunbar’s fifteenth-century characterization of “Jok Fule” and Lydgate’s Order of Fools, 
remain active in the sixteenth-century fool literature that immediately precedes the 
earliest productions of Twelfth Night (c. 1602).10 This anti-fool literature associates 
singing, vocational fools with disingenuity and outright lying. Late medieval and early 
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modern writers often claim that some of the performers of popular song billing 
themselves as disabled—e.g., blind harpers and natural fools—are capitalizing on 
popular demand for this type of performance. Minstrels, whom literary historians have 
identified as the musical forebears of vocational fools, are often said to be counterfeiting 
musical ability—badly—in order to gain and keep employment.11,12 Similarly, 
vocational fools are often said to be counterfeiting cognitive disability in their verbal 
performances. In fact, Piers Plowman contains a sweeping damnation of both these forms 
of counterfeiting: the Prologue specifically states that some minstrels are “synnelees” 
but that “japeres and jangeleres, Judas children, / Feynen hem fantasies, and fooles hem 
maketh, / And han wit at wille to werken if they sholde.”13 In other words, fools are 
explicitly associated with the seamier side of minstrelsy and are said to be feigning 
cognitive disability in order to avoid more legitimate labor.14 
Tomaso Garzoni’s treatise L’hospedale de pazzi incurabili repeats these allegations 
of fools’ counterfeiting at great length.15 Garzoni draws up a serious indictment against 
counterfeit fools, charging them simultaneously with craftiness and with disabling their 
own cognitive faculties. The treatise was published in Italian in 1586 and met with great 
success in Italy, which may well have inspired Edward Blount to publish it in English as 
The hospitall of incurable fooles in 1600.16 There is little evidence surrounding the 
circumstances of its English publication, and the translation has been attributed 
variously and conjecturally to Edward Blount himself or to Thomas Nashe. The latter 
attribution arose from a note in one early copy of The hospitall: “Tho. Nashe had some 
hand in this translation and it was the last he did as I heare P. W.”17 However, there is 
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no other evidence to support the case for Nashe as translator, although there may be a 
rather fanciful allure in the notion that the author who wrote so vividly of Jack Wilton’s 
travels into Italy in The Unfortunate Traveller might have had a more than passing 
interest in Italian madness. 
The hospitall’s prefatory letter to the well-to-do John Hodgson connects it to the 
literary works of other luminaries of the period: Thomas Dekker’s The Gull’s Horn-book 
(1609) and a prefatory epistle to Thomas Middleton’s Father Hubburd’s Tales: or the Ant 
and the Nightingale (1604) both refer to Hodgson in laudatory terms. This connection, 
however oblique, suggests that The hospitall may have circulated—or its publisher may 
have wished that it should circulate—among consumers of early-seventeenth-century 
dramatists’ prose works. 
The treatise tells of the narrator’s hospital for fools, who are all given “distinct 
Cels [within the hospital], wherein they may all commodiously, and with great ease 
repose themselves.”18 The “pazzi” in the Italian title might more accurately be translated 
as “madmen” or “crazy people,” and Garzoni signals his satirical intent by signing his 
prefatory note to the reader as “Il pazzissimo” (roughly, “the craziest of all”).19 The 
English translation’s employment of “fooles” for “pazzi” reflects the blurry conceptual 
boundaries between folly and madness that obtain in premodern English and French 
literature.20 It also destabilizes the balance between analysis and performance—between 
talking about fools and acting a fool. 
The blurring of folly and madness likewise appears in the content of the treatise 
itself. The narrator lays out chapters (or “discourses”), each devoted to one of twenty-
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nine clearly demarcated types of fools. The sixteenth discourse, which is devoted to 
“parasiticall or scoffing Fooles,” begins: 
It is not in a manner convenient, that these whom we call Parasiticall or 
counterfeit Fooles, should have place in the Hospitall of our Incurables, in 
that they not being really Foolish in minde, as the others are, have little to 
doe in this assembly, but it seemeth that they should rather be placed in 
the number of the wise, sage Cato affirming that, Stultitiam simulare loco, 
prudentia summa est. To play the Foole in time and place is greatest 
wisedome sure.21 
 
Conspicuously, this statement makes it clear that the fools deemed incurable and 
therefore suited to residence in the hospital should be irrevocably cognitively disabled, 
or “really Foolish in minde”—that is, one might assume, they should be “naturall” 
fools. Those fools lodged in the hospital should not merely be giving a performance of 
folly: they should not be “artificial” fools. In other words, this passage calcifies the 
traditional early modern distinction between “naturall” and “artificiall” folly. 
Moreover, the passage clearly medicalizes the condition of the “naturall” fool while 
attributing merit to the “artificial” one. Monica Calabritto has shown how Garzoni’s 
Italian text operates in an atmosphere of increasing regulation of social norms at the end 
of the sixteenth century.22 She argues, “Garzoni’s treatment of madness and of mad 
individuals is more rigid and conservative than that which was used in contemporary 
hospitals in Italy.”23 Garzoni’s obsession with delineating distinct categories of persons 
plays, consciously or unconsciously, into English concerns about drawing boundary 
lines between the cognitively disabled members at the margins of society and their 
nervous contemporaries in the social center. 
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However, the narrator immediately complicates this account—and the 
discourse’s implicit investment in the boundaries between “naturall” and “artificiall” 
folly—by describing a more troublesome kind of fool: 
But because there be some that otherwhiles play the Fooles in jest, with 
that little folly they have in their heads, it being a manifest signe of folly, 
to play the Foole for no purpose at all, to give other men contentment, by 
such men I say, we onely meane it, when in this our Hospital we place 
Parasiticall or counterfeit Fooles.24 
 
Those who counterfeit folly “in jest” for entertainment—that is, those who perform 
fooling vocationally—are placed in the hospital for being “really Foolish in minde,” 
after all. The narrator thus portrays the “counterfeit” performance of cognitive 
disability as concrete evidence that the performer is actually cognitively disabled. In 
Garzoni’s treatise, no display of folly will keep the fool who displays it safely outside 
the confines of the hospital. 
The narrator’s disdain for “play[ing] the Foole for no purpose at all” is shared by 
numerous other early modern literary figures. One explanatory moment occurs in Book 
II of The Countesse of Pembrokes Arcadia, in which the Jacques-like Plangus likens 
“wretched humaine-kind” to players on the stage: 
Like players pla’st to fill a filthy stage,  
Where chaunge of thoughts one foole to other shewes, 
And all but jests, save onely sorrowes rage.  
The child feeles that; the man that feeling knowes,  
With cries first borne, the presage of his life,  
Where wit but serves, to have true tast of woes.25 
 
Here, Plangus represents all the players on the stage as fools engaging in pointless jokes 
and histrionics. He clearly regards the players as the sort who “play the Foole for no 
purpose at all,” unless that purpose is to intensify the “true tast of woes.” Garzoni’s 
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narrator shows a similar contempt for players and members of the lower classes alike in 
the discourse on “ridiculous fooles.” In this discourse, a mad king demonstrates his 
complete abandonment to his follies by “practis[ing] and convers[ing] as well with the 
basest vulgar sort, as with gentlemen and great lords” and “tumbling and dauncing like 
some stage foole, to the great abashment of those that were present at such 
indignities.”26 The king’s genuine behavior, an indicator of his genuine madness, 
becomes more worthy of censure when it mimics the behavior of the stage fool’s 
feigning of folly.  
Indeed, Garzoni’s narrator says that counterfeiting folly may induce cognitive 
impairment: 
And there is no doubt but that amongst these men, we may well reckon 
that Gallus Vibius […] who many times fayning himselfe to be a Foole, 
and jesting in this manner, at last he came to be so in good earnest, 
growing a starcke naturall Foole, to the ende that whereas he scoffed and 
deluded others, for chastisement of his folly, he might at last remaine 
derided and flouted himself.27 
 
The dangers of feigning folly and jesting like a fool are similarly expounded by the 
narrator of Dekker’s The Guls Horne-booke, who promises readers, “Tush, tush, Tarleton, 
Kemp, nor Singer, nor all the litter of Fooles that now come drawling behinde them, 
never plaid the Clownes more naturally then [sic] the arrantest Sot of you all, shall, if 
hee will but boyle my Instructions in his brainepan.”28 Dekker’s narrator evinces both a 
witty weariness of the English stage-fool tradition and a sly knowledge of how the 
categories of “artificiall” and “naturall” folly are often elided in the same tradition.  
Garzoni’s narrator, not content with mere allusions to performed folly, 
immediately proffers an explicit example of a stage player. In contrast to Twelfth Night’s 
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Viola, who calls Feste “wise enough to play the fool” (3.1.53), the narrator clearly sees 
“playing of the foole” as disabling one’s wits: 
In our daies one Garbinello hath a notable grace in playing of the foole, 
who as in representing a poore Padoan countrey man, a Magnifico, or 
some doddipoule Doctor Gratian he hath no fellow; so in this other kind 
of dissimulation, exceedeth he all others, for whosoever heareth or seeth 
him, by actions, gestures, and words, judgeth him to bee no other then a 
naturall Foole.29 
 
This account, with its insistence on the impossibility of discerning between playing a 
fool and being one in fact, props up the indictment of feigning fools that the treatise has 
been developing. Published shortly before the earliest recorded performance of Twelfth 
Night (1602), it bears more than a passing resemblance to Malvolio’s attitude in his 
passive-aggressive altercations with Feste (e.g., 1.5), and does much to illumine Feste’s 
precariously liminal position between “counterfeit” and “real” folly. The distinction 
between “counterfeit” and “naturall” folly is completely elided in the figure of 
Garbinello: despite his status as a player, he is judged “to bee no other then a naturall 
Foole” by both the auditory and visual senses of all who witness him (emphasis added). 
Feste and all other vocational fools run just this risk of being doubly censured for both 
displaying counterfeit folly and bringing “naturall” folly upon themselves. 
The narrator closes this discourse with a supplication to Mercury, whom the 
counterfeit fools are said to regard “as the god of all knaves, and craftie jackes like to 
themselves” and to rely on for protection.30 In the supplication, the narrator names 
Mercury “the inventor of the Harpe […] and of Rhetoricke,” thereby associating the god 
with the artistic practices for which fools are both celebrated and derided.31 He 
concludes by promising that, if Mercury will give the counterfeit fools in the hospital 
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his protection, he can “expect without any delay, before thy image in the Temple of the 
Phenicians, the oblation of a Foxes skinne, which will be an offering much conformable 
both to them and thy selfe.”32 In associating counterfeit fools and their mythological 
patron with the craftiness of the fox, the narrator concludes his exposition of these fools’ 
cognitive deficits with a gesture toward their alleged hyper-intellection and lack of 
ethical virtues. Despite or perhaps because of its internal self-contradictions, this 
characterization of vocational fools as both hyper-intellectual and hyper-disabled 
follows them throughout early modern literature. Indeed, given the narrator’s sly 
characterization of himself as “Il pazzissimo,” the indictment of the counterfeit fools is 
one in which he may be implicating himself. 
This common portrayal of fools’ vocation as counterfeiting is not in every case a 
criticism associated with anti-fool sentiment. In early modern English, the word 
“counterfeit” does not have a uniformly negative connotation.33 For example, George 
Puttenham’s The Arte of English Poesie (1589) identifies artificial fools’ counterfeiting of 
folly34 as the source of the humor in their performance: 
[A] buffoon or counterfeit fool, to hear him speak wisely, which is like 
himself, it is no sport at all, but for such a counterfeit to talk and look 
foolishly, it maketh us laugh, because it is no part of his natural, for in 
every uncomeliness there must be a certain absurdity and disproportion 
to nature and the opinion of the hearer or beholder to make the thing 
ridiculous. But for a fool to talk foolishly or a wise man wisely, there is no 
such absurdity or disproportion.35 
 
For Puttenham, the catalyst for the audience’s laughter at the performance of the 
“counterfeit fool” is the audience’s recognition of the misalignment between the fool’s 
actual ability and his performance of disability. In other words, like Viola in Twelfth 
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Night, Puttenham recognizes that the counterfeit fool is giving a performance of folly—
not necessarily playing himself. Simultaneously, he takes comfort in deriving his 
amusement at the counterfeit fool’s performance from the “disproportion” between the 
fool’s presumed ability and his performance of disability. As scholars of disability 
studies working in other periods point out, audiences frequently prefer that able-bodied 
performers represent disabled characters and that disabled bodies be hidden from 
public view.36 Puttenham clearly locates the audience’s pleasure in a performance of 
folly in precisely this dissociation between the representation of disabled, bodily 
intellection and the performer’s own bodily, cognitive ability. Nonetheless, as Garzoni’s 
treatise demonstrates, this very dissociation renders premodern fools suspect and 
subject to moral opprobrium. 
The problems Garzoni and Puttenham adduce converge in the figure of the 
vocational fool as he is played on the early modern English stage. Act 4, scene 2 of 
Twelfth Night shows Feste negotiating the problems inherent in “fayning himselfe to be 
a Foole,” as Garzoni would put it, as he plays the role of Sir Topas the curate while he, 
Maria, and Sir Toby Belch torment Malvolio in the “dark house.”37 After Feste has 
taunted Malvolio by counterfeiting the voice of Sir Topas and accusing Malvolio of 
lunacy, Maria remarks to Feste, “Thou mightst have done this”—that is, might have 
performed the role of Sir Topas the curate—“without thy beard and gown, he sees thee 
not” (4.2.57–58). Other commentators have justifiably used this line to point out how 
unnecessary it is for Feste to don a curate’s costume in order to deceive Malvolio.38 I 
want to emphasize that Maria’s comment also demonstrates how entirely Feste’s 
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performance of the curate’s role relies on vocal counterfeiture. Immediately after her 
comment, Sir Toby bids Feste doff the persona of Sir Topas by saying, “To him in thine 
own voice,” thereby confirming that Feste’s playing of Sir Topas relies on the 
assumption of uncharacteristic vocal qualities (4.2.59). Maria’s and Toby’s words both 
evince their assumption that the voice in which Feste performs his fooling—as opposed 
to the voice of he uses when performing as Sir Topas the curate—is his “own voice.” 
That is, they assume no counterfeiture in the vocal qualities of Feste’s usual fooling. 
Toby’s remark here suggests that Feste’s voice is taken as synonymous with his 
identity as the fool. And throughout the play, other characters imply that Feste’s vocal 
characteristics are constant and recognizable when they repeatedly comment that his 
voice is notably beautiful in song. It is implied that the part of Feste the fool is thought 
of by all but Viola as uncounterfeited, rather than as a performed role. Criticism on 
Twelfth Night evinces a similar understanding of Feste’s voices. For instance, Lois Potter 
refers to Feste’s vocal performance as Sir Topas as Feste’s “trick voice,” thus—like Sir 
Toby—conferring a kind of normativity on Feste’s “own voice.”39 Nonetheless, to join 
Toby in deeming Feste’s habitual voice to be his “own voice” is to presume to know 
something like Feste’s true self and to ignore the possibility, spoken by Viola, that there 
is a consummate artifice in Feste’s “playing of the Foole.” Feste’s vocal disguise or 
“trick voice” emphasizes his audience’s difficulties in discerning the differences 
between his performance and his “own” persona—if there are any. His vocal 
counterfeiture gestures toward the twin possibilities that his entire act of playing the 
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fool is likewise counterfeited or that the illusion of counterfeiture veils genuine 
cognitive disability. 
At the same time, the artifice and potential counterfeiture implicated in Feste’s 
fooling do not diminish the disruptive effect of his songs and witty repartee. When 
Feste doffs the voice of Sir Topas and “re-enters” as the fool (or so Malvolio is led to 
believe), he announces his re-entry by singing. “Hey Robin, jolly Robin, / Tell me how 
thy lady does,” he begins, and Malvolio instantaneously recognizes him and calls out, 
“Fool!” (4.2.65–67). Feste, however, ignores the address and continues to sing while 
Malvolio tries to attract his attention: 
MALVOLIO  Fool! 
FESTE [singing] “My lady is unkind, pardie.” 
MALVOLIO  Fool! 
FESTE   “Alas, why is she so?” 
MALVOLIO  Fool, I say! 
FESTE   “She loves another—” Who calls, ha? 
MALVOLIO Good fool, as ever thou wilt deserve well at my hand, help 
me to a candle, and pen, ink, and paper. As I am a gentleman, I will live to 
be thankful to thee for ’t. (4.2.67–76) 
 
Even as Malvolio attempts to interrupt the song, Feste’s seemingly silly ditty becomes 
the means by which he can ignore Malvolio’s pleas. Malvolio’s pleas, in turn, remind 
both Feste and the audience that Feste is “playing of the Foole,” although Malvolio 
clearly regards the fooling persona as genuine—or genuine enough for supplication. 
Thus, in facilitating Feste’s insouciant performance of counterfeit fooling while serving 




Once Malvolio does catch Feste’s attention and again begs the “[g]ood fool” for a 
light and writing implements, Feste himself pauses to interrogate Malvolio about the 
veracity of the latter’s mental stability, thereby accusing Malvolio of the very crime of 
counterfeiture so often attributed to vocational fools: 
FESTE  I will help you to ’t. But tell me true, are you not mad 
indeed, or do you but counterfeit? 
MALVOLIO Believe me, I am not. I tell thee true. 
FESTE  Nay, I’ll ne’er believe a madman till I see his brains.  
(4.2.104–6) 
 
The choice Feste proffers Malvolio is a narrow one: according to the binary strictures of 
Feste’s question, Malvolio can either aver that he is mentally infirm or that he is 
dissembling mental infirmity. Feste’s question—in form indubitably harsh—yet echoes 
Malvolio’s earlier insinuation that Feste himself is mentally lacking: “I saw him put 
down the other day with an ordinary fool that has no more brain than a stone” (1.5.72–
73). And Feste’s rejoinder to Malvolio’s asseveration of truth shows the emptiness of 
even the narrow choice Feste has laid out: instead, Feste suggests, he has already judged 
Malvolio mad, and he will only believe the madman’s word when he “see[s] his 
brains”—a macabre sort of ocular proof. This moment trains a spotlight on the 
precariousness of both Feste’s and Malvolio’s social positions: each has access to the 
social circle for whom they perform their duties, yet each is ultimately on the margins of 
that circle, and each must compete for favor and esteem. The harshness of Feste and his 
fellow tricksters’ ultimate victory over Malvolio is perhaps best understood, though not 
justified, in light of Feste’s own outsider status—a problem to which this chapter will 
return in discussion of the first and last acts of the play. 
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In the scene at hand, Feste leaves with another song, the second of the two songs 
that bookend his performance of “himself”—that is, of the counterfeit fool whose 
persona can never be certainly distinguished from his “own voice”: 
FESTE  I am gone, sir, 
And anon, sir, 
I’ll be with you again, 
In a trice, 
Like to the old Vice, 
Your need to sustain; 
Who, with dagger of lath, 
In his rage and his wrath, 
Cries, ah, ha! to the devil: 
Like a mad lad, 
Pare thy nails, dad; 
Adieu, good man devil. (4.2.111–22) 
 
The song’s jangling, repetitive rhymes harken to the technique that, according to 
Puttenham, “showeth a certain lightness either of the matter or of the maker’s head.” 
The song’s comparison of the first-person singer “to the old Vice” links Feste to the 
history of fooling on the English stage, in which the Vice served as a dramatic precursor 
to the fool. Simultaneously, it highlights the slippage between sung words and their 
performer. At the same time, the form of the song itself places Feste within the minstrel 
tradition that received so much derision from premodern writers. A devotee of 
Puttenham’s, hearing this song, might well have thought of Puttenham’s critique of 
Skelton: “But a rude, railing rhymer, and all his doings ridiculous, he used both short 
distances and short measures, pleasing only the popular ear. In our courtly maker we 
banish them utterly.”41 Feste, whose song clearly fails Puttenham’s standards for the 
“courtly maker,” deflects attention from his song’s failures by further ostracizing his 
fellow outsider, Malvolio—a deflection that relies on the disruption of fooling to disable 
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the judgment of his courtly audience. Indeed, the “rude, railing” rhymes of Feste’s 
songs more than hint at his own marginalized status as a cognitively different fool 
whose songs fail would-be elite aesthetic standards like Puttenham’s. Moreover, these 
songs provide pleasure to audiences, as evidenced by their frequent presence in 
comedies and even tragedies. Audiences who enjoy the pleasures these songs offer 
implicate themselves in Puttenham-esque judgments of the “popular ear,” showing 
their own cognitive bent toward putatively low aesthetic forms. 
Popular song is often represented as “non-rational” in early modern literature—
that is, it is not forced into the analytical categories of rationality and irrationality.42 This 
assertion would have shocked the vast majority of early modern music theorists, as well 
as their medieval and classical forebears: music was, after all, long categorized among 
the fundamental disciplines in the classical quadrivium—which also included 
astronomy, math, and geometry—rather than the trivium, which was comprised of 
grammar, rhetoric, and logic. In theory, music was even seen as hyperrational: the 
music historian Claude Palisca has argued that sixteenth-century Renaissance thinkers 
increasingly thought of music as an art that governed all the other disciplines.43 
Nonetheless, musical practices have always troubled musical theories, and 
Shakespearean songs often fail to meet these theoretical standards of hyperrationality.44 
Feste’s songs, in addition to refusing to engage such musico-theoretical standards, 
operate under the umbrage of sixteenth-century socio-musical biases that deem popular 
song insufficiently erudite and insufficiently gentlemanly. 
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George Puttenham’s The Arte of English Poesie aptly showcases the intersecting 
prejudices concerning cognitive faculties, gender, and class that underpin these 
standards of hyperrationality in medieval and Renaissance theories of music. His 
theories of the relative merits of “artificial” and “popular” song both parallel 
premodern theories of “artificial” versus “natural” fooling and reproduce the cultural 
norms that categorize singers and fans of popular song as cognitively deficient. 
Puttenham strongly links specific poetic conventions with specific genres of song and, 
in turn, specific kinds of singers. His discussions of the poetic forms he associates with 
popular song often begin, like other discussions in the Arte, with questions of aesthetic 
judgment. For example, book 2, chapter 10 begins with this injunction: 
But this ye must observe withal, that because your concords contain the 
chief part of music in your meter, their distances may not be too wide or 
far asunder, lest the ear should lose the tune and be defrauded of his 
delight. And whensoever ye see any maker use large and extraordinary 
distances, ye must think he doth intend to show himself more artificial 
than popular, and yet therein is not to be discommended.45 
 
Puttenham analogizes the work of the poet (“maker”) to the work of the musical 
composer through a pun on “concords.” In early modern writing about music, 
“concord” often refers to consonant harmony; in Puttenham’s treatise, it also often 
serves as a synonym for “rhyme.” 
Here, Puttenham’s analogy specifically compares the treatment of rhyme to the 
treatment of harmonic rhythm, the rate at which the chords change in a given piece or 
section of music.46 Puttenham suggests that relatively slow harmonic rhythms run the 
risk of allowing auditors to “lose the tune.” This is an indication that he might have 
appreciated such pieces as simple motets by contemporary composers of “more 
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artificial than popular” music, but that he would have been less taken by the more 
complex works that were being written by his contemporaries.47 In other words, the 
passage identifies Puttenham’s musical tastes as solidly middlebrow. At the same time, 
it lauds artifice in poetic creation at the expense of the “popular,” which is assumed to 
be lowbrow. 
These aesthetic values appear elsewhere in the treatise, particularly when 
Puttenham deals with performances of song and poetry—that is, the very type of 
performance given by Robert Armin’s fools and the other singers in early modern plays. 
In another of the Arte’s many passages that use music as an extended metaphor for 
poetry, Puttenham directly links fools, songs and rhymes, and “lightness” of mind: 
Note also that rhyme or concord is not commendably used both in the end 
and middle of a verse, unless it be in toys and trifling poesies, for it 
showeth a certain lightness either of the matter or of the maker’s head, 
albeit these common rhymers use it much. For as I said before, like as the 
symphony in a verse of great length is, as it were, lost by looking after 
him, and yet may the meter be very grave and stately, so on the other side 
doth the over-busy and too speedy return of one manner of tune too much 
annoy and, as it were, glut the ear—unless it be in small and popular 
musics sung by these cantabanqui [from It. cantabanchi, “sings-on-
benches”] upon benches and barrels’ heads, where they have none other 
audience than boys or country fellows that pass by them in the street; or 
else by blind harpers or such like tavern minstrels that give a fit of mirth 
for a groat, and their matters being for the most part stories of old time, as 
The Tale of Sir Topas, the reports of Bevis of Southampton, Guy of Warwick, 
Adam Bell, and Clym of the Clough, and such other old romances or 
historical rhymes, made purposely for recreation of the common people at 
Christmas dinners and bride-ales, and in taverns and alehouses and such 
other places of base resort. Also they be used in carols and rounds and 
such light or lascivious poems, which are commonly more commodiously 
uttered by these buffoons or vices in plays than by any other person.48 
 
Ostensibly, this passage, which is a single sentence in the 1589 edition49—long and 
compendious, even by Puttenham’s standards—cautions against the use of internal 
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rhymes. Internal rhymes are indeed characteristic of medieval English verse, and their 
chiming sounds might be thought of as the aural cousins of the tailed rhyme that is 
famously satirized in the Canterbury Tales’ “Tale of Sir Thopas.” Puttenham’s clear 
disdain for this type of verse comports with the more forceful and concise assessment of 
Chaucer’s Host: “Thy drasty rymyng is nat worth a toord!”50 However, Puttenham 
expands his critique to impugn the cognitive ability of the makers of such rhymes, the 
character of those who perform them, and the taste and class of those who enjoy them. 
Puttenham’s suspicion of performers of popular song draws on the conceptual 
metaphor of blindness as want of judgment: literal blindness becomes metaphorical 
blindness to finer music and poetry, in Puttenham’s estimation. Thus, his reference to 
“blind harpers” is an observation of the reality that many early modern performers of 
popular song were physically impaired. It is also an insinuation that figurative 
blindness—that is, want of musical judgment—impairs the cognitive apprehension of 
the “base” audiences who enjoy the blind harpers’ performance. Indeed, Puttenham’s 
concern that the jangling internal rhyme “showeth a certain lightness either of the 
matter or of the maker’s head” shows his anxiety that inept poetry—what we might call 
disabled poetry—reflects not only the disabled apprehension of its auditors and 
performers but of its creators, too. 
The other critiques Puttenham here lays out likewise charge performers and 
hearers of popular song with failures in cognitive apprehension. One such form of 
failed apprehension is aural: perhaps surprisingly, the “ear” that Puttenham fears will 
be glutted by “the over busy and too speedy return of one manner of tune” is not the 
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abstracted ear of an auditor assumed to share Puttenham’s tastes, education, or status. 
Rather, it is a generalized “ear” capable of representing both educated auditors—such 
as Puttenham and his readers—and “boys or country fellows.” Puttenham makes it 
quite clear that he regards the latters’ taste for the “popular” songs of the cantabanqui as 
neither astonishing nor commendable. Likewise, he displays contempt for the “blind 
harpers” and “tavern minstrels,” who commercialize their songs by “giv[ing] a fit of 
mirth for a groat.”51 Puttenham’s characterization of these singer’s performances 
suggests that the “fit[s] of mirth” that harpers and minstrels parcel out for hire are 
unworthy of the attention of the higher ranks, both because they fail adjudications of 
taste and because they subject performances of song and poetry to commodification.52 
Moreoever, his dismissive employment of “groat” participates in a wider late-sixteenth- 
century tradition, evinced by such other texts as Robert Greene’s 1592 “Groats-Worth of 
witte, bought with a million of Repentance,” of associating the lowly groat with impaired 
cognition and moral fault.53 
The genre of popular song itself thus fails Puttenham’s standards for 
gentlemanly intellection and freedom from economic exchange. He implies that popular 
song and its rhymes are found wanting, not only for their “light” and “lascivious” 
characters, but also for their susceptibility to intellectually unworthy forms of exchange. 
His critique of such songs clearly encompasses figures similar to Feste, who sings for 
hire, and Autolycus, who baldly peddles ballads with his other “trumpery” (Twelfth 
Night 2.3; The Winter’s Tale, 4.4.680). Puttenham’s employment of the conceptual 
metaphor of blindness as lack of insight, paired with his repeated cautions that the 
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“tune” of poetry should not lose the ear, evinces his belief in an interplay between sight 
and sound; between words and music; and between making, performing, hearing, and 
assessing poetry. The nexus of the system he lays out is the popular song—the sung 
poem—a genre that he deems inherently lacking, disabled, and moreover, “more 
commodiously uttered by these buffoons or vices in plays than by any other person.” 
The formulation of this critique throws the burden of poetry’s failures not upon courtly 
makers, but upon the lower entertainers of benches, taverns, and the popular 
playhouse: the minstrels, the vices, and their artistic heirs, the “buffoons” or fools. 
Throughout Twelfth Night, Feste—a lower entertainer, such as the ones 
Puttenham despises—displays the awareness of the “witty fool” who knows he is ever 
in danger of being taken as cognitively disabled. This anxiety is especially apparent 
during his exchange with Olivia in act 1, scene 5, when Feste accosts Olivia with words 
that highlight how he is performing “fooling” for her entertainment: 
FESTE  Wit, an ’t be thy will, put me into good fooling! Those wits 
that think they have thee do very oft prove fools, and I that am sure I lack 
thee may pass for a wise man. For what says Quinapalus? —“Better a 
witty fool than a foolish wit.” God bless thee, Lady! (1.5.28–32)54 
 
Feste’s speech introduces the idea, widely bruited about in the early modern period, 
that the vocational fool’s entertainment value rests on his cognitive deficiency. Feste’s 
perhaps overly-dramatized show of reverent invocation of “Wit” functions as an 
insouciant metacommentary on the mental dexterity that he, who is “sure [he] lack[s]” 
wit, is about to be called upon to display. 
Likewise, the rest of the scene circles incessantly around the playful juxtaposition 
of the supposedly cognitively deficient fool’s performance of wit with Olivia’s 
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ostensibly more sober conversation. Olivia answers Feste’s greeting with a curt “Take 
the fool away” (1.5.33), whereupon Feste commences a nimble mock-interrogation of 
the wisdom of Olivia’s conduct. He closes his performance with a deft reversal that 
turns the epithet of “fool” back toward Olivia: “The lady bade take away the fool, 
therefore I say again, take her away” (1.5.45–46). When Olivia retorts, “Sir, I bade them 
take away you,” Feste replies, “Misprision in the highest degree! Lady, ‘Cucullus non 
facit monachum,’—that’s as much to say as I wear not motley in my brain” (1.5.47–50). 
There is a subtle defensiveness in the verbal panache of this last asseveration, 
particularly in the faux-learned Latin aphorism, “Cucullus non facit monachum” (“The 
cowl does not make a monk”). Despite Feste’s prefatorial remarks on his “lack” of wit, 
the success of his performance rests on donning the guise of fool, rather than being 
taken for one. For his performance to succeed, his audience must both revel in his 
display of mental acuity and buy the idea of mental deficiency as a charade. 
In this early Twelfth Night scene, Malvolio is the only character so ill-humored as 
to suggest that Feste’s mental deficiency is actual and not feigned. Furthermore, 
Malvolio strongly insinuates that Feste is mentally unsound, invoking the vocabulary of 
illness to characterize vocational fools: when asked by Olivia for an assessment of 
Feste’s fooling, Malvolio says, “[I]nfirmity, that decays the wise, doth ever make the 
better fool.” Feste replies, “God send you, sir, a speedy infirmity, for the better 
increasing your folly!” (1.5.66–68). By playing winkingly upon the fiction of “infirmity” 
even while pushing it away, Feste always risks the possibility that his status as a 
licensed fool will be lost by serious misprision of his abilities. The risk of misprision is 
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all the greater because the “infirmity” in question is cognitive: invisible, illegible, and 
thus always available to his opponents’ invocations. His fooling makes it imperative 
that he challenge and play on culturally constructed fictions of normative cognition. 
Malvolio, undeterred, redoubles his insinuations, saying of Feste, “I saw him put down 
the other day with an ordinary fool that has no more brain than a stone,” thereby 
insinuating that Feste’s ability is inferior to a putatively witless natural fool’s (1.5.72–
73). Though Malvolio’s statement acknowledges that Feste is held in higher esteem than 
other fools, it still calls Feste’s relatively high status into question.55 Likewise, Feste 
clearly understands how precarious is his position. The fool must be keenly aware that 
his auditors construct their own notions of cognitive normativity in opposition to 
carefully parsed deficiencies in the various early modern categories of fools. His 
performance as a “foole artificiall” depends on holding himself above “fooles naturall” 
while still playing to the cultural fiction of cognitive impairment.56 
Singing is a key way in which Feste plays on such fictions. In Twelfth Night, song 
is not merely an indicator of cognitive difference; it is also a mode of performance by 
which Feste himself embodies hypermarginality and plays with constructs of 
difference.57 As the contextual surroundings of Feste’s other performances of song 
throughout the play show, his hypermarginality resides in the intersection of cognition, 
masculinity, and class. He traffics in fooling—that is, he performs verbal wit and song 
for hire. Of the four scenes in which he sings, in two he explicitly receives payment for 
his song (2.3 and 2.4), and in a third he is paid for his jests and then performs his song 
for the good will of the playgoers (5.1). In these scenes, his explicit commercialization of 
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his art sets him apart from the ideal of the gentlemanly artist valorized by writers like 
George Puttenham, and it identifies him as a member of a lower rank. Just as saliently, 
this very commercialization of his performances cordons him off from the activities of 
leisured male homosociality that are available to Orsino and even to Sir Toby Belch and 
Sir Andrew Aguecheek.58 
Indeed, while Feste’s relationship with Sir Toby and Sir Andrew has many 
elements of camaraderie, it should be noted that the legendary nocturnal singing and 
cavorting of act 2, scene 3 is prefaced by a monetary transaction. At the beginning of the 
scene, Sir Toby greets Feste convivially and suggests a “catch”—a round for several 
voices (2.3.16). However, Sir Andrew then asks Feste if the latter has received sixpence 
for the previous night’s fooling and requests a song. Sir Toby and Sir Andrew each give 
Feste sixpence, and only then does Feste asks them what kind of song they would like 
to hear (2.3.22–27). Moreover, Sir Andrew accompanies the donation of his sixpence 
with the broken-off remark, “If one knight give a—,” thereby emphasizing his and Sir 
Toby’s rank and monied status in contradistinction to Feste’s (2.3.31–31). Sir Andrew 
thereby sets himself and Sir Toby at the intersection of elite rank and masculinity, while 
he places Feste and Feste’s impending song outside the boundaries of these forms of 
power.59 
The subsequent scene, in which Orsino has Curio fetch Feste in order to bid him 
sing, similarly shows that Feste performs for hire—and in the social context of gendered 
forms of difference. Orsino bids Viola (as Cesario) to “[m]ark” the song: 
182 
!
ORSINO  [I]t is old and plain; 
The spinsters and the knitters in the sun, 
And the free maids that weave their thread with bones, 
Do use to chant it. (2.4.42–45) 
 
Orsino explicitly associates the song he wants Feste to sing with women and women’s 
work. Indeed, his designation of the song as an “old” one that is “chant[ed]” by women 
closely matches Gertrude’s characterization of the songs Ophelia sings as she dies. In so 
doing, he associates Feste with women singer-workers: spinsters, knitters, and maids. 
The binary system he thereby invokes does not contrast masculinity with femininity; 
rather, it contrasts unmarked elite masculinity with other, marked forms of gender, 
which are implicitly associated with cognitive malleability. In order to capitalize on this 
system and make a living by his song, Feste must play into the world created by 
empowered men: Orsino, Toby, and Andrew, answering to their elite masculinity with 
his bought song. It is Feste’s multiform difference—together with his artificiality, or 
artful skill—that enables his song, and it is his song that marks his multiform difference. 
At the same time, Andrew’s designation as a “foolish knight” (1.3.12) compromises his 
masculinity in a different way: he invites the label “natural,” which correctly indicates 
the way in which he has disabled his own cognition by failing to take advantage of the 
educational opportunities afforded him by his wealth and rank. 
Twelfth Night, like the Tale of Beryn, separates the character of the artificial, 
vocational fool from that of the young man whose non-vocational folly results from his 
refusal of education. Twelfth Night’s separation of “witty fool” from “foolish wit” 
contrasts with Robert of Cisyle and The Longer Thou Livest the More Fool Thou Art, which 
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conflate these two types of character—a move that effectively impugns vocational fools 
for their alleged responsibility for their moral and educational deficits. By separating 
these types of folly and holding them in tension, Twelfth Night makes space for some 
celebration of the artificial, vocational fool at the expense of the dissolute, ill-educated 
young man. Pace those scholars who have adduced an Erasmian take on folly in 
Shakespeare’s later plays’ portrayals of vocational fools, Twelfth Night holds the 
“natural” fool up for ridicule—unlike the Praise of Folly, which sets apart natural fools as 
purveyors of aesthetic pleasure who need not worry about their salvation. 
Several times, characters in the play distinguish Feste’s kind of songs and 
witticisms from Sir Andrew’s lesser cognitive and performative abilities. For instance, 
Maria and Sir Toby speak of Andrew as a kind of fool. Maria openly calls him a “foolish 
knight” (1.3.12).60 She continues: 
MARIA: He’s a very fool and a prodigal. 
SIR TOBY: Fie, that you’ll say so! He plays o’ the viol-de-gamoys, and 
speaks three or four languages word for word without book, and hath all 
the good gifts of nature. 
MARIA: He hath indeed, almost natural, for besides that he’s a fool, he’s a 
great quarreler. (1.3.19-25) 
 
In his attempted rebuttal to Maria’s assessment, Sir Toby claims that Sir Andrew 
actually possesses the talents that a high-ranking young man might have cultivated 
with years of study: fluency in “three or four languages” and facility on the viola da 
gamba—a predecessor of the cello that would have theoretically suited highbrow 
musical tastes far more than the drinking songs in which Andrew, Toby, and Feste all 
indulge. Maria’s riposte deftly turns Toby’s “gifts of nature” into the mere adjective 
“natural”—i.e., the qualitative descriptor of both congenital folly and lack of education. 
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Sir Andrew himself corroborates Maria’s skepticism. He meditates on his 
impaired wit and then belies the claim that he is a polyglot:  
SIR ANDREW: Methinks sometimes I have no more wit than a Christian 
or an ordinary man has. But I am a great eater of beef, and I believe that 
does harm to my wit. 
SIR TOBY: No question. 
SIR ANDREW: An I thought that, I’d forswear it. I’ll ride home tomorrow, 
Sir Toby. 
SIR TOBY: Pourquoi, my dear knight? 
SIR ANDREW: What is “pourquoi”? Do or not do? I would I had bestowed 
that time in the tongues that I have in fencing, dancing, and bearbaiting. 
O, had I but followed the arts! (1.3.70–79) 
 
As in The Longer Thou Livest the More Fool Thou Art, in which Moros is criticized for his 
lack of Latin, Twelfth Night uses Andrew’s demonstrated ignorance of languages—here, 
French—to show his greater folly. Moreover, Andrew’s lack of skill in “the arts” 
implicitly contrasts his abilities with Feste’s artificial, or artful, abilities. Later, after Sir 
Toby haphazardly runs through a few lines from “Three merry men be we” and the 
ballad “The Constancy of Susanna,” Andrew similarly contrasts his own singing with 
that of Sir Toby, to whom he attributes a “better grace”: 
FESTE: Beshrew me, the knight’s in admirable fooling. 
SIR ANDREW: Ay, he does well enough if he be disposed, and so do I too. 
He does it with a better grace, but I do it more natural. (2.3.68-70) 
 
Following Feste’s compliment of Toby’s “fooling,” Andrew offers a contrast between 
“grace[ful]” and “natural” performance. His “I do it more natural” functions as a 
taxonomy—if a silly, drunken taxonomy—of fooling.61 If Sir Toby’s song is more artful 
than his, he does not presume to put either on a plane with Feste’s “mellifluous voice” 
(2.5.47). The perceived division between forms of fooling is sharp. 
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Feste’s own songs, it is clear, are better performed than Andrew’s or Toby’s. 
Even so, Feste’s songs serve as examples of stubbornly non-rational performance. In 
integrating music with the often-repetitive, non-disquisitive lyrics traditional in popular 
song, they introduce a mode of discourse different from the more rational rhythms of 
the play’s dialogue—even its jests. Consider the first two stanzas of Feste’s final song, 
which closes the play: 
FESTE [singing] When that I was and a little tiny boy, 
With hey, ho, the wind and the rain, 
A foolish thing was but a toy, 
For the rain it raineth every day. 
 
But when I came to man’s estate, 
 With hey, ho, the wind and the rain, 
’Gainst knaves and thieves men shut their gate, 
 For the rain it raineth every day. (5.1.376–383) 
 
The second and fourth lines—“With hey, ho, the wind and the rain” and “For the rain it 
raineth every day”—are repeated with little variation in each stanza.62 Falling between 
the smooth continuity proffered by rhymed narrative lines, they disrupt the prosodic 
sound and the narrative sense of the verse. When Feste sings this song, then, he breaks 
up his narrative with strategically repetitive, non-rational interjections. Disruptive 
though they are, these interjections also add stasis to offset the forward pulse of the 
narrative first and third lines: the repeated disruptions ground both singer and listeners 
in the drumming constancy of the “rain [that] raineth every day.” 
The second line (“With hey, ho, the wind and the rain”) is itself punctured by the 
adamantly non-signifying “hey, ho” that is characteristic of many English folk songs. 
The utter banality of the phrase obscures both its unavailability to rational, non-musical 
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discourse and the de-rationalizing work it performs in its native, sung environs: it 
resists logical parsing. Similarly, the fourth line (“For the rain it raineth every day”) 
refuses to be bundled up into neatly rational syntax. Its conjunctive opening word, 
“for,” gestures toward an explication of causality that is nowhere to be found: there is 
nothing the “for” is for. The repetition, the disruptions, and the toggling back and forth 
between narrative and static time seldom, if ever, appear in early modern dramatic 
prose or verse, yet in song they are sufficiently hum-drum to elicit little notice. Only in 
song is such non-rationality the norm. 
In following his verbal performances of wit by singing such non-signifying 
words, Feste is playfully conflating the categories of “artificial” and “natural” fooling. 
His song leaves open the question of whether the singer is employing artifice or 
unthinkingly following the contours of any number of popular songs that might be 
performed “for a groat.” By smudging the lines between these kinds of fooling via the 
genres most insistently associated with fools—words and song—he shows how both 
kinds of fooling reside outside the demesne of early modern ideals of rational thought. 
When he performs his final song—both recalling for the audience the songs that have 
come before and breaking the fictive bounds of the play to solicit the playgoers’ 
approval (“we’ll strive to please you every day”)—he draws the play’s audience itself 
into the forms of aesthetic commerce that reinforce unmarked positions of power. His 
song now supplicates, not a gentleman character’s bounty, but our own. 
It would be all too easy to celebrate Feste as a paragon of wit, as his longstanding 
association in the critical literature with Robert Armin’s “artificial” fooling attests. It is 
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true that Feste’s own verbal witticisms and, particularly, his songs put into practice an 
aesthetic that valorizes novelty, pleasure, and freedom from the strictures of rationality. 
And, certainly, to celebrate Feste in this manner would hardly be out of keeping with 
his consummately virtuoso performances of wit. Nonetheless, to focus solely on this 
aspect of Feste’s fooling would be to miss the ways in which Feste’s fooling calls into 
question the celebration of cognitive ability in both early modern dramatic and later 
literary-critical contexts—and it would be to miss the ways in which “natural” fools like 
Sir Andrew are never marked for laudatory comment at all. By blurring the categorical 
boundary lines between natural and artificial fooling, ability and disability, truth and 
falsehood, rationality and irrationality, Feste’s performances of verbal wit and songs 
locate meaning in the non-rational, resistant expressions of the characters who wear 
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Conclusion 
This project’s consideration of premodern English literature of fools and fooling 
uncovers that literature’s deep engagement with the period’s theories of cognitive 
alterity. In contrast with previous scholarship’s emphasis on the traditional 
Shakespearean-Erasmian trope of the “wise fool,” this study shows how the full corpus 
of premodern fool literature represents the fool’s wits as both hyper-able and 
disabled—sometimes alternately, sometimes at the same time. This study uses 
theoretical insights and models from disability studies to uncover how often premodern 
literature emphasizes that fools’ hyper-able and disabled wits produce socially disabling 
performances of wordplay and song; fools’ wits are portrayed not merely as a 
celebrated cognitive faculty, but also as a vexatious and disruptive force. 
Premodern literary representations of fools have more far-reaching ambitions 
than the isolated examination of fools and their wits. In my reading of the Tale of Beryn, 
the fool’s hyper-able powers of language and wit force his audience to re-conceive their 
own lack of epistemological insights as a form of widespread cognitive disability.1 This 
reading contravenes both Geffrey’s audience’s expectations and modern scholars’ 
tendency to read literary representations of disability as portraits of individuals’ 
differences against the backdrop of a societal norm. The other witty fool in this project, 
Twelfth Night’s Feste, performs similar verbal feats, but he sings and jests against the 
backdrop of late-sixteenth-century handbooks that read his songs and his social 
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position as the inverse of their masculine ideals. His songs and verbal sparring win over 
audiences, as they have done for centuries, despite the disdain for fools’ cognitive 
alterity in circulation in Shakespeare’s day. 
In contrast to Geffrey and Feste, the two less able fools in this project—the 
eponymous Robert of Cisyle and Moros in The Longer Thou Livest the More Fool Thou 
Art—exhibit the failures in cognition and moral judgment that are common to the anti-
fool strain in premodern English literature. Yet specific concerns about what the fool’s 
cognitive and moral failure entails differ in each of these texts. The medieval romance, 
Robert of Cisyle, evinces a keen anxiety about what may happen if a king turns fool and 
endangers the institution of monarchy and, by extension, the body politic itself. 
Accordingly, the poem devotes nearly its entire length to telling its readers, not why 
Robert is foolish, but that he merits punishment and how this punishment’s restorative 
intentions are entirely, conclusively efficacious. The Longer Thou Livest, on the other 
hand, concerns itself not in the slightest with the potential failure of institutions; rather, 
it turns a sharp focus on how, through the fool’s persistent rejection of education and 
embrace of folly, language itself may fail. 
The concerns of these four texts which this project touches are not singular in 
premodern English fool literature, nor does the conclusion of my study indicate their 
terminus ad quem. Rather, thematic analogues abound throughout medieval and early 
modern England. To take only one example, each of the aspects of folly I investigate in 
these four chapters is taken up in King Lear. This project’s introduction has already 
noted the play’s concern with the physical embodiment of cognitive faculties, especially 
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in their decline. This interest abuts the Tale of Beryn’s investment in the topos of the five 
wits: when Edgar, disguised as Poor Tom, meets the deranged Lear railing in the storm, 
Edgar cries, “Bless thy five wits!” (3.6.14). It is both an allusion to the window-like 
faculties that both guard from and admit peril and, as in Twelfth Night, another 
Shakespearean juxtaposition of the problems of madness, folly, and mutability of wit. 
Edgar, perhaps Shakespeare’s most overt performer of cognitive alterity, follows this 
remark by uttering doggerel accompanied by the kind of nonsensical, quasi-solfège 
syllables that characterize Moros’ ineffectual attempts at song: “Do, de, de, de. Sese!” 
(First Folio, 3.6.29). The Quarto substitutes for these lines “Loudla, doodla,” suggesting 
that what matters about the words of Edgar-as-Poor-Tom is not their precise phonemic 
content, but their disruptive non-rationality (Scene 13, l. 64). 
And, as scholars of Robert of Cisyle have long noted, there is no text more 
obsessively occupied than King Lear with the implications of the turning of a king’s wits 
to folly. A brief moment that illustrates the finesse with which Shakespeare and his 
collaborators re-oriented their materials toward this theme occurs in Act 3, Scene 2, 
when Lear’s Fool sings the song that Feste uses to close Twelfth Night. Feste sings: 
“When that I was and a little tiny boy, / With hey, ho, the wind and the rain, / A 
foolish thing was but a toy, / For the rain it raineth every day” (5.1.376–9). Chapter 4 of 
this project has already argued for the stubborn non-rationality of this song, taken in its 
entirety. To the extent that the song does hint at a narrative arc, it alludes to the coming-
of-age theme that pervades so much fool literature: the next line is “But when I came to 
man’s estate” (5.1.380). Toward the end of Act 3, Scene 2 of King Lear, following Lear’s 
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raging against the storm and, finally, his admision that his “wits begin to turn,” Lear’s 
Fool introduces Feste’s song, but with telling variation: 
He that has and a little tiny wit, 
With heigh-ho, the wind and the rain, 
Must make content with his fortunes fit, 
Though the rain it raineth every day. (First Folio, 3.2.73–6) 
 
Lear’s Fool eradicates the stubborn non-rationality of Feste’s song and, instead, turns it 
into a pointed commentary on the diminished fortunes of his monarch and the 
concessions demanded of one who lacks an adequately able wit. With the merest 
change of word, he transforms Feste’s breezy line—“For the rain it raineth every day”—
into “Though the rain it raineth every day,” an unsentimental note of resignation to the 
condition of the king whose wits leave him seeking shelter in a hovel, and leave the 
fortunes of the “gored state” in other hands (5.3.295). 
At the outset of this project, I set aside the now-traditional reading of the 
Shakespearean-Erasmian “wise fool” who possesses peculiar insight. It may be that my 
culminating gesture toward Lear’s Fool seems to reinstate the keen insight of that most 
famous of fools. If it indeed does so, it is with the hope that readers of this study will 
see how uneasily premodern fool texts like King Lear ruminate on the many forms and 
faces of cognitive alterity and how persistently they question societal valuations of 
relativized cognition. These texts, moreover, ceaselessly enjoin audiences to encounter, 
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finally, not a model of cognition, not a symptom or diagnosis of cognitive lack—but a 
particular wit with a particular body, features, verbal habits, abilities, and loyalties. 
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1 Readers might debate whether the Beryn-poet has successfully conveyed Geffrey’s 
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